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FACTS AND MORALS IN THE ARMS DEBATE

By ROBERT A. LEVINE

I. Introduction

OF the several public dialogues currently being carried on in the United States, the controversy over military strength and disarmament may be both the most important and the most confusing. Its importance is obvious; it is an interesting commentary on the vital nature of armament-disarmament policy that the literature in the field is burgeoning almost as fast as the literature about the Civil War on its 100th anniversary. But, if the importance is obvious, the confusion is becoming equally so.

It would appear that there is a wall of language between those who speak of armament and those who speak of disarmament. On the rare occasions when a two-sided debate can be arranged, it frequently turns out that each side utters slogans to some vast unknown audience and does not speak at all to its opponents' arguments. The phrase "a dialogue of the deaf" sometimes seems an entirely appropriate description of the discussions between the proponents of more or less armament and the proponents of more or less disarmament. And with the debaters talking past one another, the uncommitted listener in the audience can be completely confused as to just what *is* going on.

One paradox is that some of the points about which the battle rages most fiercely are not really at issue, while there is deceptive harmony on other matters where the disputants are actually not in agreement at all. For example, will the next war exterminate humanity as in the novel and movie of a few years ago, *On the Beach*? This appears to be a major unanswered question, yet few experts consider this catastrophe a real possibility. Should the United States agree to disarmament steps with absolute guarantees of Communist compliance? Enforced disarmament may appear to be an almost unanimously supported aim of national policy, yet some extremely rational and moral people have severe doubts about the matter. Should we regard as mere mugwumps those politicians who stand firmly in favor of both more armament and disarmament? No, because the positions are not necessarily as far apart as the heat generated in the argument would make them appear. Indeed, sometimes it seems that beneath the verbiage there is no policy difference at all between the two sides. Most (but not all) of

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those concerned with military strength would agree, even enthusiastically, that disarmament with proper controls is a desirable aim for national policy. Most (but not all) of those concerned with disarmament would agree that substantial controls are needed. The debate thus takes on subtlety. The issue is not: Should we arm or should we disarm? Rather it involves such questions as: How much control with how much disarmament? Should we increase our armament while negotiating for disarmament? Which is more urgent? Within the mainstream of the debate, there do not exist two clearcut schools of thought on such issues. Rather there are gradations of opinion, shading into one another. This article refers throughout to an "armament" side and a "disarmament" side. But it should be borne in mind that this is an oversimplification in regard to the more interesting and important participants in the discussion—that there are no clearly separable sides, but merely varying blends of opinion.

Indeed, the real world is complicated enough so that even this description of the oversimplification is in itself an oversimplification. There are some viewpoints that do not blend well with the others and these must be discussed in different terms from those used here. Both the Communists on the left, and the right-wing radicals who swing so far around the full circle of opinion as to join the left-wing totalitarians in a search for simple and final solutions to complex problems, are outside our frame of reference. In addition, many much more sincere proponents of unilateral disarmament, such as some members of the Society of Friends who quite explicitly arrive at their viewpoints through reasoning plus "acts of faith," may feel themselves outside of this discussion. Certainly the Friends' argument is a moving one:

> We have tried to face the hard facts; to put the case for non-violence in terms of common sense. Yet, we are aware that the man who chooses in these terms alone cannot sustain himself against the mass pressures of an age of violence. If truth ever reaches power, if ever it speaks to the individual citizen, it will not be the argument that convinces. Rather it will be his own inner sense of integrity that impels him to say, "Here I stand. Regardless of relevance or consequence, I can do no other."
>
> This is not "reasonable": the politics of eternity is not rule by reason alone, but by reason ennobled by right.[1]

Yet it has not influenced many American decision-makers, and the effects on national policy of the Friends and similar groups have been

[1] American Friends Service Committee, *Speak Truth to Power*, Philadelphia, 1955, p. 68.

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achieved much more through reasoned arguments of the type that are discussed below than through faith, however deep. This article discusses the reasoning behind different points of view on policy as this reasoning proceeds from the value systems of the holders of these viewpoints. The range of value systems considered is quite wide, but the gradations of opinion discussed here share the common characteristic that they are not held "regardless of relevance or consequence."

Subtle issues and blending viewpoints, however, do not make the differences of opinion any less real. The question to be looked at is: Which are the true, which the illusory issues? In short, what *is* the debate all about?

Perhaps the basic reason for the confusion is that many of the opposing arguments appear to be contradictory but actually are irrelevant to one another. The debate often seems to be one of morality (disarmament) versus reality (strength), but morality and reality are not opposites. In fact, both sides stay close to reality, except perhaps for purposes of rhetoric; and both sides possess moral-value systems, albeit slightly different ones, but it is not always easy to see them through the word-barrage. This apparent dichotomy between morality and reality makes it easy to choose sides. "Are you an idealist or a realist?" But it does not clarify anything. Consider the following two statements.

The first is from Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War*, simultaneously the most praised and the most criticized book in the field. Kahn believes: "We must still be able to fight and survive wars just as long as it is possible to have such a capability. Not only is it prudent to take out insurance against a war occurring unintentionally, but we must also be able to stand up to the threat of fighting or, credibly, to threaten to initiate a war ourselves—unpleasant though this sounds and is. We must at least make it risky for the enemy to force us into situations in which we must choose between fighting and appeasing. We must have an 'alternative to peace,' so long as there is no world government and it is technologically and economically possible to have such an alternative. This 'alternative to peace' must include a general war capability as well as a limited war capability. . . . These remarks will distress all who quite properly view the thought of fighting a war with so much horror they feel uneasy at having even a high-quality deterrent force, much less a credible capability for initiating, fighting, and terminating all kinds of wars. I can sympathize with this attitude. But I believe it borders on the irresponsible."[2]

[2] Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, Princeton, N.J., 1960, pp. 559-60.

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The other statement is from what is probably the most highly critical review of the book, by James Newman, in the *Scientific American*: "This is a moral tract on mass murder: how to plan it, how to commit it, how to get away with it, how to justify it. . . . Herman Kahn, we are told, 'is one of the very few who have managed to avoid the "mental block" so characteristic of writers on nuclear warfare.' The mental block consists, if I am not mistaken, of a scruple for life."[3]

Most people can choose readily between the two points of view. Do you take Kahn's "realistic" position that it is close to irresponsible to exclude the initiating and fighting of a war from the list of acceptable alternatives, or do you subscribe to Newman's "moral" position that the willingness to think coolly about thermonuclear war is in itself the highest immorality? Actually, this "realism" on the one side and "moralism" on the other do not necessarily conflict, although there are obviously some differences of opinion between Kahn and Newman. Realism and moralism are not logical opposites; and the differences between Kahn and Newman are not based on such an opposition of "reality" to "moral principles." Kahn knows he is a responsible analyst, and he implies that it is irresponsible for a person to abhor war so deeply that he will prefer any other alternative to any risk of war. Newman is profoundly troubled by the possibility of thermonuclear war and he feels that anybody who is willing to look such war in the face and explore its implications unemotionally is necessarily immoral.

But, in fact, Newman is not necessarily unrealistic, nor is Kahn necessarily immoral or even amoral. Kahn is too pat when he dismisses as unrealistic those who are unwilling to consider the alternative of war. It is perfectly possible to face up to hard facts squarely, as Kahn does, and still reject war as being worse than any other disaster. As a matter of fact, as I will try to show, the factual assessments of many people on both sides are not very different. The disarmament advocates do not stress their agreement with certain of the facts put forward by the other side—perhaps because they feel that the facts themselves are slightly immoral—but nonetheless they agree.

Similarly, Newman is wrong when he states that the lack of a "mental block" on the subject of war is immoral. A man can boast a highly idealistic system of values—one that emphasizes life, liberty, justice, and all the rest of the things Newman presumably values highly—and still accept some chance of nuclear war as preferable to some other alternatives. Preservation of life is not the only moral virtue, as

[3] James R. Newman, "Two Discussions of Thermonuclear War," *Scientific American*, CCIV (March 1961), pp. 197-200.

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such persons as Patrick Henry have pointed out. In a more current context, the advocates of armament and deterrence do not always like to admit to their morality, perhaps from a feeling that doing so might smack of unmanliness among hard-headed men, but in fact they have strong moral-value systems, although not precisely the same one as Newman.

Indeed, the discovery that neither side has a monopoly on either rationality or morality is the first step in the attempt to find out what the arms debate is and is not about. Every serious participant in the debate possesses three things:

(1) A view of certain physical facts, such as the effects of radiation, the possibilities of sheltering, and so forth.

(2) An analysis of the probability of certain future situations, given various possible present policies—for example, the probability of a war starting from deliberate enemy surprise attack, the probability of a war starting by accident, the probability of the Soviets' taking over Berlin if we prove weak.

(3) A system of moral-value judgments with which to weigh subjectively the possible outcomes of United States policy. The relative values placed on the avoidance of nuclear war and the avoidance of a Soviet takeover in West Europe might be an example here. This differs from an individual's "objective" assessment of how one policy or another may affect the relative probability of war or Communist hegemony; here, his concern is to ask himself which possibility he would care about more if they were equally likely alternatives, and how much more.

The first two items constitute the individual's view of reality; the third is his system of morality. Although the boundary lines between the categories are blurred, they are separable, and each serious debater possesses all three—a view of the facts, a guess at the probabilities, and a set of values. The idea that the armament advocates, the "realists," have in some sense "more" of (1) and (2) and "not enough" of (3)—in other words, that they are realistic but immoral—is nonsense. So is the idea that the disarmament men, the "moralists," are deficient in (1) and (2) and are therefore unrealistic. The "great debate" is not over the quantity of realism or morality on each side. It is about the content of the three categories—the facts and probabilities as seen by each side, and the values of each side.

And the case argued here is that, while most of the noise in the debate has been over the facts, the basic issue between the debaters is not one of facts, but one of values. "Give me liberty or give me death" is not

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absolute. The question of personal and public morality that really underlies the great debate is, "What risk of death for what hope of liberty?"

II. The Facts

It has been stated that the objective facts often seem to be most in dispute. Even the physical effects of nuclear war and of peacetime nuclear explosions appear to be in doubt and subject to legitimate debate. But when the chips are down, it almost always appears that both sides are in agreement about the hard, physical, objective facts. Values differ and, partially because they do, analyses of future probabilities differ, but the facts seem to be generally agreed upon—and, as might be expected, the facts are usually those supplied by the "realists." Both because the armament advocates tend to start their reasoning by looking at the facts and because, institutionally, they generally work for government agencies where they have first access to these facts, the "realists" start out ahead on this score.

Observe the long-standing issue of a nuclear test ban, involving two types of seemingly controversial facts. The first type of fact constitutes one of the major initial impulses for banning nuclear tests: the question of peacetime fallout and radiation levels. In spite of the controversy that has raged over these questions and in spite of the continuing doubts over precise numerical effects on world population, present and future, there really is substantial agreement here. The reason for the controversy has been summed up in Congressional testimony by Warren Weaver, Chairman of the Committee on Genetic Effects of Atomic Radiation of the National Academy of Sciences:

> I think all of us ordinary individuals are confused by the geneticists disagreeing. They are supposed to be the experts in this matter, and if they disagree, what are we to conclude?
>
> Well, a good deal of their disagreement results from . . . the paradox of numbers and the paradox of time, whether you are influenced by a very small ratio or whether you are influenced by an absolute amount of harm, whether you are concerned with your immediate children or whether you are concerned with the long generations.[4]

There is a consensus on the facts—that peacetime nuclear testing in the atmosphere is likely to cause deaths and other personal disasters in both present and future generations which will be large in absolute numbers, but small relative to the present and future base populations under con-

[4] Warren Weaver, Testimony recorded in Senate of the United States, *Control and Reduction of Armaments*, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Par. 12, January 16-17, 1957, p. 1145.

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sideration. Non-atmospheric testing is not likely to cause any adverse biological effects. There is plenty of legitimate disagreement over the moral significance of the atmospheric tests, but little as to the facts.

The other type of hard fact involved in the nuclear test ban relates to the detectability of underground nuclear explosions. The disarmament men have been unhappy because, when test ban negotiations began to appear more encouraging in 1959, the United States came up with new estimates on the detectability of "decoupled" underground nuclear explosions, and on the number and detectability of small earthquakes, that set the negotiations back a year or more. On the political level, there was a good deal of dissatisfaction with the way the new estimates were disclosed. Nobody, however, has challenged the scientific validity of the newly discovered data, or the fact that, even before the introduction of the new data, the Soviet Union had not yet agreed to an effective control system. Again, the argument continued, legitimately, over the significance of the facts, but the facts themselves were agreed upon by both sides.

Much more important and potentially much more controversial than the facts regarding a test ban, however, are the physical facts of the results of a nuclear war. Here the substantive agreement between the "experts" on both sides of the armament-disarmament issue has been obscured by such highly charged documents as *On the Beach*, which is not expert from a technological point of view, although it may be an expert piece of propaganda. Even here, however, the consensus exists.

Look first at the results of a nuclear war in which no protective measures—no civil defense measures—are attempted. The facts here are extremely dark—in the United States a very large number of us would be dead—but almost all of the experts agree that some millions of human beings in this country and presumably more elsewhere would survive. Meager survival and widespread horrible death is not a consummation devoutly to be wished, but it is, literally, infinitely different from the complete elimination of mankind depicted in *On the Beach*. It is the difference between a future and no future. The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, summarizing hearings in which the participants, like the Committee itself, tended strongly to favor the armament side of the controversy, asserted that an attack involving 1,446 megatons of nuclear weapons dropped on the United States "would have cost the lives of approximately 50 million Americans with some 20 million others sustaining serious injuries."[5] This should be

[5] Congress of the United States, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War*, Summary-Analysis of Hearings, June 22-26, 1959 (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., August 1959), p. 5.

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compared with the statement of Linus Pauling, the chief scientific advocate of disarmament in this country, regarding an attack involving 2,500 megatons dropped on the United States, "I conclude that, in contemplating a possible nuclear war, we should estimate that between one-half and three-quarters of the people in the United States would be dead at the end of sixty days."[6] That is, Pauling estimates a number of deaths from 75 per cent to 150 per cent larger than the Congressional one for an attack about 75 per cent larger. Thus there is some difference in the figures cited by the advocates of the two sides, but in gross terms of death and survival both sides agree, first, that attacks of this size with no civilian protection will kill fantastic numbers of people but that, second, the human race as such would survive. So far as larger attacks go, fewer serious estimates have been made, but Ralph Lapp, not an advocate of either side, cites estimates that "in a nation such as the United States, an attack with 10,000 megatons of high-yield fission weapons would kill approximately 80 per cent of the population (if unsheltered) within 60 days. A 20,000-megaton attack would kill 95 per cent; in other words, it would virtually saturate the nation with lethal fallout. Because of its larger land areas, the U.S.S.R. would not saturate quite as quickly, but a 10,000-megaton attack would mean about 75 per cent mortality, and a 20,000-megaton attack would raise this figure to roughly 90 per cent."[7] This adds up to a much more horrendous picture than the smaller attack and gives one little more reason to look complacently on nuclear war than does the prospect of outright annihilation; but it is still not *On the Beach*, not even for the countries under direct attack, let alone Australia.

Furthermore, Dr. Lapp's parenthetical phrase, "if unsheltered," leads to consideration of the effects of nuclear war *with* civil defense. Civil defense is so controversial a policy issue in the debate that, on the face of it, the facts themselves appear in question. But as in the case of nuclear war with no civil defense, it turns out that the facts are in general agreed on and the dispute revolves around which facts to stress. Governor Robert Meyner of New Jersey was quoted by the *New York Times* as telling the California Legislature in an anti-civil-defense speech, "If a city like San Francisco or Newark or Los Angeles or Trenton were to be hit by a few megaton bombs, everything in the civil defense handbook would go out the window."[8] But Rogers Cannell of the Stanford Research Institute has stated: "Calculations for many possible attacks

[6] Linus Pauling, *No More War!*, New York, 1958, p. 141.
[7] Ralph E. Lapp, "Nuclear War," in John M. Fowler, ed., *Fallout*, New York, 1960, p. 172.
[8] *New York Times*, March 20, 1960, p. 51.

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show that over one-half of the United States population would survive if they had fallout shelter, yet would die without it. . . . Blast shelter would reduce the fatal area of destruction for one weapon to 1/200th of the area when shelters are lacking. Studies of many possible attacks indicate that a program providing good blast shelters in urban areas plus fallout shelters in the rest of the nation could hold total casualties to less than 10 per cent of the population."[9] The Meyner and the Cannell statements appear to differ on the facts, but in actuality they do not. Cannell does not claim that either the city of San Francisco or the people sitting in shelters at ground zero can be saved. Nor does he state that shelters are equally efficient against all thermonuclear attacks. He does state that proper measures could save many millions of lives—lives of people who would be within an aboveground blast area outside of the much smaller area of shelter destruction; lives of people who are outside of any blast area but are subject to radiation death unless protected from fallout. Statements of this nature on how many can be saved are not in factual opposition to statements like Meyner's on how many cannot. The difference lies mainly in the emphasis.

In the case of nuclear war with civil defense, then, as in the no-defense case, there is little real disagreement over the hard physical facts as to what can be salvaged. The disarmament advocates do not oppose civil defense measures because they refuse to face facts or because they are callous about the saving of lives. Rather, their opposition rests on questions of relative values, and values are not arguable in the same sense as facts and interpretations of acts. Part of the argument is given by John M. Fowler, a middle-of-the-road disarmament advocate: "A shelter program would be costly: estimates at the hearings were from 5 to 20 billions of dollars. Although it is true that shelters would have some influence in deterring an attack, to most people it will seem foolish to spend billions of dollars to bury the nation underground when it so desperately needs schools and teachers, highways, adequate health programs, etc. To a half-starved world it would be another example of our self-centered approach to world problems. I would prefer to see the time, energy, and money spent on purposes more productive than civil defense."[10]

One can disagree with this statement but he cannot argue with it. *De gustibus non est disputandum.* But the cost argument is only the lesser portion of the real objections to civil defense. On an even more

[9] Rogers Cannell, "The Active Role of Passive Defense," *SRI Journal,* III (Fourth Quarter, 1959), p. 182.

[10] John M. Fowler, "National Survival," in *Fallout, op.cit.,* p. 185.

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important matter, the facts are agreed to but the values are not. According to Congressman Chet Holifield (D., California), Chairman of a special subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy:

> A further consideration of utmost importance goes to the role of civil-defense preparedness in strategic planning and cold-war diplomacy. What part does civil defense have in our general thesis of massive retaliation as a deterrent to war?
>
> We must consider the possibility of extremely provocative action against us or our allies—but not direct attack on the United States—by the Soviet Union. What action would we be prepared to take in that event? If our civil defenses were no stronger than they are today, a decision to launch a massive retaliatory assault against the Soviet Union might result in the loss of 50 million or 100 million American lives in the counterattack, even if our strike forces substantially reduced the Soviet retaliatory capability. (If the Soviet Union should launch the first strike—which is more probable—the number of American casualties might exceed 100 million.) Consequently one must ask whether the United States would ever be willing to carry out its massive retaliation doctrine in any situation short of a direct massive assault against the American homeland.[11]

The disarmament people would willingly subscribe to the factual content of this statement. It is precisely the thought that there might be some conditions under which the United States would launch a massive retaliation against something "short of a direct massive assault against the American homeland" that keeps them awake at night. Under their values there is considerable doubt about launching a U.S. attack even as retaliation against a Soviet strike at the United States, let alone in the lesser situation. Indeed, it was evidently in an attempt to distinguish between these concepts of civil defense as protection and civil defense as a device to enable us to pursue a "stronger" foreign policy that President Kennedy, in asking for support for civil defense in May 1961, said:

> This Administration has been looking hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. . . . It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be foolproof against surprise attack, or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack.
>
> . . . the history of this planet, and particularly the history of the twentieth century, is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war, or a war of escalation in which the stakes by each side gradually increase to the point of maximum danger which cannot be either foreseen or deterred.
>
> It is on this basis that civil defense can be readily justifiable as insurance for the civilian population, in case of an enemy miscalculation. It is in-

[11] Chet Holifield, "Civil Defense," in *ibid.*, p. 130.

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surance we trust will never be needed; but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.[12]

The President seemed unwilling, at least at that stage, to use civil defense explicitly as a weapon, as Congressman Holifield might. But this difference is not over factual matters.

Thus, on the hard facts of the terrors of nuclear war there is little true disagreement between the partisans of arms and of disarmament. Before leaving this area of relative agreement, however, one further point should be made. If nuclear war is the Scylla of national policy, communism is generally agreed to be the Charybdis. And there is as little disagreement over the facts of life under communism as on the facts of death in nuclear war. Both sides agree that life under Soviet domination would be extremely unpleasant for us or for any other Western people. Both sides agree that life under communism is extremely unpleasant for the Poles and the Hungarians. Those few of the debaters who believe the Communist way of life to be preferable have concealed themselves carefully and do not enter significantly into the discussion. Once again, the facts of the present are not in dispute. But the values, such as the relative unpleasantness of communism and radiation, are in dispute, and the probabilities and possibilities, the predictions of the future consequences of present United States policies, are in dispute.

III. The Probabilities

General agreement on the facts has been shown above, and the general disagreements on values are pinpointed below. But the beliefs of the two sides about the probabilities—the events that may occur in the future if we undertake specified policies in the present—occupy some sort of halfway status. There is consensus on the *possible* consequences of present policies and, by and large, on which probabilities are significant. The severe disagreements arise over the relative probabilities—which ones are most significant. For example, both sides agree that under a "strong" military policy, accidental war is a possibility; they also agree that under a policy that unilaterally weakens United States defenses Soviet domination is a serious possibility. But is an accidental war under a strong military posture more likely than deliberate Soviet aggression under a weak American posture? Would a weak posture be more likely to lead to peace plus "justice," to peace plus Russian domination, or to war? On questions of this nature, there

[12] Quoted in *New York Times*, May 26, 1961, p. 12.

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is no consensus whatever. It is difficult and perhaps impossible to say with assurance that one future event is twice as probable or half as probable as another. At least, it is just as easy to make out a case either way. There is room for the comments of experts here, but even the experts must be listened to cautiously because they tend to dwell overmuch on the dangers and advantages in their own fields. Military specialists might argue that, without the American nuclear deterrent, the Communists would take over Japan. But political specialists might point out that Japanese distaste for our nuclear deterrent and our expenditure of money on military rather than economic aid could drive Japan toward communism. What it comes to is that differing estimates of probability seem to be based finally on differing values.

To illustrate some of these differing estimates of probabilities, consider the chances of a nuclear war starting between the United States and Russia. While there are many possible short- and long-run causes of a nuclear war, there are at least four basic ways in which one might start: (1) it might be started deliberately by the Soviets; (2) it might be started deliberately by the United States; (3) it might be started accidentally by either side, or both; and (4) it might build up from tit-for-tat blows in a smaller war—the so-called "escalator" effect. The two sides in the armament-disarmament debate would differ on the relative probabilities of these four occurrences, but both would agree that some significant probability exists of a war starting in any one of these ways.

For purposes of policy discussion, these four possible causes of general war fall into two sets. The first pairs a war deliberately started by the Soviets with an accidental nuclear war started either by extreme miscalculation, by misinterpretation of a nuclear accident, or by some military person who has gone out of his mind. Both the advocates of arms and of disarmament would agree to both possibilities in this pair, but since the armament party fears Soviet attack much more than it fears accidental war, it urges a policy—deterrence—that would minimize the danger of this attack even at the cost of increasing the probability of accident. The disarmament party, while recognizing the possibility of Soviet attack, fears accidental war much more. And from this division over relative probabilities come disagreements over policy. To take one example, consider airborne alert: the Strategic Air Command, fearing that its bomber force might be caught on the ground by a deliberate Soviet surprise attack, and confident that its men cannot start a war accidentally, has proposed that some portion of the force be kept in the air, equipped with nuclear weapons, at all times. To which Norman

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Cousins retorts: "The practical effect of such a move, however, could be exactly the opposite of the one intended. First, the fact of hundreds of jet planes in the air will lead to even more extreme counter measures. . . . Each side, meanwhile, has to reckon with the risk that a pilot or submarine commander may go berserk and make the decision that would start the full chain reaction. The possibility of an accident or a miscalculation grows in direct proportion to the distribution of the power and the means of instant use."[13]

SAC fears the start of a nuclear war with a surprise attack catching our forces on the ground. Cousins fears that the proposed countermeasure is more likely to cause war than to prevent it. Neither side can prove its case as to relative probabilities in any objective sense, but only one side can be right. An airborne alert either increases the net probability of nuclear war or decreases it; it cannot do both. An individual will try to base his stand on his personal view of the objective probabilities; but, again, his view is necessarily colored by his value judgments. Indeed, this division between fear of Soviet attack and fear of accidental war is one of the major overall differences between the advocates of deterrence and of disarmament. Deterrence and disarmament are not opposing goals of the two groups, but they are different (although not as different as it might appear) roads to the same goal—avoiding war. Which road one chooses depends on one's analysis of the relative probabilities of the two types of war and ultimately on one's value system.

The other pair of causes of a nuclear war between this country and the Soviet Union brings together the possibility of the "escalator" effect —a large war gradually building up from a smaller war in a third area —and a deliberate United States attack on Russia as the American answer to Russian aggression elsewhere—the so-called "massive retaliation" policy. Here again, both sides would agree that there is a significant chance of a Russian-American war starting either way, but the policy positions of the two parties are affected both by their assessments of the relative likelihood of the two possibilities and their value judgments on related matters.

The armament partisans, although they recognize the possibility of the escalator effect, have some confidence that a limited war can be kept limited. Add to this their strong value judgment against Communist political gains, leading to a belief such as Holifield's that even a direct attack on the Soviet Union should be considered as a means of limiting these gains, and they see the possibility of our starting a nuclear

[13] Norman Cousins, "The Fallacy of the Deterrent," *Saturday Review*, April 16, 1960, p. 28.

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war with the Soviets. As Kahn has put it, "To recognize such possibilities is not to endorse them." But these advocates of armament, while they feel strongly about Communist gains, still wish to reduce the likelihood that our attack will start a general nuclear war; thus one of their chief policy prescriptions is to increase the so-called "conventional" forces of the United States—the forces designed to fight a limited war on a limited basis—in order to remove or at least constrain the temptation to answer limited aggression with massive retaliation. The armament position here sometimes appears confusing. Since limited-war forces are costly, this phase of the discussion obtrudes into the other dialog about arms and the budget, as well as into the great sub-debate over the use of nuclear weapons in limited wars. Nor can interservice rivalries be ignored here; but nonetheless, although the particular size and characteristics of the limited forces are not agreed on by the armament partisans, the need for them is.

The disarmament party, on the other hand, fearing the escalator effect, having a strong value judgment against even limited war, and feeling less strongly the urge to limit Communist aggression, is led to oppose increases in the "conventional" as well as the nuclear arms of the United States, although it is much less immediately concerned with limited than with massive forces. Again, which side one takes depends on a complex of personal judgments and necessarily imprecise analysis. Because of the cross-currents here, the battle lines are not as clear as in some other places.

This discussion of the use of limited-war forces to limit Communist political gains, however, brings us to another set of possible future events. The consideration of the probabilities of the four causes of a Soviet-American war covered only half the picture. If avoiding this war were the only goal of United States policy, the answer would be quite simple. Probably both the armament and disarmament group would agree that the surest way of staying out of war would be for the United States to disarm unilaterally and completely. This would avoid the necessity of any sticky negotiations with Russia; it would make it impossible for us to start a war with the Soviets; and it would make attack by the Soviets extremely unlikely, since they could take what they wanted without war. In fact, unilateral disarmament in this sense[14] is seldom suggested, except by extreme pacifists, because both sides in the debate do value highly at least one other goal of American policy. This goal could be

[14] The unilateral taking of small steps toward disarmament in hope of Soviet reciprocation, as is suggested by Charles Osgood and others, is quite different, although it too is sometimes called "unilateral disarmament."

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labeled "continued freedom for free nations," or it could be called more simply, as it was above, "limitation of Communist political gains." The armament and disarmament sides share this political goal, although they weight it differently relative to the goal of avoiding war with Russia, and its very existence precludes simple solutions like unilateral disarmament.

As with the goal of avoiding war, however, the fact that the two teams of debaters share the goal of avoiding encroachments on the "free world" does not preclude legitimate argument over the assessment of future consequences of present policies. Here again it is possible to pair two types of dangers. The coupling in this case would be between Communist encroachment by aggression and Communist encroachment by persuasion. Both the advocates of arms and of disarmament recognize the possibility of the gaining of anti-American footholds (so-called to avoid the question of what is and what is not Communist) by aggression as was attempted in the Korean War, by persuasion as in Cuba, or by some unspecified combination of the two as in China and Indo-China. But because of their values and predilections, each side stresses one sort of gain much more than it does another.

The armament partisans worry most about Soviet aggression. Kahn, for example, in addition to favoring deterrence of direct Russian attack on the United States, advocates: "... deterrence of extremely provocative behavior. The Soviets now ask themselves if they can force the United States to accept peacefully the consequences of some extremely provocative action (say a large-scale attack on Europe of a Munich-type crisis). ... If the [civil defense] evacuation did not persuade the Soviets to desist, then in the last resort the United States might decide that it was less risky to go to war than to acquiesce."[15] In other words, this school of thought holds that the dangers of aggression by the Soviets are so great that we must, in extreme cases, be prepared even to undertake a nuclear war to stop them. Indeed, some of the armament advocates (though not Kahn) argue that any disarmament step, no matter how well controlled, will leave us open to aggression, overt or covert. Complete disarmament, they feel, would leave us completely open.

But the disarmament partisans argue that Communist seduction is more dangerous than rape. The best way to avoid Communist gains is to avoid policies like Kahn's, which might frighten allies toward neutralism and neutrals toward communism. Dollars should go into

[15] Herman Kahn, Testimony recorded in Congress of the United States, *Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War*, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, June 22-26, 1959, p. 910.

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foreign economic aid and other measures to save people from the blandishments of communism, rather than into civil defense and the other prerequisites for a credible American threat to use nuclear war. To which the armament men would answer that they too favor foreign economic aid; that the answer to the either/or question should be, "Both, with more taxes if necessary"; and that while they recognize the dangers of voluntary moves toward communism, the Sino-Soviet record cannot leave us complacent about aggression. A very important part of the difference here is due to the fact that when the armament men think of Communist gains, they think of Europe, where military defenses would be the preferred tool; while the disarmament people think of Afro-Asia, where economic weapons might be more effective. Once more, the particular mix of aggression and subversion, of defense weaponry and financial assistance, that one visualizes is a function of individual preferences and values.

Before leaving the probable future consequences of present policies, one further controversy should be mentioned. As pointed out earlier, there is very little disagreement over the facts of personal survival in nuclear war and the increased possibilities for such survival if certain civil defense measures are taken. But if survival of people, a matter of "hard" scientific analysis, can be agreed upon, beliefs about survival of a "nation" and "national values" are much more controversial. The armament advocates suggest that, in the event of a nuclear attack on the United States with some previous preparations on our part, and in the event that we did not lose the war, economic recovery should be possible within the lifetime of the survivors. They point to the fact that Russia and Germany, a decade and a half after the destruction of World War II, are much better off than they were before the war. To which the disarmament partisans retort that the next war, even with extensive civil defense preparations, would be much worse than the last and that no generalizations can be drawn. Beyond this, however, the anti-arms party argues that not only thermonuclear war, but even the preparations for such war, will necessarily destroy the system of values the defenses have been set up to protect. According to Erich Fromm:

> It does not take much imagination to visualize that sudden destruction and the threat of slow death to a large part of the American population, or the Russian population, or large parts of the world, will create such a panic, fury, and despair as could only be compared with the mass psychosis resulting from the Black Death in the Middle Ages. The traumatic effects of such a catastrophe would lead us to a new form of primitive barbarism, to the resurgence of the most archaic elements, which are still potentiali-

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ties in every man and of which we have had ample evidence in the terror systems of Hitler and Stalin. It would sound most unlikely to many students of human nature and psychopathology that human beings could cherish freedom, respect for life or love after having witnessed and participated in the unlimited cruelty of man against man which thermonuclear war would mean. It is a psychological fact that acts of brutality have a brutalizing effect on the participants and lead to more brutality.

But What if the Deterrent Works?

What is the likely future of the social character of man in a bilateral or multilateral armed world, where, no matter how complex the problems or how full the satisfactions of any particular society, the biggest and most pervasive reality in any man's life is the poised missile, the humming data processor connected to it, the waiting radiation counters and seismographs, the over-all technocratic perfection (overlying the nagging but impotent fear of its imperfection) of the mechanism of holocaust? To live for any length of time under the constant threat of destruction creates certain psychological effects in most human beings—fright, hostility, callousness, a hardening of the heart, and a resulting indifference to all the values we cherish. Such conditions will transform us into barbarians —though barbarians equipped with the most complicated machines. If we are serious in claiming that our aim is to preserve freedom (that is, to prevent the subordination of the individual under an all-powerful state), we must admit that this freedom will be lost, whether the deterrent works or does not work.[16]

The armament partisans will, of course, admit no such thing. They see no evidence of loss of freedom in the United States under the deterrent policies of the years past, nor do they feel that the construction of elemental civil defenses will brutalize the populace. But they do see quite clearly the destruction of freedom in Hungary, in China, and elsewhere and believe extension of this destruction to be the real danger. Once again, it comes to a question of personal estimates of the probability of institutional survival under the various kinds of disasters possible in a grim age, and of the personal values placed on each of these institutions.

Indeed, what much of the debate finally seems to boil down to is that people have a knack for marshaling impressive rational evidence in support of positions they chose emotionally to begin with. Whatever course of objective analysis leads to a set of relative probabilities for future events, the so-called "objective" probabilities have a way of corresponding suspiciously to purely subjective value judgments as to desirable and undesirable events. It would be unfair to say of any man that

[16] Erich Fromm, "The Case for Unilateral Disarmament," in *Daedalus*, Special Issue on Arms Control, Fall 1960, pp. 1018-19.

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his objective view of probabilities derives primarily from an inflexible set of personal value judgments. It is more likely that the sincere student will be able to conduct a relatively objective analysis, reconsider his set of personal judgments, and discover that he values certain items more highly than he thought. But, at any rate, the individual's view of the probable future and his set of values are inextricably intertwined and both are legitimate subject matter for the arms debate.

IV. The Values

In the final analysis, then, it appears that the arms debate concerns, or should concern, a set of values—a system of morality. While systems of morality are complicated affairs, there are perhaps two over-all kinds of goals for national policy that are relevant to the debate between the armament and the disarmament positions—peace, both for us and the rest of the world, and freedom, both for us and the rest of the world. Neither can be defined simply. Peace can mean the absence of war, the absence of hot war, or the absence of nuclear war, while freedom can include the freedom of Yugoslavia and Spain to pursue their dictatorial ways without outside interference.

But what makes life complicated is that the general goals of both peace and freedom are agreed to by both parties in the arms debate. Because the armament side worries about America's world position, America's commitments, America's alliances—in short, America's ability to protect its own freedom and that of the free world—it does not follow either that it is immoral or that it does not care about peace. The armament advocates care deeply about peace as well as freedom. Because the disarmament side worries about nuclear war, about fallout, about holocaust, it does not follow either that it is unrealistic or that it does not care about freedom. The disarmament advocates care deeply about freedom for the United States and the other countries of the world, although, like Fromm in the quotation above (and like most of the armament advocates, for that matter), they worry about internal erosion as well as external encroachment. People, particularly people of the intellectual caliber of those who have been engaged in the arms debate, are complicated animals and are perfectly capable of holding both peace and freedom as simultaneous goals.

Where the real differences occur is in the relative weighting of these two goals. Compare the following two statements, both by people rather firmly committed to the armament side of the debate.

According to Henry Kissinger: "There is no doubt that the avoidance

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of war must be a primary goal of all responsible statesmen. The desirability of maintaining peace cannot be the subject of either intellectual or partisan political controversy in the free world. The only reasonable issue is how best to achieve this objective. . . . As the risks of war have become more cataclysmic, the result has not been a universal reconciliation but a perpetuation of all disputes. Much as we may deplore it, most major historical changes have been brought about to a greater or lesser degree by the threat or the use of force. Our age faces the paradoxical problem that because the violence of war has grown out of all proportion to the objectives to be achieved, no issue has been resolved. We cannot have war. But we have had to learn painfully that peace is something more than the absence of war."[17]

But, say the Messrs. Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, and Possony: "The priority objective of any American grand strategy is, by a broad margin, the preservation and enhancement of our political system rather than the maintenance of peace. . . . Strategy is inseparable from the willingness to take risks and deny the enemy a guarantee of immunity in case he desists from a particular aggression. If it is our purpose to combat communism, then it follows that our overriding objective is not to preserve peace at all costs, but to destroy the aggressive power of communism. . . . A sense of measure and moderation is the leaven of all constructive undertakings. But without the willingness to use force and without the sacrifice which the use of force as well as the prevention of war entails, no major international crisis has ever been settled short of appeasement or surrender."[18]

The disagreement between the two statements is obvious. Even though Kissinger and the other three have somewhat similar orientations, and even though they all recognize the complexity of the problem, there is an ineradicable difference between the two positions. Neither side holds peace or our political system to be absolute, and both recognize the need for the leaven of moderation. But the value weights given to peace and to freedom by the statement that says, "The violence of war has grown out of all proportion to the objectives to be achieved," differ from those in the statement that "Our overriding objective is not to preserve peace at all costs, but to destroy the aggressive power of communism."

And because neither war nor communism is upon us but rather both are risks for the future, the problem becomes even more difficult. How much risk of war are you willing to take in order to increase your

[17] Henry Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice*, New York, 1960, pp. 169-70.
[18] Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, and Stefan T. Possony, *A Forward Strategy for America*, New York, 1961, pp. 402-4.

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chances for freedom? How much risk of war are you willing to take in order to increase the chances for freedom of a Briton or a Frenchman? How much risk for an Indonesian or a Ghanian? What about a Chinese or a Hungarian? The debate is complicated—it covers different parts of the world, different time periods, different situations; and it is subtle—there are no absolute certainties, only probable gains toward peace or freedom, and probable losses. But, basically, it is a debate over two goals—goals which most Americans hold in common, but to which they assign a wide array of contrasting values. You can stand at one extreme or another, or you can, without being inconsistent, stand somewhere in the middle, but where you stand will depend ultimately on how you weigh these goals—and in the light of the weights, how you assess the probabilities of achieving them.

This is what is behind the arms debate, and it is these values and probabilities that should be the subject matter of the discussion—not the admitted evils of nuclear holocaust or Communist domination.

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THE KHRUSHCHEV SUCCESSION PROBLEM

By MYRON RUSH

IN any personal dictatorship or tyranny, one thing is certain: some day there will be a succession crisis. That dread day casts a long shadow before, influencing the period of dictatorial rule by anticipation. There is inherent in dictatorship a succession cycle: first, a period of stable dictatorial rule; then, a succession crisis; finally, a resolution of the crisis or a dissolution of the political system. Some dictatorial regimes experience a series of personal dictatorships; the Soviet regime, for example, has twice gone through the cycle, and now has its third dictator. This historical experience affects the general character of the entire succession cycle. Serious inquiry into the succession to Khrushchev requires us to consider the *general character* of the succession cycle in the Soviet system as well as the *particular factors* that are likely to influence the course and outcome of the Khrushchev succession crisis.[1]

The grounds for supposing that a serious succession crisis will follow Khrushchev's demise are not simply that crises occurred when Lenin's and Stalin's rule came to an end; it is principally the nature of the Soviet political system that makes such crises inevitable. There are two reasons for this. First, there is no established, recognized center of decision-making in the Soviet system. Second, for this reason, and for others of comparable weight, no orderly method of succession has been or is likely to be devised.

I. Inevitability of the Succession Crisis

To the question of where decisive authority or *internal sovereignty* resides, a formal answer can of course be found in the Party Statute and in the State Constitution. But these documents are not the ultimate

[1] General treatment of the succession problem is uncommon in treatises on the Soviet political system, although the problem is an inherent feature of that system. However, two books published in the months following Stalin's death examined the matter ably and at length on the basis of evidence then available: *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*, by W. W. Rostow, Mentor, 1954; and *Terror and Progress USSR*, by Barrington Moore, Jr., Cambridge, Mass., 1954. The problem of succession in any totalitarian regime is considered by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski in *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1956. Accounts of the two succession crises the Soviet regime has known are numerous. The most detailed study of the Lenin succession crisis is in E. H. Carr's multi-volume *A History of Soviet Russia*, London, 1950. A comprehensive account of the Stalin succession crisis, however, has yet to be written.

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authority in the Soviet system, and their provisions have often been disregarded. Does the supreme authority reside in the government's Council of Ministers or in organs of the party? If the party is sovereign, which of its bodies has the power of decision: the Presidium or the Secretariat? Or is it the Central Committee, which meets briefly every few months, or the Party Congress, which meets every few years? Soviet history gives no single answer; it has been different at different times. The question of supreme authority is the fundamental issue of Soviet politics and has been fought over by its chief figures. Uncertainty as to the decisive authority may ultimately imperil the regime, but only in the absence of an established dictator—that is, during a succession crisis—is the problem acute.

No rule for establishing the legitimacy of a successor is possible in the Soviet system, since dictatorial authority inheres in no office or title. It is unprovided for in the fundamental laws of party and state, which establish *collective* organs of leadership without exception. The crucial question, then, is whether the dictator's fiat, or that of some collective, can effect an orderly transfer of power when there is no rule of legitimacy.

To avert a succession crisis, the dictator must make known his choice of successor and give him the powers he will need to make good his claim at the decisive moment when the dictator can no longer impose his will.[2] Arranging this is an extremely hazardous undertaking. If the dictator delegates wide powers to a lieutenant, he may find it hard to prevent seizure of the remainder. Moreover, once the dictator's choice of a successor is known, his entourage may pay court to the favorite rather than to himself; alternatively, they may concentrate their fire on the presumptive heir, who endangers their present power and threatens to become their next master.

The dictator's dilemma is not without a solution, or at least the promise of one. The power of the presumptive heir can be circumscribed by that of others. Perhaps the chief danger in this arrangement is that the heir may reach an accommodation with some of his rivals. This danger may be reduced, though not eliminated, by concentrating substantial power in the hands of a single rival, thus forming a triad made up of the dictator, his presumptive heir, and the rival, who may be termed the "counterheir."

This is basically the arrangement established by Stalin in his last years. He placed Malenkov in the Secretariat in 1948, making him the

[2] As will be discussed below, orderly transfer of the dictator's power to a collective is a possible, but very doubtful, solution.

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only figure besides himself to sit in the three top councils—Secretariat, Council of Ministers, and Politburo—a fact that seemed to mark Malenkov as Stalin's presumptive successor. A year later Stalin brought Khrushchev from the Ukraine to be a member of the Secretariat, thus establishing a powerful counterweight to Malenkov's extraordinary powers.[3] The triadal arrangement was confirmed at the Nineteenth Congress (1952) when Malenkov gave the Report of the Central Committee and Khrushchev gave the next most important report, one on changes in the Party Statute.

A triad of this type sets the stage for the heir's assumption of power but does not consummate it. It is a convenient transitional arrangement, but it only postpones the ultimate dilemma: either the dictator must finally remove the counterweight and permit the heir to accumulate dangerous powers, or he must continue the triadal arrangement until his death, when the surviving members will confront each other as claimants to the succession. The latter was history's resolution of the dilemma, if not Stalin's, for the dictator failed in his last convulsive efforts to alter his succession arrangements (the "doctors' affair").[4] Within ten days after his death, Malenkov and Khrushchev fought their first battle in a series of encounters that resulted in Khrushchev's establishment as Stalin's successor.

While Stalin evidently failed in his effort to choose a successor, Lenin failed even in his much more limited aim of preventing Stalin from inheriting his power: his call for the removal of Stalin as General Secretary, in the postscript to his "Testament," was disregarded by the Thirteenth Party Congress. Thus the will of neither of the two previous dictators was followed in the situation brought about by his death. Clearly, *designation* is not a principle of legitimacy in the Soviet system, and efforts to establish machinery for ensuring the succession

[3] An important additional counterweight was Stalin's reinforced personal control of the political police.

[4] The "doctors' affair," the arrest of a group of "murderer-doctors" accused of "plotting against the health" of leading Soviet military personnel in January 1953, portended a radical change in the leadership that, if it was not designed to implement Stalin's succession arrangements, could only upset them. Contemporary evidence indicates that Malenkov's political position was actually weakened by the affair. Moreover, following Stalin's death, Malenkov was associated with the execution of the security official, Riumin, who had been charged with investigating the so-called plot. On the other hand, in his secret speech to the Twentieth Congress Khrushchev defended Riumin's chief, S. Ignatiev, who was Minister of State Security when the affair was publicized. Khrushchev's most powerful deputy at the present time, Frol Kozlov, was the only important party leader to write an article expounding the political meaning of the alleged doctors' plot (*Kommunist*, February 1953). There is evidence bearing on the political significance of the "doctors' affair" in the author's book: *The Rise of Khrushchev*, Washington, D.C., 1958, pp. 17, 55, 56, 77.

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of the dictator's chosen heir inevitably encounter serious difficulties. For these reasons it may be questioned whether even a determined and far-seeing dictator could obviate a succession struggle.

Conceivably, election to some special office might be a means of authorizing dictatorial power during a crisis. But which office? Senior Secretary of the Central Committee might seem suitable. But Lenin was never a secretary, and both Stalin and Khrushchev occupied the office of the senior Secretary for several years without being recognized as dictator. Certainly the man who becomes senior Secretary when Khrushchev's rule comes to an end will be favorably placed in the struggle for the succession; his every move will be observed with especial care by all parties. But mere occupancy of the post will not provide him with the authority that is needed to become dictator. Until now, the office of senior Secretary has been far less valuable for the authority it confers than for the opportunity it affords the incumbent to aggrandize power. The next senior Secretary may indeed become dictator; but if he does, the source of his pre-eminent authority will be his successful exercise of the office to win power, not his colleagues' acknowledgment that they must obey him because he occupies the office.

Although no office now exists that confers dictatorial authority, is this lack not remediable? Could the dictator not proclaim, for example, that his present powers inhere jointly in the offices of senior Secretary and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and that when these posts fall vacant the Central Committee is to meet to elect a single successor to both posts? To institutionalize personal dictatorship in this way runs counter to party traditions. But the decisive objection is that this scheme requires the members of the Central Committee (or whatever body might be designated) to give themselves up to a new master of their own choosing at the very time when the dictator's death has provided them with a moment of enhanced power and relative freedom. This does not seem an effective device for averting a succession crisis.

In the USSR, then, the dictator evidently comes to his office by seizure of power, not by an orderly transfer of legitimate authority. I do not see how such great powers can be seized against the certain opposition of rivals without producing a political crisis. Its depth and effects, however, are variable, according to (1) the duration of the struggle, (2) its scope and intensity, and (3) the manner of its resolution.

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II. Character of the Succession Crisis

How long the succession struggle lasts is important chiefly as it affects the struggle's intensity. While a brief crisis can produce a great effect, a prolonged crisis is much more likely to bring about the political activation of potentially powerful forces in Soviet society. Of the two succession crises the regime has known, Lenin's lasted roughly eight years, from his incapacitating illness in 1922 until around 1930, and Stalin's only four years, from 1953 to 1957. In both instances prolongation of the crisis produced a temporary increase in the number and variety of those engaged in higher politics; but such tendencies were halted and then reversed each time by the most powerful contender, after he consolidated his power and thereby resolved the crisis.

At the outset, the succession crisis is largely colored by the personal rivalry of the most ambitious of the former dictator's lieutenants. In their efforts to inherit the dictator's former power, they are compelled to maneuver and compromise. Thus factions, or "fractions," as they are called by Bolsheviks, are formed in the top leadership according to the shifting calculation of personal interest and political principle. Now, such factions also pervade politics under the unchallenged rule of the dictator when their object is to influence the dictator, to share patronage, and to protect their members. In a succession crisis, however, there is no unchallenged authority to arbitrate differences and to limit the scope of factional activity, which becomes greatly intensified and develops according to a new logic.

Factional activity in the USSR is necessarily conducted in a conspiratorial atmosphere, since the Party Statute prohibits "attempts to form factional groupings destructive of Party unity" (Article 27). Yet the dictator ordinarily tolerates factional activity, which is everywhere the stuff of politics, and even fosters it for his own ends. Only if there is special reason will he destroy a faction and punish its chief members.[5] In a succession struggle, however, the stakes of factional activity are far greater than under a dictator. The victor will be a virtual dictator, yet he will feel threatened by the defeated. To consolidate his newly won power, he is likely to condemn his opponents as factionalists and enemies of the party. Thus the contending factions in a succession crisis face severe statutory sanctions. This illegal, conspiratorial quality gives the succession struggle an intensity that makes it extremely difficult to settle by some simple vote among peers.

A faction's strength consists chiefly in its collective control over some

[5] A terrible instance of this is Stalin's blood purge of the Leningrad faction, 1948-1950.

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part of the institutions of dictatorship, which now may serve as levers of power in the succession struggle. What are these crucial political bodies in the Soviet system? They are, first, the party apparatus and, next, the other major institutions: the state bureaucracy, the army, and the political police. Finally, there are subsidiary bodies, sometimes called the party's "transmission belts," which could play an important role in future crises: the trade union association, intellectuals' organizations (such as the Writers' Union), the Young Communist League, and others. Even in the phase of stable dictatorship, these institutions are in a state of considerable tension; in a succession crisis, tension can readily become conflict. The leaders who manipulate these organizations mean to limit this conflict, to keep them mere agencies of dictatorship and passive objects of factional politics; but in such circumstances these bodies readily acquire a life and movement of their own.

There are several ways in which this can come about. For example, a claimant who has lost a battle but remains a contender for the succession may be tempted to seek support within institutions that his opponents control; or he may support the authority and interests of functionaries in institutions that he already controls in order to improve their capacity to serve as instruments in his bid for the succession. In either case, the result may be to make him dependent on groups that formerly were excluded from higher politics. Having become active supporters of his candidacy, they may acquire a voice in the higher politics of the Soviet regime. In this fashion, major institutions may come to be altered and the balance among them upset. If the succession struggle acquires this new dimension, the regime may be modified in important ways.

Finally, if the crisis cannot be resolved within this enlarged arena, a weakened faction may seek to redress the balance by appealing to the passions and interests of broad groups in Soviet society. This adds a further dimension to the struggle and might under certain circumstances seriously weaken the regime.

The decisive question in the succession crisis is the manner of its resolution. More particularly, the position of the party apparatus in the newly stabilized regime provides a rough test of whether the succession crisis has changed the character of the system: if the *apparat* exercises hegemony over the other institutions of dictatorship and over Soviet society, then the regime almost certainly remains totalitarian. The duration, the scope, and the intensity of the succession crisis work their effects on the character of the Soviet regime principally through their influence on this question: if the crisis is brief and easily resolved, the

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party's hegemony seems assured; if it is long and intense, and if important social groups become engaged in the higher politics of the USSR, then the party machine's hegemony may be endangered and its authority might even be overthrown.

Why is the position of the party machine the overriding question in Soviet politics?[6] Chiefly because it is the main source of totalitarianism in the Soviet regime. The party is committed to fashioning Soviet institutions and Soviet man in accordance with an ideal, however undelineated, that permanently threatens the habits and customary practices of the people at large. As custodian of the holy writings of Marx and Lenin, it embodies most of what remains of the revolutionary spirit in the Soviet regime. It is responsible for indoctrinating a population acknowledged to be lacking in enthusiasm for the official ideology. The party sets the goals of economic activity and enforces the system of priorities that assures that industrial and military power increases more rapidly than popular consumption.

The Soviet people accept the regime that governs them, for they see no alternative. But they do not share the party's fundamental goals, which involve the continuing revolutionary transformation of Soviet society, or its ultimate objective, a world-wide Communist system. This gives rise to a certain tension, or "contradiction," between the party machine and the populace. It is a contradiction that even the continuing abatement of the terror of Stalin's time and progressive improvement of the material conditions of life are unlikely to remove.

Reservations of various kinds about the party machine's goals are also evident in the institutions controlled by the party. These reservations seem especially strong among the economic managers in the state bureaucracy. Their primary professional concerns include the obvious functions of production, technology, labor discipline, and finance. In addition, they are deeply engaged in the politics of planning. Though they have conflicting interests, members of the bureaucratic elite also share important goals. One is to reduce the ambitious pace of economic development that strains Soviet resources to the limit. Another is to improve the forms and methods of administration and to establish a more rational price system. Perhaps most important, the economic

[6] The party's apparatus must be distinguished from its membership as a whole. The *apparat* is made up of the party's permanent staff, the paid officials who work in secretariats on all party echelons. Their number has been very roughly estimated as around a quarter-million, no more than 3 or 4 per cent of the total party membership. (Leonard Shapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, 1960, pp. 524-25, 572-73.) Not all members of higher party bodies—the various party committees and their executive organs, the party bureaus—are *apparatchiks*. Many are economic administrators in the state bureaucracy, military officers, or political police officials.

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bureaucracy wants to lessen arbitrary interference by the full-time members of the party machine.

The conflict between the interests and goals of the state bureaucracy and those of the party machine is basic. The state bureaucracy prefers to be governed by fixed rules, to "go through channels"; it opposes intervention from the outside. It favors rationality, efficiency, routine, orderly procedure, a disregard for problems that are not pressing, and a stereotyped solution for problems that cannot be disregarded. Regularity is its watchword. In their personal careers, Soviet bureaucrats, like bureaucrats everywhere, seem to favor stability, security, regular advancement, and greater material rewards.

While the party machine also displays strong bureaucratic tendencies, it has succumbed to them far less. It puts ideology and enthusiasm above rationality and efficiency. Typically, the party apparatus sets new tasks, mobilizes opinion, shifts cadres; it locates difficulties, fixes responsibility for mistakes, and ensures that non-party institutions carry out party orders. Its preferred activity is the "crash" program. By its militant spirit and organization the party made the October Revolution, won the civil war, and carried out Stalin's social revolutions "from above."

The party official and the economic executive are not separate breeds. They are frequently shifted from one bureaucracy to the other, particularly at the lowest and the highest levels. Yet each official in the USSR tends to identify his personal fortunes with the political fortunes of the bureaucracy that largely formed his political ideas, policy preferences, and personal skills. The tendency of Soviet leaders to become specialists in either party work or economic administration has gone sufficiently far for Soviet writers to have thought it necessary on occasion to challenge the notion that party work is a distinct profession. The extent to which the party and government bureaucracies remained separate under Stalin is suggested by the fact that more than half of the leading party officials in his time had never served in a government post.[7]

[7] This can be inferred from the factual findings of T. H. Rigby in "The Selection of Leading Personnel in the Soviet State and Communist Party," a doctoral thesis submitted at the University of London in 1954; see table on p. 184. Of 36 republican party secretaries whose previous careers were known to Rigby, 20 had not held government posts. This was also true in the following cases: 38 of 82 territorial and regional party secretaries; 29 of 43 city party secretaries; 86 of 138 district party secretaries (p. 184). By the same token, as Rigby emphasizes, these figures also show that interchange of personnel between the two bureaucracies was practiced extensively. Significantly, it was easier to rise in the party apparatus without having served in the administrative bureaucracy (more than half the party leaders studied by Rigby had no experience in government) than to rise in the bureaucracy without having served in the *apparat* (only one-third). From this it appears that under Stalin the party apparatus was a surer road to success than the bureaucracy.

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Possessing contrasting traits and performing overlapping functions, the economic and the party bureaucracies have naturally tended to oppose each other. Their conflict over who should direct the economic process and what its fundamental goals should be has long marked Soviet politics and played an important role in the two succession crises experienced by the Soviet regime.

After Lenin's death, it figured in the controversy between Stalin, boss of the party apparatus, and Rykov, head of the government.[8] Stalin's victory in 1930 made the apparatus of full-time party workers the sovereign institution in Soviet society. However, in the great purge of the mid-1930's it was reduced to an instrument of Stalin's absolute rule —though still the pre-eminent one—in an intricate system of institutional balances and controls embracing the party apparatus, the political police, the state bureaucracy, and the army. At Stalin's death, the complex system of institutional checks and balances that had maintained his absolute rule began to break up into its elements. The resulting institutional conflict was intensified as the leaders, in accordance with their personal strategies, recruited these forces for the portentous battles to come. Because these personal strategies illuminate the mechanics of power in a Soviet succession crisis, it is useful to consider them at some length.

III. Conflict of Institutions and Policies in the Stalin Succession Crisis

After Stalin died, Malenkov staked his bid for power largely on the state bureaucracy. His strategy evidently was based on the notion that the party apparatus, and particularly its center, the Secretariat, could be weakened, and that the state bureaucracy, freed from its constraint, could be made the dominant institution in Soviet society. He apparently justified his strategy doctrinally by arguing that Lenin intended state organs to have primacy over party organs once the proletarian revolution was victorious.[9]

To succeed, Malenkov's strategy required forceful measures and dangerous maneuvers. He had to strengthen the government apparatus, protecting it against encroachments by the provincial party apparatus.

[8] The Lenin succession struggle also involved the Comintern, the trade unions, student organizations, and local political machines.

[9] "Members of the anti-party group departed from the Leninist understanding of the leading role of the party in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . Some of them . . . , seeking to substantiate the [alleged] necessity of the primacy of state organs over party, distorted the Leninist doctrine on the role of the party after the victory of the proletarian revolution." (*Kommunist*, No. 10, 1957, p. 5.)

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This meant that secretariats on all echelons, particularly their first secretaries, had to be weakened and their power shared more widely with the party bureaus,[10] where the state bureaucracy was well represented. It was partly for this reason, no doubt, that Malenkov resurrected the phrase "collective leadership." Since provincial first secretaries were the strongest element in the Central Committee, Malenkov tried to keep that body without influence, just as in Stalin's day—at least until many more bureaucrats could be added to it. To preserve the myth of party sovereignty while in fact making the government supreme, Malenkov tried to dominate the party Presidium so as to be able to promulgate policy in its name. To fashion Stalin's inert and diffuse bureaucracy into an effective instrument of rule, a strong government—that is, Council of Ministers—was required. In the very first hours after Stalin's death, Malenkov halved the number of ministries and increased the discretionary powers of their heads. By these means, the oversized bureaucracy was reduced and state authority was concentrated in the hands of a few powerful figures.

Despite some conservative features in Malenkov's reform strategy, it promised fundamental change. His decision to oppose the party machine and its system of secretarial rule was crucial. It made him a supporter of the bureau in provincial party organizations, where diverse social forces were represented; thus it opened the way to an incipient pluralism in Soviet politics. It made him a strong partisan of "liberalizing" policies that could enlist the support of the economic bureaucracy and perhaps deprive the party of a key function: policing the system of priorities that favors heavy industry and armaments over consumption.

In the struggle that followed, Malenkov's effort to rule through the government, independently of the party apparatus, met defeat, and he resigned as head of the government. There followed a further break-up of the great economic power which Malenkov had initially concentrated in the Council of Ministers after Stalin's death. As a consequence of this weakening of its center, the economic bureaucracy's capacity to resist interference from provincial party machines declined. At the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev, the head of the opposing faction, ordered provincial functionaries to oversee production. He acknowledged that many *apparatchiks* were reluctant to accept this change from "political" to "economic" work. But his determined effort to forge the party machine into an instrument that could impose his economic policies on the country was to meet with success in the following years.

[10] A bureau is the executive body of party committees, corresponding to the Presidium of the Central Committee.

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In 1957 Khrushchev carried out his reorganization plan, which virtually eliminated the central economic ministries and transferred their authority to provincial "economic councils" that could be controlled by the local party machine. With the bureaucratic elite's political power in jeopardy, Malenkov and other top economic executives rose to their defense. They were joined by several of Stalin's oldest associates, who finally recognized that Khrushchev's aggrandizement of the party machine endangered their own positions. The maneuver failed and its leaders were purged. The bureaucratic elite paid a heavy price for defeat: many were expelled from Moscow and dispersed throughout the land. Thus in 1957, some twenty years after Stalin usurped absolute power, Khrushchev restored to the party machine its hegemony over Soviet society.

What conclusions can be drawn from this account of the bureaucratic elite's fortunes since Stalin's death? Economic administrators were deeply involved in the Stalin succession crisis. Evidence of their potential political strength is implicit in the actions of both Malenkov, who made the bureaucratic elite his main power base, and Khrushchev, who took drastic action to eradicate its influence in Moscow. Indeed, the bureaucratic elite proved itself an autonomous political force, and not merely an instrument of factional intrigue, by maintaining the struggle with the party machine long after its principal leader had lost his position as head of the government. Yet the completeness of its defeat and the relative ease with which this was accomplished suggest that its potentialities at Stalin's death were less than Malenkov had supposed.[11]

The bureaucratic elite's role in the massive and intricate Soviet economy is evidently not so crucial as it had appeared to be. In the post-Stalin years the economic bureaucracy was repeatedly reorganized and transformed; the number of economic ministries was halved and doubled within a year, and finally cut severely; economic administration was first concentrated, then diffused; the powers of an economic minister were sharply increased, then abolished. Finally, the agency that was supposed to plan the economic activities of these protean bodies was itself subject to remarkable variation in its powers and internal organization. Despite the disruptive effects of these basic administrative changes, Soviet industry was able to adjust to them and maintain a high rate of growth. The performance of the Soviet economy, then, does not seem

[11] The outcome, of course, provides no simple measure of the relative strength of the party and state bureaucracies. In the highly fluid situation after Stalin died, other things had their effect: chance, the strategies and personal qualities of the contenders, and the role of the political police are only three among them.

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highly sensitive to changes in the administrative superstructure. The political bargaining power of the bureaucratic elite, while considerable, thus has significant limits. A diffuse and weakened state bureaucracy, if it is closely directed by a powerful and close-knit party machine, may be adequate to supervise the economy.

The cleavage between the party and the state bureaucracy, which already existed at Stalin's death, was broadened and deepened by their subsequent conflict. The intensity of this struggle seems incompatible with the West's conception of a Soviet "ruling class" embracing both the party and the state bureaucracy. Both groups, of course, possess power and privilege far beyond the dreams of mere workers or peasants. But in battling for hegemony the two antagonists employed potent weapons against each other. The fate of hundreds of economic administrators who were expelled from Moscow testifies to the seriousness of the contest in which they were engaged. Moreover, the two sides did not scruple in the heat of battle to harm the state. The high cost in money and confusion did not deter them from repeatedly reorganizing the economic bureaucracy for fractional ends. They were even willing to risk grave injury to the Soviet empire in order to gain a victory over the domestic enemy, as when Khrushchev delivered the "secret speech" implicating his political opponents in Stalin's crimes.[12] Although the conflict between the party machine and the state bureaucracy was temporarily resolved without weakening the regime, its severity permits us to speak, in Marxist terms, of an "antagonistic contradiction" between them.

Transcending this conflict of institutions and personalities when Stalin died was the fundamental question: how was Soviet Russia to be ruled? Stalin's system, despite its success in creating a huge and powerful empire, had induced popular lethargy and bureaucratic inertia. The need for reform was unchallenged. But who would be the reformers? Where was reform to begin? How far was it to go? Besides the questions of institutional reform already discussed, which most closely touched the vested interests of the two bureaucracies, there were questions of public welfare and the national interest that proved to be equally serious sources of conflict.

[12] Khrushchev's object in delivering the speech at a secret session of the Twentieth Congress was of course not simply to denigrate his opponents. It was also to dispel suspicion that he was an incipient Stalin, to reassure the party that he would not use terror against it, as Stalin had done, and to destroy Stalin's stifling authority so that he could freely develop his own policies and programs for the USSR. But his hasty pursuit of these objectives undoubtedly injured Soviet interests, particularly in East Europe. (See the author's *The Rise of Khrushchev*, pp. 1, 40-66, 71.)

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Controversy arose over a number of such policy questions. In agriculture, the economic managers headed by Malenkov favored increased reliance on experts, investment in the central areas, and intensive cultivation. The Khrushchev faction wanted agriculture administered largely by the rural party apparatus and called for a crash program in the virgin and reclaimed lands to achieve a quick increase in grain production. As regards industry, a bitter dispute arose over Malenkov's efforts to improve supplies of consumer goods rapidly, at the cost of some retardation of the remarkable growth of heavy industry. Malenkov also sought to finance his consumer goods program by a moderate reduction in defense spending. This led to a muted public controversy regarding the military threat posed by the cold war. Malenkov seemed to believe that with the advent of thermonuclear weapons war became so dangerous to both sides that it required, and at the same time made possible, a negotiated settlement of the cold war. This view was challenged in 1954 and 1955 by the Khrushchev faction, which stressed instead that the new weapons increased the danger of a surprise attack on the USSR. It called for increased defense spending and vigorous conduct of the cold war.

Defeat of the Malenkov faction in 1955 set back the consumer goods program a number of years. Vigorous development of Soviet missile weapons by the victorious Khrushchev faction enabled the USSR to forge ahead of the United States in these new weapons by 1957, and thus may have led indirectly to intensification of the arms race. As a result, relations between the West and the Communist world developed differently, whether for good or for ill, than they would have if the Malenkov-led administrative bureaucracy had won.

IV. Political Forces in the Next Succession Crisis

This brief review of the two succession crises that the Soviet regime has known shows that they were fairly prolonged, led to intense controversy on questions of policy, produced institutional conflict between the party and the other institutions of dictatorship, and in a limited degree involved broad social strata. Nevertheless, these crises did not significantly alter the totalitarian character of the regime. True, many important liberalizing changes followed Stalin's death. The succession crisis contributed significantly to this development by compelling the rival factions to consider popular needs and sentiments. Since 1957, however, the Khrushchev regime has selected among them, suppressing any that have a manifest tendency to weaken the dictatorship, fostering

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those that are conducive to efficiency and popular welfare without being politically dangerous. Thus, reform in the administration of agriculture has continued and has even been accelerated, while pluralistic tendencies in the party and "revisionism" in the arts have been attacked vigorously. Change since 1957 has been "managed change," designed to preserve, not alter, the regime's totalitarian character, while improving the life of the people.

The Soviet regime preserved its totalitarian character after the deaths of Lenin and Stalin because the institutions and social groups that were drawn into higher Soviet politics by the resulting succession crisis evidently were neither sufficiently powerful nor sufficiently antagonistic to overthrow the party's hegemony. This conclusion gives rise to two questions that may have a decisive bearing on the Khrushchev succession problem. First, is there reason to suppose that these institutions and groups will be stronger at the onset of the next crisis? Second, are these groups likely to join forces in opposition to the party machine?

There is a theory that holds that amelioration of what is oppressive and fundamentally hostile in the Soviet regime is an inevitable result of material and educational progress in the USSR. Now, it is certainly questionable that social progress necessarily gives rise to political progress; yet it is reasonable to inquire whether social progress in the USSR may not, *under specified circumstances*, give rise to political effects that could lessen the ability of the Soviet regime to exercise totalitarian rule. What is relevant here is not simply popular attitudes toward the regime and their probable evolution; equally, if not more, important are the political tendencies of the leading personnel in major Soviet institutions, especially insofar as such tendencies may gain expression in the unsettled conditions of a succession crisis.

Large increases in the personal wealth of members of the bureaucracy, for example, provide substantial economic resources that could promote political struggle against the *apparat*.[13] But increased political power is not the inevitable result of increased economic power: it depends on the political will of those who have authority and of those who seek it. Improved personal material and cultural standards by themselves might only intensify the bureaucrat's reluctance to risk provoking the jealous *apparat* that might deprive him of these hard-won privileges.

The material progress of recent years, however, has been accompanied by an abatement of the police terror. The paralyzing fear of police

[13] More important than personal wealth in the Soviet system is control over the national wealth; the economic bureaucracy now has less of such control than it possessed when Stalin died.

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repression that the Soviet people experienced under Stalin persisted after his death. This terrible legacy may have given his heirs a needed period of grace in which to resolve the inevitable crisis produced by his death. As fear abated, there were political stirrings, not only within sub-elites but also among intellectuals and students.[14] Politically significant agitation reached its height in the most critical period of the leadership struggle: the twenty months beginning with Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and ending with the purge of Zhukov. Subsequently, while fear of police repression may have declined further, the stabilization of Khrushchev's personal dictatorship and the restoration of party hegemony effectively discouraged widespread political dissidence or popular disaffection.[15]

Thus, in the eight years since Stalin died, an easier and more permissive political atmosphere has evolved in which defeated political opponents, while shorn of effective political power, are not, so far as we know, deprived of their lives. Factional leaders in the next crisis may be protected by a powerful sanction: the initiator of more severe reprisals would be widely feared as an incipient Stalin, and his life might be imperiled along with his growing powers.[16] For this reason, it may be supposed that the political resolution of these groups, like their eco-

[14] This development is described in an interview by David Burg, who experienced it while a student at Moscow University:

BURG: "From 1951 to 1954, practically all of us showed to the world a completely straight Communist face. You confined any critical views of the regime to your closest friends and even then unpleasant things sometimes happened. The danger of arrest and deportation was immediate. I was, frankly, very surprised to learn in 1955 and 1956, after the 'Thaw' began, that there were a great number of other small circles of friends, thinking in much the same way, who had been cut off from each other."

INTERVIEWER: "How did you become aware of the 'Thaw'? Did it follow close after Stalin's death?"

BURG: "Not immediately—there was a short period of groping confusion. Then in the winter of '55 all of a sudden people started to talk about things they would never have mentioned previously. . . . And gradually there was more talk about politics, especially after the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 when Khrushchev made his famous denunciation of Stalin." ("The Voice of a Dissenter," *Harper's Magazine*, May 1961, p. 127.)

[15] There have been occasional localized disturbances, however, such as the strikes and rioting in Kazakhstan in 1959.

[16] This is not to assert that a reduction in the role of the political police is the product of a secular trend that must continue. On the contrary, under certain circumstances, police repression might be intensified. It is not true, as Hitler proved, that police terror is incompatible with scientific-industrial progress; nor is even a libertarian society immune to its imposition. Moreover, Stalin's blood purge is not only a warning to those who would let themselves be tyrannized; it is also a model for a future tyrant, something Stalin lacked until Hitler showed him the way by his blood purge of the Nazi leadership in 1934.

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nomic potential, will be substantially greater in the Khrushchev succession crisis than when Stalin died.

Our second question remains: Are these groups and the institutions associated with them likely to form an effective alliance directed against the party machine's capacity to dominate them? This will depend on two critical factors: (1) the distribution of political power when Khrushchev ceases to exercise dictatorial power; and (2) the respective strategies adopted in the succession crisis by the leaders of institutions that the *apparat* has subjected to close party control during the Khrushchev regime.

If Khrushchev's dictatorship ended in the near future, something like the present arrangement of political power would prevail at the onset of the succession crisis. If his dictatorship continued for an extended period of time, of course, there would be greater likelihood that significant changes might occur in the relative power of the economic bureaucracy, the army, and the political police. There would also be greater chance of a redistribution of power among elements of the party machine.[17] It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that Khrushchev will continue to order his dictatorship as before: the centralized party machine can be expected to govern and control the other Soviet institutions, which will remain basically decentralized. Only if Khrushchev's dictatorial power suffered a slow decline before expiring—thereby enabling non-party institutions to gain increased autonomy and their leaders to acquire greater scope for political maneuver—would a basic rearrangement of political power in the USSR be likely to occur before the Khrushchev succession crisis.

Most probably, then, the onset of the succession crisis will find non-party institutions subordinate to the sovereign party *apparat*. In this respect, their political position may be weaker than in 1953 or 1923. When Lenin was incapacitated, the party machine had yet to establish its hegemony; when Stalin fell mortally ill, it had long since been deprived of hegemony. If, as anticipated, the party machine firmly controls the economic bureaucracy, the army, and the political police when Khrushchev ceases to rule, it will have a transient opportunity to resolve the succession question quickly in its own favor by making one of its leaders dictator. That opportunity lost, a crisis would ensue whose severity might far exceed that of the crisis brought on by Stalin's death. Having ruled by terror, Stalin left behind him a residue of fear that helped stabilize the regime during the years that his succession was

[17] For example, the central apparatus might be further strengthened and the discretionary powers of provincial party bosses somewhat curtailed.

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being decided. The absence of such terror when Khrushchev ceases to rule may embolden dissident groups to engage in forceful political action, possibly leading to a concerted attack on the party *apparat*.

The party machine, having made itself the sole highly centralized institution in the Soviet political system, has necessarily assumed a heavy responsibility for management of the national economy. It would be difficult to discharge this responsibility if the party were weakened by internal divisions at a time of crisis. In that event, local economic agencies, which are now balanced against each other under party supervision in regional administrative centers, would tend to coalesce; this would probably be accompanied by rapid centralization of the state administration in Moscow. Were this to occur, the state bureaucracy would be greatly strengthened for a struggle against party hegemony.

The depth of this crisis and its outcome will depend on the strategies of the leaders of non-party institutions. Unless these strategies are grounded in opposition to the *apparat* as the common enemy, these institutions will be at odds with each other and will probably be unable to free themselves from subjection to the *apparat*. Some variant of the Stalin succession crisis might then be enacted. In the years just after Stalin's death, the army was first the party machine's ally (1953 to mid-1957), later its victim. The economic bureaucracy first fought the army-party alliance; later its own internal divisions transformed a prospective victory over the party machine into an overwhelming defeat at its hand (December 1956-June 1957). Such divisions, if repeated, would probably enable the *apparat* to resolve the succession crisis without serious impairment of its power. On the other hand, an alliance of the dominant factions in the administrative bureaucracy, the political police (if it has not been reduced to a department of the former), the economic bureaucracy, and the army would be a most formidable opponent of the party machine. Whether such an alliance took form would depend on the political ambitions of the men who found themselves at the head of these institutions, their capacity to overcome mutual suspicion, their determination to win institutional autonomy, their success in drawing their subordinates into the political struggle and, finally, the intensity of their antagonism to the *apparat*.

The *apparat* is itself subject to divisions: between the center and the provinces; between agricultural and industrial party cadres; between the party machine of one city, or republic, and that of another; and so forth. These divisions could contribute importantly to the *apparat*'s vulnerability to attack by powerful opponents. The effectiveness of any

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alliance against the party will also depend on its ability to capitalize on divisions among Khrushchev's closest heirs in the top party organs. Dissident individuals or factions that lack power over the *apparat* will seek support among the non-party institutions and could become their leaders. Thus, the chief supporters of political pluralism as against party monolithism are likely to be found among the former dictator's closest associates, as they were after the death of Stalin. Moreover, factional opponents purged by Khrushchev as well as erstwhile supporters demoted by him, if they are still alive and politically ambitious, could play an important role in leadership of the alliance, a factor which Stalin eliminated by executing his purged rivals and lieutenants.

Controversy over questions of policy will doubtless be intense. Its effect will be to exacerbate factional conflict, though it may bring particular institutions into temporary alignment with the party apparatus. Only if factional conflict and controversy over policy are transformed into a fundamentally *institutional* conflict, a struggle for autonomy, will an effective alliance against the party machine be likely to form and persist long enough to break its power.

Such an alliance of non-party institutions seeking to free themselves from party domination could probably deprive the party of its hegemony. Whether it could also rule Russia, however, or defend itself against the party machine's counterattack, involves the question whether the USSR can experience a non-violent political revolution. It is a question that can hardly be answered from our present vantage point.

V. Khrushchev and the Question of His Succession

Khrushchev's rise to dictatorship has been motivated by a passion for power and renown and by devotion to communism. The same two elements are inextricably involved in his effort to arrange an orderly succession. If he fails in this, his person and policies will surely be a central issue in the resulting struggle over the succession, just as Stalin's person and policies became a central issue in the Stalin succession crisis. Soviet historiography being what it is, the account of Khrushchev's reign that will appear in future party histories will in large measure depend on the course and outcome of the Khrushchev succession crisis. As for Khrushchev's concern for the future of communism in Russia, an orderly succession may be required to preserve Moscow's hegemony in the world Communist movement and the party's hegemony in Soviet society.

The problem of succession, as it presents itself to Khrushchev, seems

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basically that of assuring that his dictatorial powers are smoothly transferred, at the critical moment, to a designated heir.

True, an alternative solution is available: Khrushchev could leave a testament that disqualified all his lieutenants from exercising dictatorship. This was the course chosen by Lenin when he dictated his famous "Testament" pointing out the deficiencies, along with the merits, of his principal lieutenants. But Khrushchev's solution to the succession problem is not likely to be Lenin's, just as Khrushchev's understanding of his personal dictatorship is not Lenin's. For Lenin, the prerogatives of dictatorial rule derived from his possession of the transcendent political wisdom that enabled him to create the Communist Party and establish the Soviet state. Khrushchev by contrast seems to view his dictatorial position as an office required by the Soviet political system. Lenin could readily designate an oligarchy to succeed him, since he saw no need for one individual to inherit his powers. Khrushchev, on the other hand, prefers rule by the party machine and seems to believe that a boss is needed to preserve its hegemony over Soviet society. In any case, the failure of oligarchical rule after Lenin's death, and again after Stalin's, makes oligarchy an unpromising solution to the Khrushchev succession problem.[18]

It seems likely, then, that Khrushchev will try to arrange an orderly transfer of his power by designating his successor. If so, he will have to face the difficulties inherent in this solution of the succession problem.

Khrushchev encountered the succession problem almost at the moment of his accession to dictatorial power, since he was already aged 63 in 1957. At the same time, he had to consolidate his rule, which was threatened by new challenges. Faced with this double difficulty, Khrushchev naturally slighted the succession problem in his initial dispositions. To supervise the party machine, the most powerful agency of his rule, he chose Kirichenko, whose Ukrainian origins and political experience made him a doubtful candidate for the succession. In this early period, the chief counterweights to Kirichenko's power were apparently Aristov and Kozlov. Aristov had special responsibility for the part of the party machine that lay in the Russian Republic, and Kozlov was Khrushchev's chief deputy in the government. While the circumstances surrounding Kirichenko's fall from grace in 1959 are clouded, there is reason to believe that he may have overreached himself in the exercise of his great powers.[19]

[18] Of course, it could serve as a temporary device for rule during a struggle for the succession, but then it would not be the means to an orderly transfer of power.

[19] After his fall, some former members of the Ukrainian Party machine who had risen with Kirichenko were demoted with him.

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Khrushchev's new arrangements, which took form in the early months of 1960, evinced somewhat greater concern for the succession problem. In Kirichenko's place now appeared a highly eligible candidate for the succession, Frol Kozlov, who was transferred from the government to the party Secretariat. Did this signify that Kozlov was Khrushchev's presumptive successor? Evidently.[20] Kozlov subsequently reported in Khrushchev's stead to the Central Committee on the Bucharest meeting of Communist leaders in June 1960, a crucial event in the developing Sino-Soviet polemic. Moreover, in presenting "Amendments to the Statute" at the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in October 1961, Kozlov followed in the footsteps of Khrushchev, who performed that same role at the Nineteenth Congress (1952).

Lacking Stalin's vast powers, however, Khrushchev has not permitted Kozlov to exercise as much authority as Malenkov did under Stalin. On entering the party Secretariat, Kozlov gave up his government post, unlike Malenkov, who did not cease to be Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers when he became Secretary of the Central Committee in 1948. Moreover, the power of strong rivals was set against Kozlov's, to balance and circumscribe it: Aristov in the Bureau for the Russian Republic (subsequently Aristov was replaced by G. I. Voronov); Brezhnev and possibly Kosygin, head of Gosplan, in the state-government bureaucracy. Even in the Secretariat, Suslov's authority became a counter to Kozlov's. Khrushchev may sometime choose to concentrate in a single individual a large part of the power that Kozlov's rivals now enjoy, thereby establishing a new triad; as yet he has not done so.

When he enhanced Kozlov's position, Khrushchev took care to strengthen his own. Under the new dispensation, he alone is a member of all the top organs of dictatorship: the Presidium, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Central Committee's Bureau for the Russian Republic, and the USSR Council of Ministers; the other leaders now sit on no more than two of these four bodies. The cult of Khrushchev, a potent instrument of dictatorship and one that has grown appreciably since 1957, has received fresh impetus.[21] At the January 1961 plenum

[20] Kozlov was not elected to Stalin's forty-man Presidium in 1952, and he was demoted to provincial third secretary in the weeks following Stalin's death; his remarkable rise since then seems due to Khrushchev.

[21] According to the Central Committee (Resolution of June 30, 1956), "any action against" Stalin was ruled out during his lifetime because of his personality cult, which guaranteed him public support. Khrushchev, too, has used the cult of his person to deter political opposition.

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of the Central Committee, Khrushchev forcefully asserted his authority over the speakers, not excepting Presidium members.

While Khrushchev has strengthened his position, this does not mean that he meets no opposition. In the past year he has alluded to views opposed to his own on important questions of defense policy, investment policy, and diplomacy. There is even evidence of efforts to ensure observance of the forms of collegial rule. But his will is decisive, and others must influence him if they are to affect high policy; which is to say that he continues to rule as dictator.

Though Khrushchev's apparent choice as successor is an able man, Kozlov's talents have not been given large scope, at least in public activities. There is some question—as indeed there once was respecting Khrushchev—whether he has the capacity to exercise dictatorial power. Fearful of their present power and future glory, dictators are inclined to choose successors who are unlikely, by reason of manifest or hidden weaknesses, to threaten either. According to Khrushchev, Stalin's chosen political heir, Malenkov, was a contemptible pretender to the throne.[22] Kozlov's suitability for this role is also uncertain.

Khrushchev seems unlikely at this time to strengthen substantially Kozlov's claim to the succession. To do so might enable Kozlov to develop an independent base of power that could at some point threaten Khrushchev's rule;[23] alternatively, it might encourage Kozlov's rivals to unite against him, thereby endangering his capacity to make good his claim to the succession at the moment of decision. Even if Khrushchev resolved to transfer dictatorial power to Kozlov during his own lifetime—a selfless act for which history has few precedents—he would find it difficult to persist in his intention if Kozlov disregarded his

[22] The credibility of Khrushchev's remark on the subject to Averill Harriman is uncertain, yet there may have been some hidden weakness in Malenkov's political personality that at once made him a suitable choice as Stalin's heir and weakened his capacity to wage the struggle to succeed Stalin. At the same time, it does not appear that Stalin recognized Khrushchev's full potentialities as a dictator. In the years before he died, Stalin gave Khrushchev control of some key levers of the party machine as a means of assuring that Malenkov did not challenge his own authority while he lived. But after placing Khrushchev in this powerful position, Stalin denied him an important voice in deciding policy. Evidently he saw in Khrushchev a shrewd manipulator of the levers of power and a loyal supporter of his own authority, but not a possible candidate for the succession if Malenkov proved deficient in qualities of leadership or personal loyalty. If Stalin underestimated the man who finally succeeded him, it was apparently not in doubting his capacity to seize dictatorial power, but in failing to recognize in Khrushchev the qualities needed to formulate and execute strategies that would advance the cause of Bolshevism.

[23] Kozlov has had an incipient base of this kind in the Leningrad organization, which he headed until 1957, and whose members have been favored for important positions in the central government in recent years.

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advice on large questions of policy or proved unable to cope with contentious rivals.[24]

In any case, the durability of the present arrangement may be questioned. As noted above, Stalin evidently felt compelled to modify his arrangements for the succession just a few weeks after the Nineteenth Party Congress had enacted them. Since Khrushchev's own authority is not above question and the problems that face him are great, his succession arrangements may not prove much more lasting.

VI. The Succession Problem and Mankind

When Stalin died, many Western observers believed that his successors were unlikely to fall out among themselves on questions of policy. While recognizing that the Lenin succession crisis had precipitated conflict between Trotsky and Stalin on the future course of the revolution, they argued that the regime's course was set, that questions still unresolved, not being fundamental, were not likely to be a radical source of controversy. Actually, as we have seen, basic and pervasive policy disagreements sundered the leadership in the Stalin succession crisis. Fundamental alternatives surpassing even those of the 1920's now confront the Soviet Union in the 1960's and will doubtless play their part in the Khrushchev succession crisis. What are the epochal problems that bear on Khrushchev's efforts to effect an orderly transition from his regime to the next and that his successors will inherit? They have to do with internal affairs, the world Communist movement, and relations with the West.

The chief internal question is one we have already discussed at length: can party hegemony be maintained, without undue loss of efficiency and popular support, against the impulse toward greater autonomy of institutions and social groups that the party machine controls?

As for the world Communist movement, disturbances in East Europe may occur during the Khrushchev succession crisis, just as after Stalin's death. When Stalin died, the little Stalins in the satellites continued to look to Moscow, on which they were wholly dependent, for final determination of their policies. Yet within months the order that Stalin had achieved by close direction, police methods, and terror was threatened. Urban riots occurred in Czechoslovakia, where there was a domestic succession crisis; in East Germany intense popular hatred of the Ulbricht

[24] In the party Secretariat elected after the Twenty-Second Congress, Kozlov's name follows Khrushchev's, with the other Secretaries listed alphabetically. This implies that Kozlov is Khrushchev's deputy for party affairs, although he has not received an appropriate title.

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regime and a passionate wish to end partition caused a rebellion. There followed relative stability, which lasted until the most acute stage of the Soviet succession crisis was initiated by Khrushchev's secret attack on Stalin. This led to new disturbances in Poland and Hungary, both torn by local succession crisis, that endangered Soviet hegemony in East Europe. Resolution of the succession crisis in Moscow with the establishment of Khrushchev's personal dictatorship in 1957 led to stabilization of the satellite regimes in East Europe.

Will history repeat itself in the Khrushchev succession crisis, producing disturbances followed by stabilization? Or can serious disturbances be prevented? Alternatively, is it possible that the disturbances will be too powerful for Moscow, wracked by a succession crisis, to control? Important elements of the problem of maintaining Soviet hegemony in East Europe will have changed. Some elements, like the improved economic situation and more rational integration of the satellite economies with the Soviet economy, may make it easier. On the other hand, Communist China's challenge to Soviet supremacy in the Communist world will certainly complicate the problem. A faction favorable to Peking already rules in Albania, and the seeds of such factions are present in the Bulgarian and other satellite regimes. Whether the new, less harsh methods of controlling these regimes will make Moscow's task easier or harder still remains to be seen.

Great as the problem of Soviet hegemony in East Europe is, it may be overshadowed by the question of Sino-Soviet relations. The issue between the two states is far more than a matter of personalities, yet it is centered on the controversy between Khrushchev and Mao. It early led to direct efforts in each country to influence party opinion in the other. If persisted in, this trend may not only intensify hostility between the two parties, but also exacerbate factional conflict within each. While there are no signs of a pro-China faction in the USSR, the general question of relations with the CPR may already be a key issue in Soviet politics. Since a succession crisis also impends in China, a critical question of world politics is which leader, Khrushchev or Mao, will first leave the political scene. The country that is first plunged into a succession crisis will be at a considerable disadvantage in the contest for control over the world Communist movement. If Khrushchev dies first, the CPR will be strongly tempted to intervene in the new succession crisis, as it did in the previous one, to secure an outcome favorable to its own interests. Such intervention, if successful, might hasten resolution of the crisis, but at the cost of great bitterness in the defeated faction. If it fails, the crisis might be further exacerbated. In any case,

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the character of the Khrushchev succession crisis will greatly depend on whether the leadership in Communist China is stable or disunited.

The major problem of Soviet foreign policy outside the Communist world is relations with the West in a missile and thermonuclear arms race. The fundamental question is whether to cope with this dangerous opponent by accommodation or by intensified political, and even military, pressure. The great policy issue of the coming years in the USSR, in grossly simplified terms, may be whether to seek accommodation with the West at the cost of increased hostility from the CPR and a probable schism in the world Communist movement; or whether to press the conflict with the West, in conjunction with a friendly CPR, thereby risking thermonuclear war. If so, the course and outcome of the Khrushchev succession struggle may decisively affect the fate of mankind.

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FRANCE AND THE AFTERMATH OF ROOSEVELT'S "QUARANTINE" SPEECH

By JOHN McVICKAR HAIGHT, Jr.

ON October 5, 1937, in the heart of America's isolationist belt, President Franklin D. Roosevelt denounced the dictators and called for a concerted international effort to quarantine the aggressors. His words drew the excited attention of the world and raised high the expectations for an immediate revision of America's neutrality policy. An opportunity was quickly provided Roosevelt to implement his new policy when the signators of the Nine Power Treaty were invited to Brussels to confer over Japan's undeclared war against China. These developments roused the ire of the American isolationists but brought fresh hope to those who believed a policy of resistance would restrain the dictators. For the next several weeks in this year of decision the balance swung away from the appeasers towards the resisters. For a time, because of American participation, the Brussels conference seemed to hold high promise for the success of the latter group. Then, as the United States backed away, the appeasers returned to lead Europe along the road to Munich.

The French paid special attention to American foreign policy as it unfolded from the Chicago speech through to the end of the Brussels conference, and the question whether the United States would join an effective quarantine of the aggressors became an important issue between the proponents of resistance and appeasement as they fought for control of France's foreign policy. The resisters shared high expectations for a revision of American neutrality, and evidence now at hand indicates that their expectations were not nurtured merely on wishful thinking but rather upon the words and deeds of Roosevelt and his delegate to Brussels, Norman Davis. When, however, the United States finally refused to take joint action with the other signators of the Nine Power Treaty, this not only spiked any concerted effort against Japan but contributed also to the defeat of the resisters in France.

Roosevelt began his speech in Chicago by castigating the wanton acts of the dictators. He then expressed his belief:

> . . . if we are to have a world in which we can breathe freely and live in amity without fear—the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure. . . .

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> There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from the economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world. . . .

On top of this came his proposal for a quarantine:

> It seems unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.
>
> When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

Stating his belief that "war is a contagion," he concluded by calling for "positive endeavors to preserve peace."[1]

There is small wonder that Roosevelt's address aroused world opinion[2] and provided the impetus for a series of dramatic events. Since August the League of Nations had considered ways and means of dealing with the military campaign which Japan had launched against China on July 7, but it was not until early October that some progress was made.[3] Upon hearing Roosevelt's words, the delegates at Geneva were galvanized into action.[4] Before the day was out, the League's Advisory Committee on the Far East had issued two recommendations to the Assembly. By the end of the next day the League voted approval of both the Committee's condemnation of Japan's aggression and its call for a conference that would include two important non-League powers, the United States and Japan.

Upon notification of this action the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, at once issued a parallel condemnation and announced that the United States would join the other eight nations that in 1922

[1] For the text of the speech, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, Washington, D.C., 1943, I, pp. 379-83; hereafter cited as FR, Japan. For an analysis of Roosevelt's effort to implement his speech, see my article, "Roosevelt and the Aftermath of His 'Quarantine' Speech," *Review of Politics* (forthcoming).

[2] The State Department Archives contain a separate file (711.00 President's Speech, October 5, 1937) and the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, has a special folder, both of which contain many letters dramatically revealing the world-wide attention the President's address received.

[3] The League's Advisory Committee on the Far East had begun to draft a condemnation of Japan on October 3, and on the morning of October 5 its discussion turned to a Nine Power Treaty conference. See Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to Secretary of State, Oct. 3, 4, 5, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937*, Washington, D.C., 1954, IV, pp. 51-55; hereafter cited as FR.

[4] The American Ministry in Geneva was alerted on the morning of October 5 that Roosevelt was to make an important speech within a few hours and that the League authorities should be so notified. See State Department Archives, 711.00 President's Speech, October 5, 1937/A (hereafter cited as SD); and Nancy H. Hooker, ed., *The Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat*, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, p. 154.

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at Washington had settled the current problems of the Far East by treaty.[5] Whether Roosevelt had intended to focus attention upon the Far East or not, the ball had been taken away from him.[6] World opinion jumped to the conclusion that the prime responsibility for the Nine Power conference rested with the United States and that its success was dependent upon the leadership its President would provide.

The French focused exceptional attention upon Roosevelt's words and the subsequent events in Geneva, as their press blazoned the news across the front pages. Editors in Paris and throughout the provinces exhibited an extraordinary unanimity in viewing the speech as evidence that the United States at long last had renounced its isolation. Dailies from left to right rejoiced that now if France suffered attack she could count upon direct American aid.[7] Even some of the extreme rightists, who usually had little faith in action by any democracy, were impressed by this prospect.[8]

The press and its readers jumped so rapidly and so optimistically to their conclusions for a number of reasons. First was their feeling of need for American assistance. By the fall of 1937 the threats to France's security had become only too apparent to the vast majority of Frenchmen. They generally agreed that, if the United States with all its potential might stood beside France and the other democracies, peace could be maintained.[9] Two other factors help explain the uncritical acceptance of Roosevelt's words. Many Frenchmen regarded the American President as the world's foremost spokesman of democracy, and none doubted his hatred for the absolutism of the dictators. Secondly, it was widely held throughout France that the President also opposed the isolationists within America and that he sought ways and means to throw the weight of his country into the scales against the dictators.

Variance in interpretation, a traditional prerogative among French editors, came over the implications of the speech for France's foreign

[5] For texts of the League's notes and Hull's press release, see FR, Japan, I, pp. 384-97.

[6] For a recent denial that Roosevelt intended to relate the Chicago speech to the League and its focus on the Far East, see Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXII (September 1957), p. 417.

[7] A report in the *New York Times*, Oct. 7, p. 13, noted that in contrast to the moderate response of the British papers, the French press contained "exaggerated expectations" of the "quarantine" speech. For the importance of the French press as a reflection of French reaction to the foreign policy of the United States, see my articles, "The Paris Press, 1938: Mirror of a Tragedy," *Gazette*, II (1956), pp. 150-56; "Once Again the Paris and Provincial Press," *Gazette*, VII (1961), pp. 211-17.

[8] See especially *L'Action Française*, José le Boucher, "Roosevelt's Speech," Oct. 7.

[9] Pierre Bernus in his lead editorial, "After the Chicago Speech," for *Le Journal des Debats*, Oct. 8, expressed this belief succinctly: "The accord of the United States and the Western powers would certainly be a most sure means of ending the danger of war that is abroad throughout the world."

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policy. On the left, the Socialists and the Communists saw the United States ready to re-enforce resistance to the Fascist dictators and warned lest a weak line might discourage President Roosevelt from his newly asserted leadership.[10] The so-called traditional nationalists held a similar view.[11] On the other hand the moderates of the center and right argued that Roosevelt only sought to throw his weight behind the cooperation of all nations and a rapprochement between the democratic and Fascist states.[12] As usual each journal had utilized the material at hand to justify its own party line.

France's leaders shared to a remarkable degree the public's enthusiasm and interpretation of Roosevelt's proposal. Premier Camille Chautemps and his Foreign Minister, Yvon Delbos, both spoke of the "quarantine" speech in public. Though they cautioned against jumping to conclusions, the special attention they paid to the speech indicated that they hardly practiced what they preached.[13] Both these men recognized that a policy of neutrality could not prevent the United States from weighing in the scales of peace. Like so many of their countrymen, they believed that the American people would awaken to this fact at least before the "fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour."

The Premier and his Foreign Minister had better grounds than the French public for believing that Roosevelt chafed under the restrictions of the Neutrality Acts. Only during the past spring rumors had abounded that the President intended to call an international conference, a conference that in today's parlance would at least merit the label "summit." Delbos had been sufficiently impressed by these rumors to seek further information.[14] Though unsuccessful in these attempts he

[10] See the Communist daily, *L'Humanité*, Oct. 7, and the editorial by its leading foreign commentator, Gabriel Peri. The Socialist organ, *Le Populaire*, Oct. 7, expressed this point of view in an editorial unsigned but presumably written by the Socialists' leader and the Vice-Premier of France, Léon Blum. See also the comments of Pierre Brossolette, another important Socialist news commentator, in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, a weekly of the center, Oct. 9, pp. 963-64.

[11] *L'Echo de Paris*, Pertinax, Oct. 7; *L'Epoque*, Henri de Kerillis, Oct. 7; *L'Oeuvre*, Geneviève Tabouis, Oct. 7; *L'Aube*, Georges Bidault, Oct. 7.

[12] *Le Figaro*, Wladimir d'Ormesson, "Roosevelt and Peace," Oct. 7; *Le Temps*, "Bulletin du Jour," "Roosevelt's Speech," Oct. 6; *Le Petit Parisien*, Pierre Denoyer, Oct. 6; *Agence Economique et Financière*, Henri Bérenger, Oct. 7; *Revue des Deux Mondes*, "Chronique," Oct. 15, p. 958.

[13] Delbos' comments to a press conference were reported by Jules Sauerwein, the foreign editor of *Paris Soir*, in *New York Times*, Oct. 7. Chautemps' speech before the American Club in Paris focused primarily upon the Chicago address; for the text, see *Le Temps*, Oct. 8. For the private comments of both men to the American Chargé in Paris, Edwin C. Wilson, see his dispatches of Oct. 6 and 7, FR, 1, pp. 132-36.

[14] During the spring of 1937, the French press reported these rumors widely and Delbos ordered his delegate to the London Sugar Conference to sound out the American delegate, Norman Davis, concerning them. He also requested his Ambassador to the

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must have been encouraged by a later report from his Ambassador in Washington that the American President would do everything possible to aid France.[15]

That the French leaders paid serious attention to the role the United States played in international affairs is evident from the statements they made to the American Ambassador to France, William C. Bullitt. During the past September Chautemps had remarked: "It would be impossible to preserve peace unless the United States should take the position that it would give all possible aid of an economic and financial nature to any country attacked."[16] His Foreign Minister had only been more precise when he in turn warned that League action in the Far East depended upon the direct assistance of the United States.[17] It was not difficult for Chautemps, Delbos, or their colleagues in the government to view the Chicago address as one more very vital piece of evidence that Roosevelt also recognized the need for his country to assist in the preservation of world peace.

France's leaders preferred for many reasons to have the United States focus its primary attention upon Europe. German rearmament and remilitarization of the Rhineland indicated the dangerous revival of France's traditional enemy. Already ominous words about Austria and Czechoslovakia emanated from Berlin. While Mussolini demanded recognition for his latest imperial prize, Ethiopia, he was also disturbing Europe's peace by openly supporting Franco's forces in Spain and permitting his navy to act most piratically in the Mediterranean. The recent meetings, on September 25-28, between Hitler and Mussolini had provided new evidence of the unity of the Axis. Though the French and British had agreed at Nyon to halt the current piracy by joint naval action, there was as yet no proof positive that they would be successful or that together they would be able to maintain Europe's peace. Because of the problems so close at hand, the situation in the

United States, Georges Bonnet, to inquire directly of Roosevelt. For the talks of M. Spinasse, Minister of the National Economy and chief French delegate to the Sugar Conference, with Norman Davis, see Davis Papers, File Box 55, Sugar Conference, memo of conversation of April 9 and personal letter to President Roosevelt from Davis of April 13. For reference to Ambassador Bonnet's queries to Roosevelt, see Harold L. Ickes, *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes*, II, New York, 1954, p. 124. Miss Borg deals with the President's own plans and views them as part of his groping search for some means of forestalling war, a groping that led him directly to the "quarantine" speech (*op.cit.*, pp. 409-10).

[15] Georges Bonnet, *Défense de la Paix, de Washington au Quai d'Orsay*, Geneva, 1946, p. 24; see also pp. 14-16.

[16] Ambassador in France (William C. Bullitt) to Secretary of State, Sept. 8, FR, I, pp. 389-90.

[17] Bullitt to Secretary of State, Sept. 2, FR, IV, pp. 10-11; Secretary of State to Bullitt, Sept. 3, *ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

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Far East thus seemed extremely remote. The recent landings of Japanese armies at the mouth of the Yangtze and their rapid advance toward the Chinese capital of Nanking indicated that Japan wanted to settle its account with China by arms rather than by peaceful agreement. During September the French had held back while the League discussed the Far East, for they feared a diversion of strength from Europe would only encourage the Axis to bolder action. Then, too, they knew their colony of Indo-China was particularly exposed to Japanese retaliation. Considering the world's situation, most Frenchmen would have welcomed American assistance in restraining the European aggressors, but when it came to a quarantine of the Japanese, that was indeed another matter. Only under the most unusual circumstances would any French leader dare divert his attention from Europe's dictators.

The question of the best method to preserve world peace became a matter of serious debate for the French during the fall of 1937. Two schools of thought battled to gain the final decision. Each believed that peace could be assured only by following the program it proposed. On one side were lined up the appeasers, led by Chautemps and Georges Bonnet, who had been recalled from the embassy in Washington to become Finance Minister. On the other stood the resisters with Delbos and the Vice Premier, Léon Blum, in the lead. Each hoped that the United States would intervene to strengthen their programs.[18] The appeasers wanted America to help persuade the Fascist dictators to come to the council table and settle the world's problems by negotiation. The proponents of resistance, however, assigned a more vital role to the United States. As they centered their policy upon the construction of a democratic front, they believed that such a front could easily restrain any Fascist aggression if supported by the vast strength of the United States. Delbos had focused his sixteen months at the Foreign Ministry upon constructing that front, and he knew full well its present weakness and potential strength. Thus he, even more than the appeasers, was willing to go to extremes to help Roosevelt lead his country away from isolation and into the democratic camp.

When the French leaders of both sides began to analyze Roosevelt's speech carefully, they became confused as to its implications. Premier Chautemps went so far as to ask what the President meant exactly by

[18] Though a recent article questions whether Hitler would have been influenced by the threat of the United States' playing a positive role in Europe, most Frenchmen during the late 1930's believed that he would be. Joachim Remak, "Two German Views of the United States: Hitler and His Diplomats," *World Affairs Quarterly*, XXVIII (April 1957), pp. 25-35.

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"the peace-loving nations making a concerted effort in opposition to violations of treaties."[19] Certainly further clarification was necessary before the French government could adjust its current policy.

For several weeks the French and their officials gained little insight as to the President's intentions. During his press conference after the Chicago speech he had hinted at some plan but refused to give further amplification. His comments during a fireside chat on October 12 provided no further indication. There were plenty of rumors of course. One forecast a recall of Congress for the purpose of revising the neutrality legislation, but when Congress was recalled, Roosevelt made no reference to foreign policy but rather concentrated upon America's current economic recession. Apparently the President was shying away from the international leadership that seemed to be promised at Chicago.

When it came to American policy toward the Far East, the French also could have found little to be encouraged about. The appointment of Norman Davis as the sole delegate to the Nine Power conference might appear to be a good omen, for he was regarded as an internationalist, but a mounting tide of American isolationism seemed to restrain the President and his Secretary of State. In accepting Belgium's invitation for the Nine Powers and their associates to meet in Brussels, Hull spoke neither of a "concerted effort" nor of a "quarantine," but rather of "peaceable means of hastening the end" of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Then, as Davis sailed for Europe, Roosevelt denied that his nation was tied by any previous commitment and re-emphasized that the conference should seek a peaceful solution.[20] Such a goal seemed especially naïve to both the French appeasers and resisters, who were convinced that Japan would never halt its march into China unless faced by a meaningful array of force. They also believed that, with Europe's troubles demanding the full attention of France and England, such a countermove depended upon a revision of the American policy of neutrality. Unless this took place, the Brussels conference would be a waste of time and would dangerously antagonize Japan. The French Premier's whole attitude toward the coming conference was summed up for Ambassador Bullitt when Chautemps, in speaking of the Far

[19] After asking this question, Chautemps went on to express his eagerness to sit down quietly with the President and talk over the problem. Wilson to Secretary of State, Oct. 7, FR, I, p. 135. Langer and Gleason read too much into this search for the meaning of Roosevelt's words. They regard it as an important French invitation for direct talks with the United States. See William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation*, New York, 1952, p. 22.

[20] For Hull's and Roosevelt's messages, see Department of State, *Press Releases*, XVII, No. 419, and *New York Times*, Oct. 20.

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East, recalled an old French proverb: "You sweep your own doorstep before you sweep the street."[21]

Was Chautemps' attitude toward the Nine Power meeting influenced by the British? Until more of the French documents are published,[22] it is impossible to determine if the French government knew about the British attempts to sound out the United States on its intentions in the Far East. However, even if the French were fully informed, it appears that this information would only have sustained the opinions which Chautemps expressed to Ambassador Bullitt. Certainly the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, had been unsuccessful in his effort just prior to the "quarantine" speech to discover whether the United States would join in an economic boycott of Japan.[23] Again he failed to obtain a direct answer to his question on October 12 as to whether the President "fully understood the full implication" of a quarantine of nations.[24] Then a week later Eden raised another question. Would the United States be willing to join in a mutual "assurance of military support" and "guarantees of territorial integrity" if the nations meeting at Brussels proposed active aid for China and economic pressure upon Japan? The State Department's reply merely repeated its belief that the objective of the conference was a "solution of the conflict in the Far East by agreement."[25] This experience could only have toned down whatever enthusiasm Eden might have had for the Nine Power conference.[26]

Whether or not the British influenced the French, there is evidence that the reverse was true. During a talk with Ambassador Bullitt on October 21, Delbos remarked that he had persuaded a "reluctant" Eden to come to Brussels. Though the French Foreign Minister felt the need of an activist policy more than his Premier, even he had little optimism about the Nine Power conference, but, as he stated, "It might be possible to invent something." He was, however, fully aware that the "position of the United States would be decisive."[27]

[21] Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 22, FR, III, pp. 629-30. For the evolution of French thinking after the "quarantine" speech, see Wilson to Secretary of State, Oct. 6, FR, I, pp. 132-35; Oct. 8, SD, 852.00/6648; Oct. 9, FR, I, pp. 136-37; Oct. 16, FR, I, pp. 420-22; Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 22, FR, I, pp. 147-50. Bullitt had returned to Paris on Oct. 20 after an unusually brief leave of only fifteen days in the United States.

[22] So far official policy of France has prohibited publication of most of the documents on international affairs during 1937.

[23] See FR, III, pp. 560-61, 569, 573-74, 582-83.

[24] See FR, III, pp. 600-2; 608-9.

[25] See FR, IV, pp. 89-92.

[26] On Oct. 19 the State Department believed that Eden was "not sure he would be able to go to Brussels himself." (Davis Papers, File Box 4, Nine Power Conference Folder, Memo of talks with Roosevelt, Oct. 12 and 19, by Davis.)

[27] Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 23, FR, III, pp. 634-35.

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It was at this time that Delbos and his colleagues gained a sudden and highly significant insight into what the American position might be. This development resulted from a French move in the Far East. Ever since the Japanese navy had blockaded the China coast, the major route for the transit of arms, munitions, and war materials to Chiang Kai-shek's forces lay through the French colony of Indo-China. In mid-October Japan began to threaten reprisals unless this route was closed. The Japanese Ambassador to France even went so far as to remind the French politely but pointedly that it would be "a very good thing to have a friendly Japan in case France should be at war." Being unable to protect its colony, the French government barred further transit of war material. Premier Chautemps informed Ambassador Bullitt of this action during the evening of October 21. He also stated most matter-of-factly that his government would reverse its decision if the nations meeting at Brussels would provide joint protection for Indo-China. He again made it perfectly clear that in his estimation such a guarantee depended upon the United States.[28] There is no evidence that Chautemps intended his remarks to be a formal request for an American guarantee; rather they were made as part of a general effort to bring the Ambassador up to date on French foreign policy. Considering his remarks as only part of a routine review, Chautemps and his associates were deeply impressed by Roosevelt's response.

Within a matter of hours the French Premier received a highly confidential and personal reply from the American President. In it Roosevelt deplored the closing of the Indo-China route as "a discrimination against China," for it would place that nation "in an unfavorable position at the beginning of the Brussels conference." He went on to express his hope that the French government would "find it possible to re-examine this question."[29]

The promptness of Roosevelt's response and the brief and vague phrasing of his request permitted a good deal of latitude in interpretation. Even Ambassador Bullitt felt the need of further clarification.[30]

[28] Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 22, FR, III, pp. 629-30. For other reports on the Japanese threats, see Wilson to Secretary of State, Oct. 19, FR, III, pp. 623-25; Bullitt to Secretary of State, Oct. 21, SD, 793.94111/82; Oct. 23, FR, III, pp. 634-40; Oct. 25, FR, I, pp. 150-51.

[29] For Roosevelt's message, see Acting Secretary of State (Sumner Welles) to Bullitt, Oct. 22, FR, III, p. 632; and the French Chargé d'Affaires in Washington (Jules Henry) to French Premier, Oct. 22, published in "Roosevelts Kriegswille gegen Japan. Enthullungen aus den Akten des Quai d'Orsay," *Berliner Monatshefte*, February 1943, pp. 55-56. (My translation.) It is interesting to note that the German Foreign Office selected this and two other dispatches from Henry during the fall of 1937 as significant enough to publish in this special article.

[30] Bullitt to Secretary of State, FR, III, p. 640.

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It seems that the French Foreign Minister viewed the appeal as evidence of the President's interest in the Brussels conference. Until this last cable from Washington there had been no proof that the United States would support any meaningful resistance to Japanese aggression. Now it appeared that the American President was deeply concerned about the Far Eastern situation and recognized the need for American intervention. The problem that Delbos now faced was how to assist the President in translating a personal desire into official American policy. To accomplish this, Delbos began to shift from an attitude of indifference to one of special concern for the Nine Power meeting.

On the basis of the documents at hand and particularly those dealing with Delbos' actions at Brussels, it appears that France's Foreign Minister adopted a two-phase program to encourage Roosevelt toward positive action. The first step was to assure the President that the United States would not be left out on a limb by itself but would have positive French support for any direct action in the Far East. For the second step France would insist that only direct action backed by force had any possibility of success in restraining Japan. Both phases of Delbos' new program required a major shift in French foreign policy. The second step would mean a revision of the position Delbos had held in September during the discussions at Geneva about the Far East. Then he opposed resistance to Japan, but now with American co-operation resistance became possible. As a proponent of democratic resistance to Fascist aggression, Delbos was only too ready to propose this second phase of his program. The first phase, that of encouraging Roosevelt, represented a more radical departure. It apparently was based upon the belief that Roosevelt's request to reopen Indo-China indicated that the President would consider significant alternatives to "peaceful solutions." Perhaps if persuaded that he would not be left holding the bag, he would continue the leadership he had asserted in Chicago.

Delbos' policy of encouragement did not spring forth upon the spur of the moment. It had long been a tenet of belief among the leftists in France that Roosevelt would join a front against the Fascists if assured full co-operation from the European democracies. This opinion had been expressed for many months by the major organs of the Popular Front, the Socialist *Populaire* and the Communist *Humanité*.[31] A

[31] See, for example, editorial reaction to Roosevelt's Buenos Aires speech of Dec. 1, 1936, in *Le Populaire*, André Leroux, Dec. 2, p. 1; and *L'Humanité*, Gabriel Peri, Dec. 2, p. 1. See also Léon Jouhaux's remarks before the national committee of the *Confédération Générale du Travail*, of which he was Secretary General, as published in *Voix du Peuple*, XVIII (December 1936), p. 752. This line was repeated in the editorials of *Le Populaire* and *L'Humanité* on the occasion of the "quarantine" speech (see note 10 above).

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similar line had been consistently maintained by those Frenchmen who were considered to be experts on American affairs.[32] Together, as supporters of resistance, they claimed that weakness before the dictators would only encourage them and discourage those Americans who, like Roosevelt, opposed the Neutrality Acts. As a representative of the Popular Front and a leading resister, Delbos knew these arguments well, and now that there seemed a chance of gaining American cooperation, he appears to have been willing to do everything possible to avoid discouraging the President by an attitude of indifference and aloofness.[33] Thus it is reasonable to conclude that he adopted his twofold program in order to show Roosevelt and the American interventionists that France was prepared to act at Brussels and join with the United States in actively resisting Japanese expansion.

By October 28, when the American delegates arrived in Paris on their way to Brussels, they paused to hear the latest report from Ambassador Bullitt. His current opposition to American intervention in the Far East for fear of diverting Europe's attention from the Bolshevik menace was well known to Davis and his associates, for by chance Bullitt had been in Washington at the time of the "quarantine" speech and had expressed himself freely. He had even been able to persuade Roosevelt to tone down his suggestion for positive action.[34] Having returned

[32] See the introductory comments that André Lanux wrote for a special review of the writings and speeches of Roosevelt and Hull between March 1933 and November 1936, published as a special supplement by an important French weekly, *L'Europe Nouvelle Documentaire*, December 5, 1936, No. 49. Lanux's opinions of American foreign policy had just been published by the *Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère* in a long pamphlet entitled *La neutralité américaine en 1936*. See also Raoul de Roussy de Sales' article of Dec. 11, 1937, reviewing the events of the past fall, "America Deceived by Europe," in which he asks, "How can you expect to combat the 'mystique' of isolationism if the other democracies do not stop giving in to the dictators?" (*L'Europe Nouvelle*, Dec. 11, pp. 1205-7.) Here he restated a line he had continually supported since at least 1935. De Sales acted both as the leading representative in the United States for Havas, the French news agency, and as regular correspondent for the huge *Paris Soir* and its noontime sister, *Paris Midi*. He also sent frequent and long summaries of American foreign policy to *L'Europe Nouvelle*.

[33] Pertinax, one of France's most astute and best informed foreign editors, reported that the action of the French as well as the British at the Brussels conference stemmed from their fear that "by taking an attitude of aloofness they would discourage President Roosevelt." See his article in the *New York Times*, Nov. 6. This interpretation was in line with his initial reaction to the "quarantine" speech as well as that of other traditional nationalists. See note 11 above.

[34] For Bullitt's position in the fall of 1937 and for his contribution toward Roosevelt's fireside chat of Oct. 12, see the entries for Oct. 8 and 12 in "The Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943" (unpublished manuscript in custody of the Houghton Library, Harvard University; hereafter cited as *Journals*). See also *Moffat Papers*, p. 158. (The *Journals* are cited only when pertinent material has not been published in the *Papers*.) For an able analysis of Bullitt's beliefs in 1937, see Gordon Wright, "Ambassador Bullitt and the Fall of France," *World Politics*, x (October 1957), pp. 68-69.

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hurriedly from Washington, he had been in Paris long enough to gather the reaction of France's leaders to the Chicago address and the Brussels conference. In his report to Davis he warned that the French hoped not only to push the United States into an "effective front of the democracies" but also to place upon this country "special responsibilities and special burdens." Bullitt went on to advise that unless the United States would join such a front or at least guarantee Indo-China, the French would view the Far East with indifference and focus their attention upon the worrisome situation in Europe.[35]

Though it is probable that Davis viewed the Ambassador's warnings as a reflection of his opposition to American intervention, it seems that he did take seriously Bullitt's statement that the French were trying to push the United States out in front. To counter this move by France or any other nation, Davis called in the press and denied the rumors that he carried with him a surprise program for the Brussels meeting, and he added most significantly that the United States did not intend to "drag the chestnuts from the fire for others," nor would it be a party to any "altruistic programs."[36]

Delbos appears to have been unimpressed, possibly believing he could allay such fears by his policy of encouragement. At any rate, during a speech before the annual conference of the Radical Socialist Party on October 29 he referred directly to the policies of Roosevelt and insisted, "Never have the hearts of the three great democracies beaten so well in unison. Their concept of peace is the surest way to defend it."[37]

The French Foreign Minister was not the only delegate to Brussels who hoped for American leadership. Answering questions before the House of Commons on October 31, the British Foreign Secretary referred to the coming Brussels conference and admitted that nothing effective could be done in the Far East without the United States. Eden went on to reveal his own evaluation of American assistance for Britain when he stated he would be prepared to travel "not only from Geneva to Brussels but from Melbourne to Alaska" to secure full co-operation on an equal basis with the United States. He implied that he was not going to Brussels without some expectation of achieving his goal. Such expectations must have been dampened by the Acting Secretary of State of the United States. Obviously intending to reply to Eden's statement, which had drawn wide attention in the United States, Sumner

[35] Davis reported Bullitt's warnings in his final official report on December 16, 1939 (Davis Papers, Box 5, Brussels Conference). See also *Moffat Papers*, p. 158.

[36] *New York Times*, Oct. 28.

[37] For text, see *Le Temps*, Oct. 31, p. 3.

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Welles re-emphasized that his country was going to the conference only "to help in the search for a pacific solution of the conflict."[38]

As the delegates assembled in the Belgian capital, various commentators estimated the conference's prospects. For some, Japan's refusal to send a delegation to Brussels appeared as a bad omen. Others feared that the Treaty members would do nothing and thus prove once again the weakness of the democracies, and that this could only have drastic results just when Germany and Japan were negotiating in Rome for Italian allegiance to their Anti-Comintern Pact. There were some, however, who maintained a certain hopefulness.[39] Optimism was highest among the American newsmen who were stationed in Europe. They fully shared the conclusion that the United States had a special responsibility for the conference and thus would make the most of this opportunity to fulfill the promise expressed in Roosevelt's "quarantine" speech.[40]

When the chief delegates met in a pre-conference planning session on November 2, the French Foreign Minister was perfectly frank in stating that France favored positive steps against the aggressor in the Far East. In the first of several of these "back room" meetings in which, as the *New York Times* reported, the most important decisions were being made,[41] Delbos took a stand against any appeasement. While Eden put on a show of co-operation with the American delegate, Delbos opposed the American's plan to issue a second invitation to Japan to come to Brussels for peaceful negotiations. He took no trouble to hide his impatience with the American belief that if Japan refused a second time, world opinion would clearly recognize her aggressive intentions and thus opinion would favor positive action by the conference. Delbos even went so far as to oppose any public session of the conference, if only mediation was to be proposed. He did finally accept the American proposal for a series of keynote speeches, but he had gotten across one point of his twofold program: action, not words, was necessary in the Far East.[42]

[38] For pertinent section of Eden's comments, see FR, IV, pp. 140-41; and for Welles' statement, see *New York Times*, Nov. 3.

[39] For example of pessimism, see *Le Temps*, André Dubosco, Oct. 26, p. 1; *Le Peuple*, Maurice Harmel, Nov. 3, p. 1; *Le Temps*, "Bulletin du Jour," Nov. 4, p. 1. The most optimistic note was sounded by Gabriel Peri in *L'Humanité*, Nov. 1, p. 1.

[40] See, for example, Edwin L. James, *New York Times*, Oct. 31, Section III. For an analysis of this attitude of the American reporters, see *Moffat Papers*, pp. 186-87; and Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 21, FR, IV, pp. 221-24.

[41] *New York Times*, Nov. 4, p. 13.

[42] For a record of this pre-conference talk, see *Moffat Papers*, pp. 165-66; Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 3, FR, IV, pp. 147-48.

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The French Foreign Minister must have cringed as Norman Davis addressed the conference the next day in fulsome platitudes and ample generalities. He could only have been disturbed by the stress the American delegate laid upon conciliation and "peaceful processes." The request that Japan and China co-operate "as friends and equals and not as enemies" must have seemed especially naïve. Eden made it clear in his short speech that he would go no further than the American position. In turn Delbos would do nothing more than mouth high-sounding phrases. France was in no position to act alone or assert leadership.[43]

Delbos at least had been forewarned of the temper of Davis' address, but the French news editors seem to have been taken by surprise. Geneviève Tabouis, a leading exponent of resistance, considered Davis' words a "terrible deception." Pertinax (André Giraud) moaned, "America . . . escapes by the voice of Norman Davis," and Gabriel Peri of *L'Humanité* admitted that he had nourished too many hopes since that "noble speech in Chicago." *Le Matin*, speaking for the appeasers, gloated: "The United States is holding back at Brussels. . . . It does not want to become too involved in international affairs." *L'Action Française* summed up the reaction of the extreme rightists: "The ideological preferences of the President are not to be doubted. To believe that they will be translated into action is one of the most fantastic chimeras that chattering politicians love to utilize in their attempts to lull a forgetful and ignorant public. The 'union of the three democracies' has all the value of a formula which begins and ends in a speech."[44]

Delbos waited until the evening of November 3 for his first private talks with the American delegate. Once again in the privacy of a "back room" the Foreign Minister baldly stated his conviction that Japan would not co-operate with the conference unless its armies experienced difficulties in China. To accomplish this Delbos proposed that direct aid be given to Chiang Kai-shek. He went on to explain that this might require a convoy system, as well as some action to assure the entry of war materials into Indo-China's main harbor at Hanoi. Davis refused to talk of action and diverted the discussion to general world conditions, but Delbos recovered the lead and presented his case for a democratic front. Pierrepont Moffat, one of Davis' advisers, recorded the Foreign Minister's plea: "We must align the democracies against the dictators. Civilization had been retreating. There were wars without declaration, there were bombardments of open towns, there was piracy;

[43] For texts of speeches, see U.S. Department of State, *The Conference of Brussels, November 3-24, 1937, Conference Series—37* (Washington, D.C., 1938), pp. 24-31.

[44] *L'Oeuvre*, Tabouis, Nov. 4; *L'Echo de Paris*, Pertinax, Nov. 5; *L'Humanité*, Peri, Nov. 5; *Le Matin*, Nov. 5; *L'Action Française*, Jacques Delebecque, Nov. 6.

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in short, international anarchy. The free nations were richer, were stronger, were more numerous; and yet were the vanquished. The dictatorships were speaking in tones of victors. Only an organized front of the free nations could put a stop to this retreat, and there was only one leader in the world who could organize such a 'peace front.' This was President Roosevelt. . . ."[45] Harking back to the rumors of the past spring, Delbos urged the President to call an international conference to settle the problems of the world. Until that could be adequately arranged, "just the three of us," France, Britain, and the United States, should concert their efforts in the Far East. This was necessary because the eight powers together with their ten associates meeting at Brussels would never agree to joint action against Japan. Davis again backed away and refused to discuss any positive steps until the conference explored every means by which Japan could be persuaded to accept mediation.[46]

Norman Davis was unable to convince Delbos of the validity of this approach and, following this talk, the Foreign Minister revealed his displeasure by adopting a policy of obstructionism. He raised a special fuss when it appeared France would not be included in a subcommittee that would attempt to establish direct talks with Japan. If France could be a member, this subcommittee might, so Delbos hoped, become a forerunner of a democratic front. He again obstructed a proposal of the American delegate during a debate over the wording of the second invitation to Japan to join the proceedings in Brussels. Davis had proposed the inclusion of a phrase condemning the use of arms, but the French reacted violently, saying that it was useless to include such a phrase unless the conference itself were ready to make Japan listen by preparing to match force with force.[47]

While the British delegation co-operated with the American delegate, the French played a dangerous game of blocking Davis at every turn. They ran the risk not only of antagonizing the head of the American delegation but also of arousing the ire of the American public. If the French wanted American co-operation in the Far East, why did they keep throwing road blocks in front of the conference? Was this just an irresponsible attempt to make the Americans "put up or shut up," as

[45] *Moffat Papers*, pp. 169-70.

[46] For the fullest published record of the talks on Nov. 3, see *ibid.*, pp. 168-70. See also Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 6, FR, IV, pp. 157-58; Nov. 7, *ibid.*, pp. 162-64; and Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 8, FR, III, pp. 666-67. *Moffat Journals*, Nov. 3, also contain some important unpublished material.

[47] For information about these French tactics, see Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 7, FR, IV, pp. 162-64; Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 6, *ibid.*, p. 162; *Moffat Papers*, pp. 173-74; *New York Times*, Nov. 8.

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some extreme rightists demanded,[48] or did Delbos have more solid grounds for employing this tactic? His two-step policy has already been explained as his basic reason, but there are grounds to believe that he had another reason as well, the hope that Norman Davis might after all consider alternatives to mediation.

The American delegate does not seem to have spoken of or even hinted at alternative steps, but the French should not have had too much difficulty in believing there was some chance for the success of their policy. Davis' prior roles in various international conferences had identified him as an interventionist. Though so far he had refused to discuss anything but mediation, he had never stated flatly that he would not do so if a peaceful solution was impossible. There was a chance he could be persuaded to go beyond his initial orders and speak in terms that had a closer relation to Roosevelt's words at Chicago.

That there was a division within the State Department over the line to be followed at Brussels must have been known to the Quai d'Orsay. One only had to read the *New York Times* to recognize this. It certainly must not have been difficult for the French delegates at Brussels to realize that this division was reflected by the two advisers Davis had brought with him. Pierrepont Moffat thoroughly opposed American intervention in the Far East and stood prepared to fight off any attempt of the Europeans to use the United States as a cat's-paw. As one reads the available records, it is not difficult to imagine that the French must have been aware of his position. Certainly they had known about his ideas at least since the past July, when he became the State Department's chief of the European Division. One can wonder whether the French did not also become aware of the personal antagonism that existed between Moffat and Davis over the line the United States should take at Brussels. The other American adviser, Stanley Hornbeck, had acted as the Department's political adviser on the Far East for some time, and in contrast to Moffat believed that the United States should take a strong stand in the Far East. It is probable that the French delegation learned from the British of Hornbeck's remark that the Americans had not only discussed alternatives to mediation but had a plan in mind.[49] Such bits and pieces of information could only contribute to

[48] See, for example, the weekly, *Candide*, Oct. 14, p. 1.

[49] On Nov. 2 at a luncheon meeting of the British and American delegation, Eden understood Hornbeck to say that the United States had already prepared plans for bringing pressure on Japan. See Memo by Assistant Secretary of State (Hugh R. Wilson) of conversation with the British Ambassador (Lindsay), Nov. 6, FR, IV, pp. 160-62. See also Hornbeck's note of Feb. 24, 1938, claiming Eden distorted his comments. This note is printed as a footnote to the above document. For an analysis of the position of the three Americans, see *Moffat Papers*, pp. 182-83.

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the French hope that Davis would soon crack and the conference could become an effective organization in restoring peace to the Far East.

However, as the conference adjourned for a long weekend and Delbos journeyed back to Paris, the Foreign Minister seems to have been most pessimistic about the chances for his program.[50] Nevertheless, before he returned to the Belgian capital on November 9, Delbos gained new evidence that success might be at hand. First he learned from Bullitt that the United States would no longer oppose French membership on the subcommittee.[51] Much more vital, word came from Washington indicating that Roosevelt did indeed think in terms of a much stronger policy than was being proposed by his delegate at Brussels.

This report came from the French Chargé in Washington, Jules Henry, who had talked directly with President Roosevelt on November 6. While in the White House on routine business, Henry had been surprised by the serious turn of the conversation. Roosevelt had begun by referring to his earlier note concerning the shipment of arms to China and had added that some of the powers with territories in the Far East were acting like "scared rabbits." Henry had taken immediate exception and referred to the Japanese threats. The President replied, "I am quite aware of your position," but said that he wondered whether the French were not influenced by "some unfounded fears." He went on to explain what he meant: "Doesn't one clearly see in France that a Japanese attack upon Hong Kong or Indo-China or the Dutch East Indies would mean an attack upon the Philippines? If this should happen, our common interests would be endangered and we would have to protect them together."

After this most remarkable statement, the President commented upon the isolationist opposition to any joint action in foreign affairs. He raised the question of whether a policy of neutrality at all costs gave security to the American people and provided his own answer: "Not at all, for it entails dangers and can lead to dangerous situations, indeed even war." He told the Chargé that he had been fighting that policy and that his Chicago speech had played a part in this campaign.

Jules Henry felt it necessary to add his own commentary on what he labeled as "this exceptionally frank, heart-to-heart talk." He admitted, "I have once more gained the impression that Mr. Roosevelt is really moved by feelings of genuine friendship for France," but he went on to warn that the views that Roosevelt had expressed were his own and

[50] Bullitt reported this pessimism to the Secretary of State, Nov. 6, FR, IV, p. 162; Nov. 8, *ibid.*, p. 168.

[51] Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 8, FR, IV, p. 168; and Acting Secretary of State (Welles) to Davis, Nov. 8, *ibid.*, pp. 168-69.

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were not shared by the majority of the American people, "as is clearly shown by the press, . . . and the mood of Congress." However, Henry added most significantly that the President "seemed determined to build up a policy of international cooperation and to keep public opinion alerted."[52]

What music this report must have been to the ears of France's leaders! The State Department might try to temper Henry's account[53] but that apparently had little effect. Even former Ambassador Bonnet accepted Henry's report at its face value.[54] Though the French might bridle at the term "scared rabbits," the prospect of American naval protection surely countered the sting of that remark. Premier Chautemps was so excited by this last cable from Washington that he called in Ambassador Bullitt and repeated his warning that Europe was foredoomed to war unless the United States intervened. Still believing that the best road to peace lay in the appeasement of Germany, the Premier with Bonnet's concurrence suggested that Roosevelt do his part in forwarding this goal by inviting both Chautemps and Hitler to Washington for talks.[55] Delbos, the resister, was as impressed by Roosevelt's remarks as any of his colleagues but he preferred to focus upon the Far East. As he journeyed back to Brussels his expectations must have soared, because success seemed in store for his campaign to encourage American intervention. With Henry's report as evidence of Roosevelt's personal policy, Delbos hoped to lead Davis to a discussion and acceptance of positive alternatives to peaceful solutions.

Upon his return to the Belgian capital, Delbos immediately requested a meeting with Davis and Eden, and on the next day, November 10,

[52] Henry to French Foreign Minister, Nov. 7, as printed in *Berliner Monatshefte*, February 1943, pp. 56-58. See also Bullitt to Secretary of State, Nov. 8, FR, III, pp. 666-67. Langer and Gleason refer to Henry's talk with Roosevelt and cite the article in the *Berliner Monatshefte*, but fail to relate Henry's cable to the Brussels conference; see *Challenge to Isolation*, p. 24.

[53] Acting Secretary of State (Welles) to Bullitt, Nov. 9, FR, IV, pp. 170-71.

[54] Apparently it was not by chance that at this time Bonnet issued a warning to Franz von Papen, the German Ambassador to Austria, who was visiting Paris. Von Papen reported it as fellows: "In his capacity as French Ambassador in Washington he [Bonnet] had discussed the political and economic future of Europe in detail with Roosevelt, and he could assure me that the United States intended to support Franco-British policy in Europe with the full weight of its moral convictions and its material resources." See Memo on Report to the Führer, Nov. 8, 1937, enclosed with German Ambassador in Austria (Papen) to the German Foreign Minister (Neurath), Vienna, Nov. 11, 1937, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, Washington, D.C., 1942, I, pp. 41-42.

[55] For Chautemps' talk with Bullitt, see the latter's dispatch of Nov. 10, FR, IV, pp. 172-74. For further French reaction to Roosevelt's remarks, see Memo of conversation by the Acting Secretary of State (Welles) with Henry, Nov. 10, FR, III, pp. 672-73.

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they met in two long sessions.[56] The American delegate began by talking about another attempt to open negotiations between Japan and China. Eden and Delbos reacted strongly. The latter urged: "We should already begin to consider how far we would be willing ultimately to go." He reiterated that France was prepared to go as far as the United States, provided there was complete solidarity. Japan, in his estimation, feared hostilities with the Western powers if she knew they were definitely united. If each of the nations made a small contribution, the sum total would be large enough to give pause to Japan. He then returned to the vulnerability of Indo-China and stated that France was prepared to guarantee any possession in the Far East, if others reciprocated as to the French colony. Though Moffat noted caustically, "This was what he meant by solidarity," it was, however, a clear statement of what Delbos had maintained from the beginning of the conference: resistance alone would be able to restrain Japan. For his part Eden also repeated that his country would go as far as the United States and then spoke in more specific terms. He first suggested the prohibition of all sales to and purchases from Japan, but went on: "If this idea were not practicable, we might send ships to the Orient, making a display of force." According to Moffat's record and Davis' report to the President and Secretary, the American delegate emphasized that the hands of the Administration were tied by the neutrality legislation, but he held out hope for revision when Congress convened for its special session in five days.

When the three delegates met for the second time on November 10, Delbos reiterated his impatience with the slow pace of the conference but said that he accepted it because of "the necessity of awaiting the meeting of Congress." He stated frankly that he viewed a strong Franco-Anglo-American alignment as a deterrent to the Fascist nations and that "France would be willing to play the role asked of her in the Far East."[57] When the conversation turned to a guarantee of Indo-China, Davis hesitated, for "he would have to give this pretty careful thought." Delbos then went on to say: "President Roosevelt . . . had said that he hoped France would keep the railroad open and that if Indo-China were attacked it would create a community of interest and might even constitute a threat to the Philippines. On the basis of this

[56] For the most detailed record of these sessions, see *Moffat Journals*, Nov. 10, and published excerpts in *Moffat Papers*, pp. 174-78. This record is amplified by Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 11, FR, IV, pp. 177-78; Nov. 14, *ibid.*, pp. 183-85.

[57] This important statement by Delbos appears in the *Moffat Journals* but was not published in the *Moffat Papers*. The latter, however, contains (p. 178) the subsequent quotations from Delbos' remarks at this second meeting on Nov. 10.

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. . . Mr. Delbos felt certain that Mr. Davis would agree to what he wanted. . . ."

It cannot be exactly determined how Davis responded to this news of Roosevelt's remarks to Jules Henry, but apparently he began to talk more freely. The fact of the matter was that only that very morning Davis had requested permission from the President and the Secretary of State to discuss alternatives to mediation. In this cable he noted the failure of the conference's efforts to persuade Japan to enter peaceful negotiations with China. He then urged a plan of positive action whereby the nations meeting in Brussels would agree to take no discriminatory action against China and to exert financial pressure upon Japan. Davis also proposed at this time a revision of the neutrality legislation.[58] Thus when he was informed of the Roosevelt-Henry talks, the one thing that seems to have restrained him was his determination to make no commitments until Washington replied to his morning's request.

Information supplied by Eden to his Ambassador in Washington indicates the limits to which Davis went. According to this source, Davis spoke directly of the steps that he had just formulated for his government's approval: the refusal of the Brussels powers to recognize the acquisition of any territory that Japan might take by force, and financial pressure, both by refusing to extend credit to Japan to develop such territories and by refusing to make purchases from Japan. According to the British Ambassador, "Mr. Davis had likewise discussed a possible fleet movement in the Pacific on the part of the United States, Great Britain and France."[59]

It is indicative of Delbos' reaction to Davis' proposals that upon leaving these meetings he was in a much more co-operative mood than he had been during his first visit to Brussels.[60] He seems to have assumed after the November 10 talks that his whole campaign had been successful and that the United States would now live up to the promise of the "quarantine" speech.

The expectations raised by the three-power talks lived a short life. On Friday, November 12, Secretary Hull replied tersely to Davis' alternative proposals: "None of the measures envisaged therein should be proposed by the United States."[61] In the "back room" meetings that followed,

[58] Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 10, FR, IV, pp. 175-77. See also *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, New York, 1948, I, p. 556; *Moffat Papers*, pp. 174-75.

[59] Memo by Under Secretary of State (Welles) of conversation with the British Ambassador (Lindsay), Nov. 13, FR, IV, pp. 152-55.

[60] Davis reported on Nov. 14, "The French attitude has improved appreciably of late and Delbos has been cooperative and helpful," FR, IV, p. 184.

[61] Secretary of State to Davis, Nov. 12, FR, IV, pp. 180-81.

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Davis must have found it impossible to hide his bitter disappointment over Hull's orders.[62] They stood, as Davis believed, in complete contradiction to what Roosevelt wanted him to do: seek for a peaceful solution first and then, if that was impossible, to consider alternate steps.[63] Both Delbos and Eden urged Davis to fight back. He did argue with the State Department and warned, "Unless we are prepared to participate in some positive steps . . . most countries will lose their nerve and fold their hands." If the Secretary would not consider all of Davis' initial proposals, he should, as a bare minimum, permit Davis to reaffirm the policy of non-recognition of territories seized by force and couple that with financial pressure.[64] Hull's reply did not arrive until after the weekend.

In the meantime the Brussels conference hung in the balance, awaiting the final statement of the American policy. The position of the conference was further complicated by the unwillingness of the smaller nations to consider sanctions and by Japan's second refusal to meet with the other signators of the Nine Power Treaty. The conference, however, met in public session on Saturday, November 13, to discuss its reply to Japan. Each of the major delegates spoke, but each followed the pattern that Davis set and spoke in platitudes.[65] Firmer words and final action on the reply were postponed until after the weekend. Perhaps by that time the American delegate could persuade his Secretary of State to change his mind.

Chances for Davis' success, however, seemed slim. Already the gossip current in Brussels said that Washington was "pulling the props from under [its] delegation" and that Davis' "wings are clipped."[66] News cables from the United States reported a strong revival of isolationism, and, contrary to the hopes of many at the conference, the only voices that spoke out in Washington were those of Congressmen who attacked the efforts of the European nations to involve the United States in non-American affairs. Then when President Roosevelt reopened the special session of Congress on Monday, November 15, he mentioned neither the Far East, the Nine Power conference, nor a revision of the Neutrality Act. All hope died when Davis received Hull's cable stating that

[62] For Davis' reaction to Hull's orders, see *Moffat Papers*, pp. 182 and 184. For many of the details concerning the events after Nov. 10, see the résumé that Davis forwarded to Hull, Nov. 21, FR, IV, pp. 221-24.

[63] The record that Davis kept of his talks with Roosevelt on Oct. 12 and 19 verify that this was Roosevelt's plan; see Davis Papers, File Box 4, Nine Power Conference Folder, Memo of talks with Roosevelt, Oct. 12 and 19, by Davis.

[64] Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 14, FR, IV, p. 185.

[65] For texts, see U.S. Department of State, *The Conference of Brussels*, pp. 58-63.

[66] See Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 14, FR, IV, p. 183.

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even his modified proposals were "outside the scope of the terms of the invitation to the Conference," and ordering Davis to make "a strong reaffirmation of the principles that should underlie international relationships." Davis was aware of the futility of such a step, but two days later he admitted defeat: "I bow to your judgment."[67] Recognizing the situation, the conference adjourned for a week.

The French Foreign Minister refused to take the blow quietly. As the French delegates left Brussels, they stated to the press they would not return unless the United States led the way by playing an active role.[68] Not long after Delbos returned to Paris, the press reported that France had renewed her ban on the shipment of war material through Indo-China.[69] Then in a speech before the Chamber of Deputies the Foreign Minister revealed his own personal feelings: "What makes it disheartening is that while all those nations that hold the destiny of mankind in their hands stand idly by and counsel moderation . . . , two wars are going on and military action in the Far East has been increased."[70] Delbos also seems to have turned for help to Henri Bérenger, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Senate, a former Ambassador to the United States and well-known columnist for the daily *Agence Economique et Financière*. In a public lecture the Senator dealt directly with the Japanese threats against Indo-China and stated that France's greatest hope lay in having the United States as an ally.[71] Each of these moves appear to have been part of Delbos' continuing attempt to demonstrate that resistance alone would halt Japan and that France would support such a policy if assured of American cooperation.

Delbos' campaign, however, prompted a negative reaction from the French Chargé in Washington. Referring directly to Senator Bérenger's speech, Henry warned against such maneuvers, for they could only stimulate the fears of Americans that "they might become puppets in the hands of Machiavellian intriguers from Europe." Indeed Roosevelt's request to reopen Indo-China, his later talk with Henry, even his call for a "quarantine," were his personal views, but "the President is far

[67] See Secretary of State to Davis, Nov. 15, FR, IV, pp. 187-88; Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 17, *ibid.*, pp. 200-2. Hull had cabled, Nov. 16, that there was "no present prospect of a repeal or a suspension or a modification" of the Neutrality Act (Hull, I, p. 556).

[68] Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 21, FR, IV, p. 223. Hull complained to Davis, "In one capital at least they have endeavored to convey the impression of sole responsibility of the United States in this situation" (Nov. 17, FR, IV, pp. 203-4).

[69] *New York Times*, Nov. 17 and 18.

[70] For text, see *Le Temps*, Nov. 20.

[71] For excerpts, see *New York Times*, Nov. 18.

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ahead of the public opinion of his country, and even of his closest collaborators and members of his government." On these grounds Henry concluded, "During these touchy times, which perhaps represent a period of transition for the United States, one must remain realistic and not indulge in hopes which later will not be fulfilled."[72]

After this warning the French Foreign Minister made no further effort to bring the United States into a front resisting Japanese aggression. When the Nine Power conference weakly accepted Hull's demand for a "reaffirmation of principles," Delbos revealed his utter disgust with such a move by informing the members of the French press that it would not be worth their while to return to Brussels. He himself made the trip only in time to affix his signature, most offhandedly, to a document that he had refused to help formulate and that bore in its phrasing all the earmarks of the State Department's thinking.[73]

The conference in Delbos' estimation had ended in a complete debacle. Even more serious than the refusal of the nations meeting at Brussels to act in the Far East was the final proof that the United States would not join a democratic front. The Foreign Minister knew full well what this meant for his policy of resistance, and his disappointment must have been intense after the expectations stimulated by Davis' talk about positive action.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt called for a "quarantine" of the aggressors that October morning in Chicago, he touched off a course of events that had serious consequences. Because the American Congress refused to join a "concerted effort," the Brussels conference became a fiasco. This in turn encouraged the dictators to rasher acts, such as Japan's wanton attack on December 12 upon the U.S.S. "Panay." A second tragic consequence was the weakening of the resisters in Europe. After the Nine Power conference the basic question of the appeasers became more pointed: without the United States, how could a democratic front successfully resist the dictators? Delbos must have found that question especially embarrassing as he traveled through Eastern Europe during early December in a last desperate attempt to line up a front that would resist German expansion. His efforts failed as they had at Brussels, and France became even more dependent upon a Great

[72] Henry to French Foreign Minister, Nov. 18, as printed in *Berliner Monatshefte*, February 1943, pp. 58-60.

[73] For Delbos' activities during the last days of session of the Brussels conference, see Davis to Secretary of State, Nov. 20, SD, 793.94 conference/278; Nov. 21, *ibid.*, /279; *Moffat Papers*, p. 187. For text of the "Declaration of the Conference, November 24, 1937," see U.S. State Department, *The Conference of Brussels*, pp. 76-77. Compare its text with the proposals that Hull forwarded to Davis, Nov. 17, FR, IV, pp. 205-10.

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Britain that was well along Chamberlain's road toward appeasement.[74] By March, in time for Hitler's annexation of Austria, those exponents of resistance, Eden and Delbos, had been forced from office, and with the appointment of Georges Bonnet to the Foreign Ministry in April France fell into line behind Britain.

If the year 1937 is looked at in the broadest perspective, it can be seen as the year of decision. We know now that Hitler laid out his aggressive plans just as the Brussels conference opened.[75] Would he have bowed subsequently before the determined resistance of the democracies? This must always remain one of the great questions of history. However, the chances for the success of resistance were highest in that fall of 1937. Certainly President Roosevelt had the opportunity to provide decisive support for the resisters and he seems to have been aware of this. The refusal of the United States to follow its President left Delbos and his fellow resisters so weakened that they were brushed aside by the appeasers. The aftermath of the "quarantine" speech in France and throughout the world witnessed the reverse of what President Roosevelt intended. As the French and British appeasers gained more and more control of the foreign policies of their nations and appealed to Hitler's "sweet reasonableness,"[76] the pace quickened toward the catastrophes of Munich, Prague, and ultimately the Second World War. Perhaps it is not too much to claim that the die was cast in that fateful year of 1937.

[74] With Chamberlain's approval, Viscount Halifax met Hitler for talks at Berchtesgaden, Nov. 19, just as Eden was attempting to build up a resistance policy at Brussels.

[75] On Nov. 5 Hitler unveiled for his top commanders the plans for aggression that he subsequently implemented.

[76] The term is Duff Cooper's and he used it on the morrow of Munich to castigate Chamberlain's policy of appeasement.

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THE TROTSKYITE MOVEMENT IN CEYLON

By CALVIN A. WOODWARD

"POOR old Trotsky," Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike once remarked, "his unhappy ghost seems to have found its only refuge in this country."[1] While Ceylon is not the only refuge of Trotsky, it is certainly the most hospitable, for nowhere else has his image inspired so successful a following. On two occasions since Ceylon has become independent, one or another of the Trotskyite parties has acted as the principal opposition to the government, and in one instance one of them governed Ceylon in coalition with a party of the Center. Ambitious, dedicated, expressive of the needs of the people, and possessing perhaps the most astute and distinguished leadership of any of the parties in Ceylon now that Bandaranaike has unfortunately been assassinated, the Trotskyite movement seems to have installed itself as a permanent part of Ceylonese politics.

While the activities of the Trotskyite parties in Ceylon have frequently incited fear among Western observers, never have they aroused the scholarly attention their interest would seem to warrant. No history of the parties exists outside of Ceylon, and no attempt has been made to analyze and appraise their nature and their role in Ceylonese politics. Both enticing in terms of the questions it provokes and frustrating because of the paucity of written material available in the West, the Trotskyite movement in Ceylon persists as a phenomenon crying for investigation. Why have the Trotskyite parties been able to prevail over the orthodox Communist Party? Why has the movement had a history of disunity? And finally, what is the nature of the Trotskyite parties in Ceylon and what role do they play in the nation's political life? It is these questions that the following pages attempt to answer.

I. Trotskyism Triumphant

Perhaps no other aspect of the Trotskyite movement in Ceylon is as intriguing as is its ascendancy over the Communist Party. Never, from the outset of the Marxian movement, has Stalinist communism procured nearly the popular support or the intellectual backing which Trotskyism has been able to obtain, even though the Trotskyites have never possessed

[1] Quoted in *New York Times*, March 11, 1959, p. 5.

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the organizational skill and technique of the Communists. To understand how the Trotskyite movement emerged in the first place, and to find out why it has always been able to prevail over the Communists, we must consult the origins of the Marxist movement in Ceylon.

The Marxist movement did not get under way in Ceylon until twenty years after the national independence movement had been initiated in 1915. A protest movement, the Suriya Mal or "Sunflower Movement," had been founded by a group of Marxists in the early 1930's, but its purpose was merely to disseminate Marxian literature throughout Ceylon, and the movement had neither a program nor an operational strategy designed to realize a program. Not until 1935, when the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) was formed, did Marxism become the ideology of a party espousing a positive program and dedicated to the attainment of a defined goal. The relative lateness of the founding of the party and the events in the Communist world that attended its formation were important factors contributing to the development both of a Communist and a Trotskyite persuasion in the LSSP. Had the party been founded earlier, when communism had but one voice, the Communist Party might well have been able to entrench itself as it did in other countries, and survive intact despite the ideological convulsions that were shortly to occur in world communism. If it had had time to develop the rigid organization characteristic of Communist movements, enlist a cadre of dedicated party workers, organize the proletariat, and provide a program and purpose whose appeal would attract the emergent intelligentsia, the Communist Party would have been able to monopolize any radical leftist sentiment in Ceylon. But this did not occur, and the Marxian movement in Ceylon, unlike Marxian movements elsewhere, was founded at a time when the philosophy of Trotsky was distinct from that prevailing in the Soviet Union. Moreover, Trotsky himself was in residence outside the Soviet Union and active both as a symbol and as a center of a communism purporting to be doctrinally unsullied by personal or national opportunism. Thus the existence of a distinct center of Trotskyism, politically weak but possessing the aura of the revolution and strengthened by the heroic and romantic image it recalled, provided the opportunity for the Marxian movement in Ceylon to choose between two brands of communism. The question that now must be asked is why the majority of the membership of the LSSP chose Trotskyism rather than Stalinism as the ideological basis of their movement.

First of all, the nature and message of each of the two voices of com-

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munism had much to do with determining their choice. The mere fact that of the two voices one spoke with the eloquence of idealism, while the other spoke with the calculation of realism, had great bearing on the preference of the leadership of the LSSP for Trotskyism. Stalinism, derived as it was more from the needs of the Soviet Union than from Marxian doctrine, was disillusioning, and the founders of the LSSP were at that youthful and idealistically inclined age that is not receptive to disillusionment. But Trotsky, the greatest living theoretician of communism, eloquent in his polemics and romantic in his isolation, symbolized the idealism of communism, and this, unlike Stalinism, was inspiring. Moreover, Trotskyism provided an escape from the brutality of communism in practice to the humanity of communism in theory. The bulk of the LSSP leadership was temperamentally inclined toward Trotskyism, since it was prone to emphasize theory and found distasteful the harshness of communism in power—a harshness contrary to the liberal and humanitarian ideal of communism that their education had impressed upon them.

Second, and perhaps of greater importance, Trotskyism was more adaptable to the needs of the Marxian movement in Ceylon than was Stalinism. The very weakness and inability of Trotsky to direct rigidly any movement inspired by his name and philosophy sufficed to make this so, for it allowed the LSSP to determine its policies in accord with what it felt circumstances in Ceylon necessitated. Had it joined the Comintern and placed itself under the control of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, it would have had to follow the dictates of an agency unresponsive to the needs of Ceylon and formulating its directives according to the interests of the Soviet Union.[2] The LSSP had to work within a political atmosphere highly charged with nationalism, and the weakness of the party did not allow it the luxury of deviating from the restrictions imposed upon it by the environment and circumstances in which it had to operate. Besides, the leaders of the LSSP were highly nationalistic, and, according to W. Howard Wriggins, in the platform of the LSSP at this time, "independence was its first plank, socialism the second. . . ."[3] Consequently, the party viewed the nationalization of the Communist movement by Stalin not only as a perversion of Marx-

[2] Colvin R. de Silva, the leading Trotskyite theoretician, often stresses the fact that the Trotskyite movement sprang from the needs of the Ceylonese masses. On the other hand, "The authority whom the Ceylon Communist Party has to satisfy and obey," de Silva remarked in 1950, "is not the masses of Ceylon, but the Soviet bureaucracy functioning through the Cominform" (*Left Disunity*, Lanka Sama Samaja Publication, Colombo, 1950, p. 19).

[3] *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, Princeton, N.J., 1960, p. 125.

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ism,[4] but also as antithetical to the interests of the Marxian movement in Ceylon and in conflict with its members' own fervent dedication to Ceylonese nationalism. Thus, by drawing inspiration from Trotsky rather than from Stalin, the LSSP found a convenient way to remain nationalistic, to devise policies tuned to the interests of Ceylon, and at the same time to claim the support of one of the original founders of the Communist movement.

Third, had the LSSP joined the Comintern, it would have had to transfer to the Soviet Union the authority to designate the opposition in terms of which the LSSP defined itself. Ever since the founding of the party, the LSSP had set itself in opposition to the British and the Ceylon National Congress, which the LSSP considered to be merely the dupe of the British. This definition was an important political asset to the party, as it enabled it to identify itself as a voice of Ceylonese nationalism. Founded on a class-oriented ideology that appealed to only a small segment of Ceylonese society, this identification with the nationalist ideology was crucial to the efforts of the LSSP to broaden its popular appeal and develop into a mass party. Had it associated itself with the Comintern, it would have lost much of its appeal as a nationalist party, not only because of the internationalist nature of the association, but primarily because it would have been instructed to terminate its opposition to the British. Unlike the Ceylon National Congress, the LSSP was not prominent enough to modify its agitation against the British without losing its pretense of being a nationalist party. It was this need to retain its definition of the British as the opposition that was one of the most compelling reasons why the LSSP refused to join the Comintern and accept Stalinism as its creed.

While the ease with which Trotskyism could be accommodated to the needs and inclinations of the LSSP was a major reason for its acceptance by most of the LSSP leadership, personality and the circumstances that attended the educational experience of the more prominent leaders of the party also played an important role. Two founders of the LSSP, N. M. Perera and Colvin R. de Silva, had come into contact with Trotskyite circles when they were studying in London in the late 1920's and early 1930's.[5] On the other hand, Dr. Wickremasinghe, who was to

[4] This deviation from theory and the bureaucratization of the Soviet Union form the crux of de Silva's denunciation of Stalinism (*op.cit.*, and *Their Politics and Ours*, Lanka Sama Samaja Publication, Colombo, 1954). It is also the basis of Leslie Gunawardena's denunciation of the Third International (*The Third International Condemned*, Lanka Sama Samaja Publication, Colombo, 1940).

[5] Philip Gunawardena, another leader of the Trotskyite faction in the LSSP, studied at the University of Wisconsin and received his training in Marxism from Scott Nearing.

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lead the Stalinist break from the LSSP, had been influenced by a Stalinist group during his years of study in London. This acquaintance left a decided impression on these future leaders of the LSSP and unquestionably influenced them in the ideological choice they made when they returned to Ceylon.[6] The fact that Perera became a confirmed Trotskyite was the most important personal factor in turning the LSSP into a professed Trotskyite party. Perera had won wide acclaim for his work in relieving the fever victims of the malaria epidemic that swept Ceylon in 1934-1935, and of all the leaders of the LSSP he was the most beloved by the Ceylonese people. Moreover, his charm and urbanity had made him popular among the membership of the LSSP. This, combined with the prestige he enjoyed because of his possession of a Ph.D. in Economics from London University, gave him a unique influence in the party. Consequently, his support of Trotskyism as the ideological inspiration of the LSSP was often decisive in persuading others in the party also to accept Trotskyism.

Personal considerations, ideological inclinations, and the needs of a new party trying to stabilize itself in a political setting so long monopolized by others thus combined to make the LSSP an avowedly Trotskyite party.[7] The triumph of Trotskyism at this time is the main reason that it has been able to survive as the predominant exponent of Marxism in Ceylon. Since it was the Trotskyites who retained control of the LSSP, it was they who also retained control of the trade unions that the party had set up. While the Communists made some inroads into the Trotskyite monopoly of these unions during the war, the LSSP was successful in maintaining its predominance and today draws an overwhelming share of working-class support. Among the estate workers, for instance, the Trotskyite trade unions have 70,000 members, while the trade unions of the Communist Party have only 12,000.[8] This dominance of the Trotskyite unions over the Communist ones is repeated throughout Ceylon,[9] and the fact that the Trotskyite parties predominate in all the coastal working-class areas is due to the importance of the two Trotskyite unions, the All-Ceylon Harbour and Dock Workers' Union and the United Port Workers' Union.

[6] Wriggins, *op.cit.*, pp. 125-26.

[7] It must also be mentioned that the LSSP was not in any way financially dependent on the Comintern. As de Silva proudly remarked in 1959, "We never got a penny from the Comintern. We preserved our financial and ideological independence." Quoted in *New York Times*, March 11, 1959, p. 5.

[8] While the Trotskyites have been far more successful than the Communists in organizing the estate workers, most of the estate workers belong to non-Marxist unions.

[9] According to the *New York Times*, the Trotskyite unions have a membership of one million (February 25, 1959, p. 7).

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The fact that three of the leaders of the original LSSP became Trotskyites has also contributed to the continued success of Trotskyism in Ceylon. Not only has the possession of such able and popular leaders as Perera, de Silva, and Gunawardena enabled the Trotskyites to gain popular support, but they have been a great asset in attracting the bulk of the leftist intelligentsia to the movement. The activity of these men during the war enhanced their prestige and impressed the people with the notion that they were the "only men of the people" who fought against the British. Referring to their exile during the war, the Trotskyite leaders, according to Wriggins, "could claim for themselves an unusual asset in Ceylonese politics—a myth of heroic sacrifice in the struggle."[10] The Communists, on the contrary, could make no such claim since they co-operated with the British, and as a result their appeal to the people as an anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist party has not been nearly as effective as has the same appeal of the Trotskyites.

But, most importantly, the fact that the Trotskyites, unlike the Communist Party, are under the control of no foreign power enables them to present themselves as true exponents of Ceylonese nationalism.[11] Claiming that their movement was "a creation of the Ceylonese masses," the Trotskyites allude to their war record as proof that they alone, among all Ceylonese parties, represent the true interests of the Ceylonese people. Referring to the parties of the Right, especially the United National Party, as agents of British and American finance, and speaking of the Communist Party as "a projection of the Soviet bureaucracy in Ceylon,"[12] the LSSP has successfully associated itself with Ceylonese nationalism. Not only has this enabled them to gain significant popular support, but it also has gained them the support of that portion of the intelligentsia which, while believing in Marxism, is too nationalistic to join the Communist Party. They are attracted to the Trotskyites because they believe, as de Silva stated to a gathering in 1959, "To us, the essential question is that we will never make ourselves a passive instrument of Soviet foreign policy."[13]

Because of its possession of a number of notables and the tradition of the LSSP, its affiliation with Ceylonese nationalism, and its espousal of a nationalistic Marxism—which in fact is what Trotskyism has become in Ceylon—the Trotskyite movement has been able to attract and

[10] *Op.cit.*, p. 126.

[11] According to Andrew Roth, "In Ceylon, the left is considered more nationalistic, less corrupt, and more interested in popular welfare" ("Is Ceylon Independent?" *The Nation*, Vol. 167, September 1948).

[12] *Their Politics and Ours*, p. 19.

[13] Quoted in *New York Times*, March 11, 1959, p. 5.

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recruit both the support of the masses and the support of the intelligentsia to a much greater extent than has the Communist Party. The "moderate variety" of Marxism preached by the Trotskyites has also given them recruitment and electoral advantages. Many professional and middle-class people who desire greater social progress are attracted to the LSSP, which promises important reforms without preaching a total social revolution as do the Communists. Moreover, the LSSP is more democratically organized than is the Communist Party, and the opportunity this affords for personal activity and decision has frequently been decisive in persuading leftist intellectuals to join the LSSP.

There are many reasons, therefore, why the Trotskyite movement has been able to maintain its dominance over the Communist Party in the politics of Ceylon. But to whatever extent later developments may have enabled Trotskyism to survive in Ceylon, much of its success was surely due to its peculiar origin. Without the events, circumstances, and personalities that attended the founding of the LSSP, it is distinctly possible that the "ghost of Trotsky" would not have found such a hospitable refuge in Ceylon.

II. A "History of Disunity"

Ever since Ceylon became independent in 1947, the Trotskyite parties have been able to secure sizable representation in the House of Representatives. But while collectively their strength has been impressive, as S. Namasivayan observed at the outset of the new state, ". . . their significance as an opposition is diminished by the fact that they cannot unite and have allowed differences, which appear to the detached observer academic and theoretical, which keep them apart."[14] But, as Namasivayan implies, these differences are not merely "academic and theoretical"; they are fundamental, and ever since the founding of the Trotskyite movement in Ceylon they have repeatedly resulted in its fragmentation. Splitting successively in 1940, 1941, 1945, and 1949, the Trotskyite movement has rarely been able to present itself to the people as a united party.

While each of these splits originated under different circumstances, all of them exhibited, either singly or in combination, an ideological schism or a personal struggle for power. Struggles for power between the Stalinist Dr. Wickremasinghe and the leaders of the Trotskyite group—Colvin R. de Silva, N. M. Perera, and Philip Gunawardena—in 1941; a personal defection in 1942 by a leader dissatisfied with his

[14] *The Legislatures of Ceylon, 1928-1948*, London, Faber and Faber, 1950, p. 138.

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commission in the party; disputes among de Silva, Perera, and Gunawardena over the leadership of the reunited Lanka Sama Samaja Party in 1945; and struggles among these same three men for pre-eminence in 1949 have been predominantly responsible for all the splits the Trotskyite movement has undergone. In all of these disputes ideological cleavages have also played a part: differences over the communism of Stalin and that of communism unassociated with a particular country in 1941; a difference resembling the Lenin-Bolshevik, Trotsky-Menshevik split of 1903 in 1942; and ideological disagreement concerning the valid interpretation of doctrine in all of the disputes since 1942.

Much of the "history of disunity" that has marked the movement is due to the fact that it has not produced a Lenin or a Stalin, or indeed a Trotsky, whose polemical genius, organizational skill, or sheer ruthlessness would have enabled one leader to assume and retain unchallenged control of the party.[15] Several leaders have approached this, but none has been able to combine the essential qualities of leadership in the proportion necessary to gain absolute control of the Trotskyite movement. In the main, the emergence of a dynamic party leader has been prevented because the movement has possessed so many capable and energetic leaders that no one of them can predominate over the others.[16] Colvin R. de Silva, while "one of the principal propagandists and party theoreticians," according to Wriggins, is only one of a number and, besides, he lacks organizational skill. Perera is perhaps the most popular Trotskyite leader in Ceylon, but his penchant for compromise has prevented him from retaining the near-dictatorial powers he once possessed in the movement. Gunawardena, on the other hand, although assuredly a capable politician, exhibits so much ambition for power that he has alienated much of his support in the party and consequently enjoys little backing.[17]

That the Trotskyite movement is beset by dispersed leadership po-

[15] Cultural factors have made it difficult for the Trotskyites to produce such a leader. According to Wriggins, a "deep distrust of power" and a resistance to allowing any one individual to gain too much power are "deeply embedded" in Ceylon's culture and have militated against the efforts of any of the Trotskyite leaders to dominate the movement. This same feature of Ceylon's culture has inhibited the rigid organization of any of the Ceylonese parties and has prevented even such outstanding national leaders as S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and D. S. Senanayake from gaining complete control of their parties. The Trotskyite movement, however, has had the added organizational difficulties that are inherent in an ideological orientation and a pluralistic leadership.

[16] In 1952, Ivor Jennings noted that the LSSP "contains enough leaders of ability to form a government at least as efficient as that formed by the United National Party" ("Politics in Ceylon," *Far Eastern Survey*, 1952, p. 180).

[17] For biographies of these men, see Ceylon Daily News, *Parliament of Ceylon 1947*, and *Parliament of Ceylon 1956*, Colombo, 1947 and 1957.

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tential is in large part due to the fact that the LSSP was founded under the inspiration of a pluralistic leadership. Had it been founded instead by one individual whose parental association with the party would have made it synonymous with his name, he might well have been able to elicit the popular support and command the party support necessary for him to emerge as the dominant leader. But the LSSP was forged by the efforts of four highly competent men—Colvin R. de Silva, N. M. Perera, Dr. Wickremasinghe, and Philip Gunawardena—each of whom could with equal plausibility claim title to being the inspiration of the original movement. That much of the history of disunity of the Trotskyite movement is traceable to its origin in a pluralistic and highly capable leadership is attested by the fact that each of its founders has led one of the parties that broke from the original movement.

The ideological battles that later were to accompany and embellish the struggles for power among the founders of the Trotskyite movement also originated in the conditions that attended the founding of the LSSP. Several reasons would seem to account for the prominence of ideology at the inception of the LSSP. In the first place, any new political movement, especially one with a revolutionary character and without foreseeable prospects of political success, is likely to emphasize ideology. In addition, the youthfulness, education, and political inexperience of the founders of the party, as well as the fact that the movement originated in "academic circles" led by students only recently out of the university, greatly contributed to the ideological emphasis of the early movement. Other factors, such as the need to recruit party members without being able to promise any immediate political rewards and the need to substitute for their lack of organization some means of achieving party cohesion, also contributed to the ideological orientation of the LSSP. But most important was the fact that the LSSP was founded at a time when world communism was undergoing an ideological schism. This schism, particularly when it was accompanied by a purge of the "old guard," resulted in numerous debates and discussions in academic circles like the one in which the Ceylonese Trotskyite movement originated. Consequently, ideology was an important issue of discussion among Marxists in Ceylon at the time of the founding of the movement in 1935.

While a pluralistic leadership and the beginnings of an ideological schism portended future ruptures from the outset of the Trotskyite movement, much of the disunity might have been prevented if the movement had developed a centralized organization relatively soon after its formation. But this it did not do, and rather than operating

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under the organizational principle of "democratic centralism" that Lenin had used so successfully, the LSSP relied upon a centrifugally oriented organization with a central body operating by means of discussion and compromise.[18] While in part a decentralized organization resulted from the pluralistic nature of the leadership, much also was a product of the indecision and vagueness of purpose that accompanied the early years of the party. Besides this, the means employed by the party to integrate the electorate did not require an elaborate organization, and since the LSSP, like all parties at this time, had to depend upon the use of local notables—politics in Ceylon being an eminently personal affair—the party could not develop a rigidly centralized organization. The organization of the LSSP was therefore highly personalized, with the local bodies of the party pivoting about a local notable and groups of these notables in turn pivoting about one of the national leaders of the LSSP.[19]

All of these features of the early movement—an ideological orientation, a pluralistic leadership, and a loose, decentralized and highly personalized organization—made the party ripe for dissension and factionalism. When the Soviet Union, by its Sovietization of world communism, its manifest manipulation of the Comintern to make it adjust and conform to the needs of Soviet foreign policy, and its signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, provided the occasion for a firm decision of the LSSP as to its course of action, all of these sources of potential dissension in the party converged and the LSSP underwent its initial division. It is interesting to note that when the split occurred, the membership of the party divided itself, nearly without exception, according to the position and action taken by the national leader about whom each segment pivoted.

While the expulsion of the Stalinist faction of the LSSP might have been expected to result in a greater degree of organizational cohesiveness, ideological unity, and consensus among the party leaders, especially since their number had thus been decreased, the party was not given the time necessary to effect greater unity. Adopting a policy of "revolutionary defeatism," the LSSP opposed the war effort and agitated among the people to persuade them not to support Great Britain. Consequently, the British outlawed the party, jailed its leaders, and forced the movement underground. As a result, the organization of the LSSP was

[18] A. Vaidialingham, *Samasamajism*, Colombo, 1940.

[19] Except for the fact that the decisions of the party were reached in the organization of the party itself, rather than in parliament, the LSSP greatly resembled Max Weber's "party of notables" ("Politics as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber*, New York, 1958, p. 100).

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largely destroyed and each of the leaders, after he escaped from prison, built an organization entirely around himself. Because of their inability to participate in the political life of Ceylon, and because of the general atmosphere of the war, each of the leaders concentrated on ideology, and, as a result of "years of proscription," according to Wriggins, "party leaders became adept at the nice theoretical points and shadings of argumentation."[20]

Thus the war revived, or nurtured the conditions for a revival of, ideological cleavages in the LSSP. It also aggravated the potential struggles for power in a pluralistic leadership by splitting this leadership and enabling each leader to acquire a dedicated following. At the same time, it contributed to the further decentralization of the party. Thus the war intensified each of the aspects of the movement in which disruption was latent, and helped solidify these features of the movement into a permanent pattern whose implications for disunity were realized shortly after the war.

From the end of the war until the elections of 1960, the Trotskyite movement remained divided into two parties. However, by 1960 Ceylonese politics had developed a party system wherein two parties had emerged that were powerful enough to gain a parliamentary majority without the assistance of any minor party. Because of this the Trotskyite movement was compelled to unite in order to survive. However, the reunited Lanka Sama Samaja Party contains the seeds of future disruption. Personality differences remain to threaten the unity of the movement and, while the leadership has come to a working understanding, the basic causes of the history of disunity that has marked the Trotskyite movement in Ceylon have not changed. While judgment concerning the durability of the reunited LSSP is perhaps premature, the past of the Trotskyite movement in Ceylon would seem to offer little hope that the current unity of the LSSP will last.

III. Trotskyism in the Politics of Ceylon

The Trotskyite movement has added color and at times a much-needed vitality to Ceylonese politics. During the early years of independence, the two Trotskyite parties—the LSSP led by P. Gunawardena and N. M. Perera, and Colvin R. de Silva's Bolshevik-Leninist Party—provided the only effective opposition to the government of the United National Party. It was in an effort to increase their effectiveness as an opposition that these two parties merged in 1949. P. Gunawardena,

[20] *Op.cit.*, p. 127.

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however, who had personal differences with de Silva and who discerned in the merger a lessening of his power, withdrew from the LSSP and formed the Viplavakari (Revolutionary) LSSP. The majority of the LSSP membership remained with Perera and de Silva, and under their leadership formed the Nava (New) LSSP. From 1950 until they merged ten years later, these two parties acted as the spokesmen of Trotskyism in Ceylon.

A shared ideological tradition, however, was practically the only feature which the NLSSP and VLSSP had in common. The NLSSP, which served as the principal opposition to the government from 1956 to 1960, was more ideologically oriented than the VLSSP and less willing to compromise with other parties. The VLSSP, on the other hand, was decidedly more opportunistic than the NLSSP and was prompt to conclude any alliances or coalitions that promised to increase the power of the party. More so than any other, it was this feature of the VLSSP that set off a number of polemical barrages from the NLSSP. As early as 1954, when the VLSSP entered into a coalition with the Communist Party, Colvin R. de Silva spoke of "Mr. Philip Gunawardena's own capitulation to Stalinism" and referred to the VLSSP as "a dependent satellite group of ex-Trotskyites turned Stalinist."[21] While the VLSSP shortly withdrew from this coalition, it thereafter modified its criticism of the Communist Party of Ceylon and altered its negative view of the Soviet Union. In 1957, Gunawardena traveled extensively throughout the Soviet Union and indicated that he was extremely pleased with the social and economic progress it had achieved under the leadership of the Communist Party. He also praised the political freedom allowed in the Soviet Union, and expressed his belief that the individual enjoyed much greater freedom of political thought in Russia, even under Stalin's regime, than he did in the United States. However, this favorable attitude did not lead Gunawardena to alter the ideological orientation of the VLSSP. Under his leadership, the VLSSP remained a strong exponent of Trotskyism and refused to take any action that might bring it under the control of the Soviet Union.

While the program of the VLSSP for the nationalization and socialization of the means of production and distribution was similar to that of the more moderate NLSSP, the VLSSP advocated that it be carried out with revolutionary speed, while the NLSSP was in favor of a more evolutionary schedule. Moreover, the VLSSP was decidedly less receptive to the democratic principle than was the NLSSP. "Where do

[21] *Their Politics and Ours*, p. 28.

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you find democratic socialism?" Gunawardena once asked. "In the moon?"[22] In an interview with a *New York Times* correspondent, Gunawardena elaborated on his ideas and described them as follows: "I consider myself a Leninist. I want a Socialist society for Ceylon—all private enterprise must *totally* disappear. The amount of freedom we will have will depend on whether the imperialists intervene. If they do, we will have to take steps not normally considered democratic."[23]

It is debatable, however, whether the anti-democratic and dictatorial tendencies of Gunawardena reflect his Marxian training or are more a product of his quite obvious desire for power. That personal, rather than ideological, considerations motivate him was amply demonstrated by the promptness with which he managed a coalition with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party in 1956 and accepted a post in the administration after their coalition won the election. As Minister of Agriculture, Lands, and Land Development in the cabinet of Bandaranaike, both his radicalism and ambition resulted in repeated clashes with the other members of the Cabinet. Accused by his colleagues of "taking the country on the road to communism," Gunawardena was charged with devising schemes for socialization and nationalization designed primarily to enable him to assume "dictatorial powers."[24] But while it is perhaps questionable whether Gunawardena gives priority to his personal ambition or his socialist beliefs, he seems to have made it clear that dictatorship and a somewhat personalized style of communism dominate his political thought and, consequently, that of the VLSSP, of which he has been virtual dictator.

The NLSSP, on the other hand, was the stronger of the two Trotskyite parties and espoused a moderate program of "democratic socialism" such that many Ceylonese, according to Wriggins, were led to "a fairly solid conviction that there would be little difference between a NLSSP government led by the Trotskyist Dr. N. M. Perera and the British Labour Party."[25] Following a creed that observers described as "a blend of Marxism and nationalism," the program of the NLSSP "insists on political freedom" and calls for the nationalization of the big plantations, banks, insurance companies, and the export-import trade, and the socialization of the major means of production and distribution. Thus not only was the moderate socialization program of the

[22] Quoted in *New York Times*, November 23, 1957, p. 5.
[23] Quoted in *ibid.*, November 25, 1957, p. 10.
[24] By D. Dahanayake, quoted in *ibid.*, May 8, 1959, p. 4.
[25] *Op.cit.*, p. 131.

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NLSSP in sharp contrast to the notion of the VLSSP that "all private enterprise must totally disappear," but it also believed that "democratic socialism" is workable in Ceylon and not only "in the moon." While hesitant to accept his words entirely at their face value, Wriggins describes the political beliefs of Perera as follows: "He contends that his conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat includes the notions of multiparty competition for votes, the existence of an unfettered political opposition, and, like the British Labour Party, if the majority of the voters reject the NLSSP, it will step down."[26]

The NLSSP was the most anti-Stalinist of the two Trotskyite parties, and while it was willing at times to join in a united front with the Communist Party of Ceylon, it had such differences with this party that it refused even to consider a merger. Its main difference with the Communist Party, de Silva has said, "roots itself in the attitude of the Soviet Union. . . ."[27] But it was not the Soviet Union as a whole to which the NLSSP was opposed; according to de Silva, "there are no better and more consistent friends of the Soviet Union, i.e., defenders of the social gains of the October Revolution, than us Trotskyites."[28] It was rather the Soviet bureaucracy, which was seen as usurping the power of the state for its own interests, a bureaucracy that is "concerned with trading the world revolutionary movement for agreements with imperialists in order to safeguard its own existence."[29] Thus it was not so much an ideological difference that separated the NLSSP from the Soviet Union as it was the use by the Stalinists of the power of the Soviet Union and of world communism to further their own ends. It is largely because of this that the NLSSP consistently opposed the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. But the NLSSP became a greatly democratized party and the rift between it and the Soviet Union grew deeper than ever. In view of this, there was little chance that the NLSSP would ever mend its differences with the Soviet Union or with the Communist Party of Ceylon, whose "first task," according to the NLSSP, "is to destroy Trotskyism."[30]

The recent merger of the NLSSP and the VLSSP is indicative of the growing insecurity of Trotskyism in Ceylon. While the Trotskyite movement will most likely remain the spokesman of leftist radicalism, the growth of the SLFP into a majority party has effectively ended any

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 142.
[27] *Left Disunity*, p. 9.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 17. De Silva says that Lenin "entrusted Trotsky with the task of organizing the fight against this process of bureaucratic usurpation" (*ibid.*, p. 14).
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

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hopes the movement had of developing into a major party.[31] This is recognized by the LSSP, for in the recent elections it did not attempt to contest more than thirty of the one hundred and fifty seats in the House of Representatives. Accepting its role as a minority party, the LSSP has based its political strategy on the hope of holding the balance of power in the parliament of Ceylon and thereby gaining control of the government in coalition with one of the major parties. But the increasing conservatism of both major parties makes the possibility of such coalition dim. Because of this, if the Trotskyite movement is to survive as a vital force in Ceylonese politics, it must adapt itself to the changing and less radical political temper of the country. If it refuses to do so, it is likely that its potential as a "coalition party" and its appeal as an opposition party will substantially decline.

[31] As Saul Rose observes, the rise of the SLFP was "electorally damaging" to the Trotskyites because "it provided an avenue for expression of non-Marxist Sinhalese opposition to the UNP" (*Socialism in Southern Asia*, New York, 1959, p. 86).

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Research Note

SYSTEM AND PROCESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

A Statistical Afterthought*

By ERNST B. HAAS

IT is perhaps surprising that statistical efforts to study political systems have been so slow in making an appearance in the field of international organization. Since the tedium of counting can easily enough be overcome by an externally financed and judicious delegation of authority, even this obstacle should no longer be serious. A more vital question involves the legitimate use to which such statistical exercises might be put. Certainly, counting for the sake of accumulating numerical aggregates, with or without sophisticated manipulation, is a useless enterprise; it can be justified only if the work contributes clarity of demonstration and economy of effort, not otherwise attainable, to an intellectual problem. Even though I shall present some counting techniques applied in a study of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and shall seek to justify their use on this basis, I am by no means convinced that statistical devices found appropriate in other social science contexts should be imitated slavishly in the study of international organization. Roll-call voting studies are admirable devices for determining the waxing and waning of bloc cohesion; but if we are trying to predict the policy position of a state in an international organization, it is far less certain that the Guttman Scale contributes either economy of effort or clarity of demonstration that cannot be obtained by conventional means.[1] The purpose of this article is the demonstration of what may

* Without the devoted statistical assistance of Kurt Vogel and Hildegarde Haas the completion of this article would have been impossible. I am also indebted to the Rockefeller Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, and the Institute of International Studies of the University of California (Berkeley) for financial assistance at various times, and to Herbert McClosky for criticism and advice.

[1] See the pioneering article by Leroy N. Rieselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly," *International Organization*, XIV (Spring 1960), pp. 291-306. The author makes a very convincing case for the use of the Rice Index of Cohesion and a less plausible one for the Guttman Scale, since the predictive possibilities of scalar regularities are so limited as to make unprofitable the

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be useful techniques. It is not my aim to extract all possible conclusions from the illustrative data, or to write a full analysis of the ILO.

I. The Environment of International Systems

One strong argument for a judicious amount of quantification in the study of international organizations stems from the increasing use of systems theory. Whether we favor the analytical use of purely heuristic types of systems or the more earthbound variety associated with historical sociology, the fact remains that incisive treatment demands the operational definition of boundaries. Systems that are coterminous with the sum total of international phenomena are merely a further contribution to obfuscation; hence the understandable concern of systems theorists with boundary-maintenance, even at the cost of reifying the system. In any event, a meaningful system also presupposes an "environment."[2] This notion has been responsible for a great deal of difficulty in delineation; however, without an attempt at spelling out the setting in which a given international organization must function, theorizing about the "system" represented by a given organization or group of organizations must remain vague.

It may well be argued, for example, that the ILO represents a system in which governments, employers, and workers—each forming an international sub-system with great functional specificity—influence one another in a regular fashion so as to "put out" a body of norms, the international labor conventions and recommendations. Now it would be most tempting to develop a systemic theory of international social legislation on this basis, but such a temptation must be resolutely resisted unless we specify the social and economic setting in which the actors conduct themselves. This is the purpose of specifying the "environment" in which international labor conventions originate, as shown in Table 1. The table was compiled by determining from the records of each International Labor Conference the identity of the states repre-

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burden of establishing them. For other applications of a modified Rice Scale, see my *Consensus Formation in the Council of Europe*, Berkeley, Calif., 1960; and Ernst B. Haas and Peter H. Merkl, "Parliamentarians Against Ministers: The Case of WEU," *International Organization*, XIV (Winter 1960), pp. 37-59.

[2] See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, IX (April 1957), pp. 383-400; Charles McClelland, "Systems and History in International Relations: Some Perspectives for Empirical Research and Theory," *General Systems Yearbook*, III (1958), pp. 222-34; and McClelland, "The Function of Theory in International Relations," mimeographed paper prepared for the Symposium on the Place of Theory in the Conduct and Study of International Relations, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, May 1960.

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TABLE 1. THE ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR LEGISLATION AS MEASURED BY CHARACTERISTICS OF STATES PARTICIPATING IN SELECTED INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCES
(in per cent)

	States Participating in Conferences								
	1920	*1925*	*1930*	*1935*	*1939*	*1945*	*1950*	*1955*	*1958*
Location									
Europe	67	61	54	55	46	45	39	40	39
North America	4	2	2	4	4	5	5	3	3
Latin America	15	25	27	20	28	29	20	23	23
Australasia	4	2	4	4	4	5	5	3	3
Asia	10	7	9	12	13	10	27	24	21
Africa	0	3	4	5	5	6	4	7	11
Political System									
Democracy	70	55	46	39	42	57	64	55	51
Oligarchy	30	41	46	43	47	33	27	26	24
Totalitarian	0	4	8	18	11	10	10	19	25
Economic Development									
Mature industrial	22	16	15	16	19	19	20	21	22
Rapidly industrializing	26	20	19	29	26	31	25	26	24
Mature agricultural	22	18	17	12	14	12	11	10	7
Underdeveloped	30	46	49	43	41	38	44	43	47
Economic Institutions									
Free enterprise	81	82	81	63	63	48	41	48	51
Social welfare	19	11	13	27	35	40	50	35	31
Communist	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	11	14
Corporatist	0	7	6	10	2	10	10	6	4
Political Alignment									
West				22	33		73	63	64
Totalitarian				14	5		0	10	13
Neutral				64	62		27	27	23
Number of states participating	27	44	48	49	43	42	44	62	72

sented and assigning to each state a characterization on the basis of standard political and economic information available.

The headings referring to location and political alignment are self-explanatory, but the remainder of the categories are not. "Democracy" is considered to be the applicable political characterization of a state if there are agreed and regularly observed rules for peaceful change, if voluntary participation in politics on the basis of associational interest groups prevails, if free choice among two or more political parties is possible, and the rule of law is observed. A state is considered an "oligarchy" if there are no regularly observed rules of peaceful change, continuous participation in politics is limited to a small group of literate and/or wealthy citizens, the political scene is dominated by such institu-

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tional interest groups as the army, church, or bureaucracy, and if there is no consistent and reliable rule of law. Examples of oligarchical government are provided by contemporary Nicaragua, Peru, Thailand, and Morocco. States are characterized as "totalitarian," finally, if political leadership is monopolized by one group or party, peaceful change is possible within that group alone and not within any other actual or potential groups, mass participation in politics is compulsory and without choice of program or party, and the rule of law exists only within the limits of loyalty to the party and its programs. Apart from the Communist states, contemporary Guinea, Cuba, and possibly the former United Arab Republic fall into this pattern.

A word of clarification must be added with respect to our "oligarchies." I have grouped together political systems on the basis of their prevailing structures *in action* and have ignored the more or less sincere declared intentions of their leaders. Edward Shils, by contrast, distinguishes "tutelary democracies," "modernizing oligarchies," "totalitarian oligarchies," and "traditional oligarchies."[3] On the basis of their actual conduct, tutelary democracies are either real democracies (India) or approach totalitarianism (Ghana). Totalitarian oligarchies are merely totalitarian systems prevented by an imperfect technology or lack of social mobilization from approaching the Nazi or Soviet prototype, distinctly a short-run factor. While there is a real difference between a traditional and a modernizing oligarchy (e.g., Bolivia before and after the 1952 revolution), the difference resides mainly in the intentions of the oligarchs and not necessarily in the structure of politics; and intentions, as Latin America amply demonstrates, are subject to drastic change. Since we are concerned with establishing the political environment of International Labor Conferences at specific points in time, a purely structural classification is to be preferred.

In categorizing stages of economic development, the overwhelming

[3] As cited in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, Princeton, N.J., 1960, pp. 53-54. Shils's categories are applied to the classification of some fifty new nations by Coleman in *ibid.*, pp. 561-76. The apologies and caveats accompanying the classification convinced me that a less ambitious scheme which focuses on immediate structural features to the detriment of declared policy objectives is preferable for spelling out the environment of international organizations. However, in the devising of typologies, the necessity for distinguishing between structural elements, seen at a fixed point in time, and dynamic political motivations among elites by no means negates the desirability of classifying motivations. While it would be tempting to argue that a certain quantity of "inputs" into ILO, deriving from strong social welfare and modernizing commitments on the part of political elites, results in an "output" of a specific type of international convention, the history of ILO and the record of the members in ratifying conventions fail to establish such a connection. See my subsequent discussion of "coverage."

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influence of W. W. Rostow hardly requires acknowledgment.[4] A "mature industrialized state" is characterized by a high or medium per capita GNP, a continuing high rate of investment, a preponderance of manufacturing in the total economy, and high technological inventiveness and adaptability. Examples are furnished by the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Japan. A "rapidly industrializing state" possesses a medium or low per capita GNP, a very high rate of investment, a marked tendency to create new manufacturing facilities and to de-emphasize agriculture relative to industry, a managerial and administrative eagerness to adopt new techniques, and the likelihood of just having reached or having nearly reached "take-off." Such conditions are found in Argentina, India, Australia, and South Africa. A "mature agricultural state" is characterized by a medium or high per capita GNP, a preponderance in the total economy of scientific and mechanized agriculture for export, high technological and managerial adaptability, and a rate of investment adequate to maintaining the position achieved. Such attributes may be found in Uruguay, Denmark, and New Zealand. An economy is "underdeveloped" if per capita GNP is low or stagnant at a medium level, if there is very little or no capital investment, if there is little managerial or technological capacity or interest in acquiring it, and if the agricultural and/or mining sector is predominant and marked by low capital input. Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Pakistan, and Peru exhibit these attributes.

Economic institutions are increasingly mixed, which makes the following categories more arbitrary than would be desirable if there were not such a crying need for some kind of typology. A "free enterprise economy" prevails if the government, directly or indirectly, does not participate consistently in the growth of the economy, if there is no general interest in extensive social legislation, and if businessmen and farmers are expected to adjust to market forces. Contemporary instances of this orientation may be found in Colombia, Honduras, Tunisia, Laos, and Japan. A "social welfare economy," however, prevails wherever the government seeks somehow to manipulate economic growth, where there is a general commitment to social legislation, and where businessmen and farmers are deliberately cushioned against certain market forces. This type of economic orientation includes the so-called "mixed economies" as well as systems, such as the American, that are free enterprise-oriented largely at the level of slogans. It would encompass, for instance, Belgium, Chile, Australia, India, and Mexico. A "Communist"

[4] *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge, Eng., 1960.

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economic system is characterized by the state's ownership and management of all major means of production, even if technically this be labeled "state capitalism." Finally, a "corporatist economy" prevails if business and labor groups, though permitted to exist, may influence economic life only through the medium of government-manipulated institutions, and if free market forces are not permitted unrestrained scope, in order to realize some doctrine of social harmony. Such conditions now exist in Portugal and Viet Nam, and did so in the United Arab Republic, with Spain constituting a marginal case, perhaps closer to free enterprise.

The environmental changes documented in the case of ILO, considered as a system, would have to take a slightly different form if applied to other international organizations. In the case of FAO, a similar survey might include rubrics for a state's share in the international commodity market, the caloric intake of its citizens, per capita agricultural productivity. A UNESCO study might wish to tabulate literacy rates and the availability of primary school facilities per capita. A WHO "environment" would have to include the number of hospital beds, medical personnel, and inoculations per head of population.

Compared with some other current suggestions for classifying the international environment, the scheme here proposed possesses some virtues and drawbacks. One such scheme, proposed by Karl Deutsch, makes possible the construction for each country of a "profile" expressed in code numbers based on summarizing 75 categories.[5] One set of categories—the "measurement profile"—rates each country on the basis of factors relating to the degree of social mobilization and economic development. It is purely quantitative and calls for no evaluative judgment on the part of the student. It covers, in much greater detail, the same ground as my "economic development" category. A second set of categories—called "rating profiles"—does involve some qualitative judgment since it includes factors on the degree of political democracy, political stability, degree of Westernization, and social homogeneity. These rating profiles establish sub-categories for the larger rubrics included under my heading of "political system." Now the Deutsch typology is clearly superior to the one I used in working with ILO materials in the degree of detailed precision that it facilitates. It is also more cumbersome to manage and, in a sense, redundant, since it

[5] Karl W. Deutsch, "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (March 1960), esp. pp. 40-44. Measurement profile statistics for African, Asian, and Latin American countries can be found in Almond and Coleman, eds., *op.cit.*, pp. 579-82.

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tabulates data that we already know to be predictably correlated. Some of the rating profile categories can be subsumed under one another and others are often irrelevant to a larger typological effort. Simplicity and economy, however, are the only major arguments that I can muster on behalf of my own procedure. The same kind of results could be achieved with Deutsch's technique, for his larger aim is applicable to the study of system and process in international organizations: "We are thus trying to form three sets of types: types of states (such as small Scandinavian democracies, or middle-sized Asian traditionalistic authoritarian regimes); types of situations (such as a severe business depression or a rapid growth of towns and industries); and a typical behavior when a typical state and a typical situation meet (such as increasing government intervention under constitutional auspices in Scandinavian countries during depression years, or increasing political instability in traditionalistic authoritarian governments under the impact of rapid industrialization."[6] Since, however, the present purpose is the correlation of this tripartite meeting of types with the systemic development of the ILO, certain categories can well be omitted and the whole procedure simplified without major loss of precision. Nor does the application of any such method obviate the eventual making of qualitative judgments by the student.

A slightly different approach dominates the typology employed by Coleman.[7] New nations are here classified with reference to testing Lipset's proposition that political competitiveness and economic development are positively correlated.[8] Concern with this proposition prompted the adoption of a threefold scheme for classifying political systems, using the terms "competitive," "semi-competitive," and "authoritarian" structures. While "competitive" approximates my definition of "democratic," the remaining terms beg more questions than they answer. Guinea, Panama, Mexico, Tunisia, and Thailand—for all their differences—emerge as semi-competitive political systems possessing a "mixed" degree of political modernity. No allowance is made for the difference between a totalitarian system and a mildly authoritarian one, such as is found in most oligarchies, modern and traditional. The usefulness of these categories is scarcely enhanced by their failure clearly to support

[6] Deutsch, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

[7] Almond and Coleman, eds., *op.cit.*, concluding chapter entitled "The Political Systems of the Developing Areas," especially pp. 532-44.

[8] Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (March 1959), pp. 69-105.

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or rebut Lipset's proposition; but their lack of precision makes them unsuitable for a description of the international environment.

Provisionally, then, the interest of both economy and clarity seems adequately served by the eleven categories I employed. Indeed, their major virtue is the possibility of applying them to countries of which we have relatively little empirical knowledge—too little for profound and comprehensive classifications of all structural and functional attributes, but enough for purposes of placing them in a systematic pattern relating to international organizations.

II. The Concept of "Coverage"

One of the chief claims of functional international organizations is their asserted impact on economic and social standards in member states. Technical assistance, of course, occupies the chief operational role here. But the use of multipartite conventions as a method for setting universally applicable standards remains a weapon in the armory of international organizations. This is especially interesting for studies of international integration because it facilitates quantitative assessments of the degree of success achieved. Naturally, this technique tells us nothing of the far more important problems involved in the actual implementation of such conventions; but at least it affords a ready tool for counting and classifying the declared willingness of governments to apply universal standards of welfare to their citizens.

The concept of "coverage" is a statistical device for arriving at conclusions as to what kinds of political and economic systems show an interest in adopting international conventions. The "coverage" of a given kind of convention is computed by counting the *actual* ratifications and stating them as a percentage of *possible* ratifications for all member states in each category of political system, economic development, and economic institutions used in the discussion of the "environment." The situation in the field of international labor conventions, in 1960, is presented on Tables 2a-2e.

The very unequal incidence of the conventions jumps to the eye. One of the useful features of the coverage concept is its ability to lend precision to general statements made by the ILO on behalf of its standard-setting activities. One recent official claim asserts: "Up to 1 October 1959, 77 States had deposited 1,925 ratifications. As was to be expected, there are great variations in the number of ratifications received from the various countries. . . . What is perhaps more surprising is the relatively high proportion of ratifications by countries outside Europe. . . . These

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TABLES 2a-c. COVERAGE OF ILO CONVENTIONS IN 1960

COVERAGE: The relation of actual ratifications to possible ratifications of ILO Conventions for all member states belonging to specific political and economic categories, expressed in per cent. The computation excludes conventions not yet in force.

D—Democracy	*OI*—Mature industrial state	*U*—Underdeveloped	*CM*—Communist economy
O—Oligarchy	*RI*—Rapidly industrializing	*FE*—Free enterprise economy	*CP*—Corporatist economy
T—Totalitarianism	*MA*—Mature agricultural	*S*—Social welfare economy	

TABLE 2a. COVERAGE OF SELECTED ILO CONVENTIONS

	NUMBER OF MEMBER STATES											
		Political System			*Economic Development*					*Economic Institutions*		
	Total	*D*	*O*	*T*	*OI*	*RI*	*MA*	*U*	*FE*	*S*	*CM*	*CP*
	83	37	25	21	16	18	6	43	41	27	12	3
Category of convention	COVERAGE											*Important non-ratifying states*
Administration of labor legislation (26, 34, 63, 81, 94, 95, 99)	30	42	15	27	37	41	36	22	22	47	25	33	Rat. less than 3 conv.: Canada, China, India, Japan, US, USSR
Occupational hazards (13, 62)	28	36	14	33	37	41	33	17	13	37	46	16	Canada, China, India, Japan, UK, US, USSR
Freedom of association (11, 87, 98)	55	66	33	63	70	70	72	41	39	69	91	33	Canada, India, US

Underground work, women (45)	61	73	44	67	69	83	50	54	59	77	50	67	Bolivia, Canada, Ukraine, US, USSR
Anti-discrimination (100, 111)	27	26	16	43	25	44	25	20	16	30	50	50	Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, US, USSR
Social security (2, 3, 12, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 48, 102, 103)	22	29	10	76	33	36	28	12	13	34	33	15	Rat. less than 9 conv.: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, US, USSR
Minimum age protection of young (5, 6, 10, 33, 59, 60, 77, 78, 79, 90)	25	26	12	37	35	39	40	15	14	30	54	10	Rat. less than 4 conv.: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Sweden, UK, US
Forced labor (29, 105)	56	64	44	59	59	67	50	52	46	71	58	83	Not rat. conv. 29: Bolivia, China, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, S. Africa, US Not rat. conv. 105: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Czech., Ecuador, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Japan, Liberia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Rumania, Spain, US, USSR
Hours and vacations (1, 4, 14, 20, 30, 41, 47, 52, 67, 89, 101, 106)	24	27	15	29	21	35	30	20	17	30	32	39	Rat. less than 5 conv.: Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, India, Japan, UK, US, USSR

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Table 2b. Coverage of Conventions Dealing with Non-Metropolitan Territories

	Total	D	O	T	OI	RI	MA	U	FE	S	CM	CP	
		NUMBER OF MEMBER STATES WITH NON-METROPOLITAN TERRITORIES											
	12	9	0	3	5	3	2	2	2	9	0	1	
		COVERAGE											*Important Non-ratifying states*
Non-metropolitan territories, etc. (50, 64, 65, 82, 84, 85, 104)	24*	35	—	5	43	5	43	7	0	35	—	14	Rat. less than 4 conv.: Australia, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, S. Africa, Spain, US

* Excluding 15 ratifications by member states having no responsibility for indigenous populations in the "non-metropolitan territory" sense.

Table 2c. Coverage of Maritime Conventions

	Total	D	O	T	OI	RI	MA	U	FE	S	CM	CP	
		NUMBER OF MEMBER STATES WITH A MERCHANT MARINE											
	50	33	7	10	11	17	5	17	21	23	4	2	
		COVERAGE											*Important non-ratifying states*
Maritime conventions (7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 22, 23, 27, 32, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 76, 92, 93, 108)	29*	34	8	28	44	32	34	14	20	35	43	13	Rat. less than 9 conv.: Canada, Colombia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Japan, Liberia, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, US, USSR

* Excluding 72 ratifications by member states having no or negligible merchant marines, according to *UN Statistical Yearbook*, 1959, p. 338.

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TABLE 2d. COVERAGE OF CONVENTIONS DEALING WITH TRIBAL AND PLANTATION LABOR

	NUMBER OF MEMBER STATES EMPLOYING TRIBAL AND PLANTATION LABOR				
	Total	*Africa*	*Latin America*	*Asia*	*Colonial Powers*
	57	11	19	16	11
			COVERAGE		
Tribal and plantation labor (107, 110)	15	14	24	6	5

TABLE 2e. DISTRIBUTION OF COVERAGE CHARACTERISTICS AMONG ILO MEMBER STATES, 1960

Characteristics	*Member States*	
	Number	*Per Cent*
Oligarchy, underdeveloped, free enterprise	23	27.7
Democracy, old industrialized, social welfare	10	12.0
Democracy, underdeveloped, free enterprise	8	9.6
Democracy, rapidly industrializing, social welfare	7	8.4
Totalitarian, new industrialized, Communist	6	7.2
Democracy, mature agricultural, social welfare	5	6.0
Totalitarian, old industrialized, Communist	4	4.8
Totalitarian, underdeveloped, social welfare	3	3.6
Democracy, rapidly industrializing, free enterprise	3	3.6
Totalitarian, underdeveloped, corporatist	3	3.6
Totalitarian, underdeveloped, free enterprise	2	2.4
Totalitarian, underdeveloped, Communist	2	2.4
Democracy, underdeveloped, social welfare	2	2.4
Democracy, old industrialized, free enterprise	2	2.4
Oligarchy, rapidly industrializing, free enterprise	1	1.3
Totalitarian, rapidly industrializing, free enterprise	1	1.3
Oligarchy, underdeveloped, social welfare	1	1.3
Total	83	100.0
Underdeveloped, free enterprise	32	74.4
Underdeveloped, social welfare	6	14.0
Underdeveloped, Communist	2	4.6
Underdeveloped, corporatist	3	7.0
Total	43	100.0
Democracy, free enterprise	13	35.0
Democracy, social welfare	24	65.0
Total	37	100.0
Rapidly industrializing, free enterprise	5	27.8
Rapidly industrializing, social welfare	7	38.9
Rapidly industrializing, Communist	6	33.3
Total	18	100.0

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figures tend to indicate that ILO standards are considered useful and applicable by many countries in the earlier stages of economic and social development."[9] This is precisely what the figures do *not* show when presented within the confines of the concept of coverage. What they tend to show is that some countries that are rapidly industrializing are interested in the International Labor Code. But the bulk of underdeveloped countries, especially if they are also free enterprise-oriented, display no such fervor. Among the many points giving rise to comment about the possibility of refining gross claims on ratifications, let us single out just one more. Communist-totalitarian countries show excellent coverage for the conventions in the field of human and trade union rights. What is known about their practices in this field—as, indeed, revealed by another aspect of ILO activity—plainly demonstrates the caution with which aggregate ratification statistics have to be treated if they are to be used as an index of international integration.

Coverage, as a refinement in the study of the impact of international conventions, also has an economic dimension. In the words of another official ILO statement: "The international minimum standards that the Code provides . . . cannot be imposed upon the world. But so wide has been their acceptance that upon the Code has been constructed a vast international network of binding mutual obligations among countries. . . . [Even though a variety of factors has prevented the even and general ratification of conventions] nevertheless, the Code has achieved a notable measure of success in improving working and living standards in many countries. In doing so, it has been effective in achieving one of the ILO's principal original aims—that of preventing cut-throat competition among countries at the expense of living standards. For an examination of the record of ratifications will show that there is a tendency for competing countries to ratify the same Conventions. Thus social standards in rival countries tend to be equalized, to the benefit both of the workers and the employers."[10] This is the old argument that international labor conventions tend to equalize conditions of competition among industrialized countries as well as among developing and mature economies, thus permitting progress without damage to labor welfare. The ratification statistics simply do *not* bear out this conclusion. Differences in coverage between mature and underdeveloped countries are obvious. What is more important, however, is the highly *uneven* incidence of conventions in specific fields among the countries most concerned in terms of their economic structure.

A final virtue of the coverage concept may be stressed. It is sometimes

[9] International Labour Office, *International Labour Standards*, Geneva, 1960, pp. 12-13.
[10] International Labour Office, *Lasting Peace the ILO Way*, Geneva, 1951, pp. 60-62.

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argued that economic and political integration among sovereign states proceeds most smoothly when their populations enjoy essentially similar social benefits—i.e., when a substantial measure of identity in economic infrastructure already exists. Table 3 provides the coverage statistics for

TABLE 3. REGIONAL INCIDENCE OF ILO CONVENTIONS

(The figures show the relation of actual ratifications to possible ratifications for all the members of a given regional organization, expressed in per cent.)

Category of Convention	*OAS*	*EEC*	*EFTA*	*NATO*	*Arab League*
Occupational hazards (13, 62)	24	67	29	33	19
Freedom of association (11, 87, 98)	48	89	76	75	37
Anti-discrimination (100, 111)	29	33	43	33	25
Social security (2, 3, 12, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 48, 102, 103)	21	51	37	33	13
Hours and vacations (1, 4, 14, 20, 30, 41, 47, 52, 67, 89, 101, 106)	24	31	24	22	14
Administration of labor legislation (26, 34, 63, 81, 94, 95, 99)	29	57	49	41	14
Minimum age and protection of the young (5, 6, 10, 33, 59, 60, 77, 78, 79, 90)	25	55	23	29	5

five contemporary regional groupings. If there is any merit in the argument stressing pre-existing uniformity, the coverage concept permits a measure of projection with respect to the chances of achieving fuller integration in these regions.[11]

III. NATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND THE LOGIC OF PLURALISM

The claim of the ILO to uniqueness in the array of modern international organizations rests on its tripartite structure; ILO is not merely another intergovernmental agency but provides for the full voting participation of representatives of national trade unions and employer organizations alongside the spokesmen of their governments. In theory,

[11] For an elaboration of this argument and other statistical means for dealing with it, see Deutsch, *op.cit.*, pp. 46-48.

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at least, these interest-group representatives are selected irrespective of their support of the national government, on the basis of the "most representative organization" formula. If the theory corresponds to the facts, the logic of pluralism—at least as it operates in industrialized countries permitting freedom of association—may be expected to work itself out in such a way that union and employer representatives carry over into the international arena their claims against the national government. In doing so they would weaken the appeal of the national state as the exclusive font of loyalty, as the high altar from which alone the indulgences of economic advantage are dispensed. On the other hand, if cohesion among the delegates of a given nation tends to prevail, the international forum merely provides another opportunity for the clamor of rival claims to be heard, with the nation-state continuing to be the only analytically legitimate criterion of classification. Table 4 presents the statistics for making a judgment on this issue.

TABLE 4. COHESION OF NATIONAL DELEGATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE, 1919-1958

		Per cent of dissent				*Per cent of dissent*		
		1919-29	*1930-44*	*1945-58*		*1919-29*	*1930-44*	*1945-58*
Employers	Afghanistan	—	0	0	Colombia	0	0	9.3
Labor		—	0	0		0	0	8
Employers	Albania	0	0	0	Costa Rica	—	0	0
Labor		0	0	0		—	0	33.6
Employers	Argentina	25	12.3	18.4	Cuba	19.1	15.1	26.9
Labor		12	21.5	6.4		12.4	10.1	8.4
Employers	Australia	15.9	32.1	46.2	Czechoslovakia	34.5	45.6	0
Labor		36.4	12.5	21.5		10.3	7.9	1
Employers	Austria	23.8	24.8	58.3	Denmark	44.9	71.3	55.2
Labor		20	27.8	20.8		16.1	6.1	19
Employers	Belgium	45.4	66.7	55.8	Dominican	0	0	13.9
Labor		16.9	17.9	11	Republic	0	0	8.9
Employers	Bolivia	—	0	0	Ecuador	0	0	0
Labor		—	0	0		0	0	1.8
Employers	Brazil	3.1	33.3	20.2	Egypt	—	0	18.5
Labor		7.1	11.8	15.6		—	0	4.3
Employers	Bulgaria	24.5	29	0	El Salvador	0	—	25
Labor		9.2	5.8	1.4		0	—	9.1
Employers	Burma	—	—	34.5	Esthonia	30.2	21.3	—
Labor		—	—	5.2		11.4	47.5	—
Employers	Byelorussia	—	—	0	Ethiopia	—	0	—
Labor		—	—	0		—	0	—
Employers	Canada	38.7	46.4	49.3	Finland	29.4	39.1	71.9
Labor		24.4	20.2	22.5		15.6	36.5	11.4
Employers	Ceylon	—	—	53.8	France	40.1	46.2	52.3
Labor		—	—	12.8		13.8	13.2	11.7
Employers	Chile	0.8	2.9	19.3	Germany	40.5	24.2	36.3
Labor		4.1	4.9	14.7		13.8	36.4	21.3
Employers	China	1.5	33.7	35.6	Ghana	—	—	50
Labor		1.5	9.5	7.9		—	—	16.7

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TABLE 4 CONT. COHESION OF NATIONAL DELEGATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE, 1919-1958

		Per cent of dissent				Per cent of dissent		
		1919-29	1930-44	1945-58		1919-29	1930-44	1945-58
Employers	Gt. Britain	24	29.2	52.9	New Zealand	—	76.1	52.9
Labor		32.6	50	20.7		—	13	17.6
Employers	Greece	28.1	30	40.9	Nicaragua	0	0	—
Labor		14.1	17.1	18.2		0	0	—
Employers	Guatemala	2.8	0	3.5	Norway	14.3	57.4	57.4
Labor		2.8	0	7		14.3	1.7	12.3
Employers	Haiti	0	0	0	Pakistan	—	—	34.6
Labor		0	0	1.9		—	—	17.3
Employers	Honduras	—	—	4.2	Panama	0	0	4
Labor		—	—	0		0	0	6
Employers	Hungary	7.8	16	5.7	Paraguay	0	—	—
Labor		21.8	30	1.9		0	—	—
Employers	Iceland	—	—	13.9	Peru	9.7	0	10.3
Labor		—	—	2.8		6.5	0	2.8
Employers	India	20.6	8.5	34.7	Philippines	—	—	8.7
Labor		40.2	74.6	10.5		—	—	7.6
Employers	Indonesia	—	—	23.8	Poland	35.1	43.6	4.7
Labor		—	—	3.2		13.7	24.5	1.6
Employers	Iran	0	0	47.8	Portugal	14.8	14.9	32.3
Labor		0	0	23.9		20.4	31.9	16.2
Employers	Iraq	—	0	14.9	Roumania	15	11.3	0
Labor		—	0	6		7.1	22.5	0
Employers	Ireland	23.2	43.1	51.9	S. Africa	22.6	36	25.6
Labor		16.1	24.1	14.8		25.8	28	25.6
Employers	Israel	—	—	45	Spain	37.6	42.1	30.4
Labor		—	—	8.8		18	6.1	15.2
Employers	Italy	23.9	11.4	44.4	Sudan	—	—	8.7
Labor		7.7	4.3	10.5		—	—	8.7
Employers	Japan	25.5	7.5	42	Sweden	50.8	52.4	66.9
Labor		36.4	62.1	37.7		17	15.2	10.2
Employers	Jordan	—	—	0	Switzerland	25.6	35	49.4
Labor		—	—	0		34.4	47	30.3
Employers	Latvia	44.9	22.8	—	Syria	—	—	12
Labor		4.5	6.3	—		—	—	0
Employers	Lebanon	—	—	21.9	Thailand	0	0	20.5
Labor		—	—	9.4		0	0	0
Employers	Liberia	9.1	0	32.9	Tunisia	—	—	27.9
Labor		0	0	15.7		—	—	16.3
Employers	Libya	—	—	12.2	Turkey	—	0	29.5
Labor		—	—	8.2		—	0	5.4
Employers	Lithuania	0	4.7	—	Ukraine	—	—	1.6
Labor		0	0	—		—	—	1.6
Employers	Luxembourg	5	51	50	Uruguay	0	0	39.4
Labor		20	16.7	6.4		7.9	4.2	11.7
Employers	Malaya	—	—	66.7	Venezuela	4.5	7.9	37.3
Labor		—	—	33.3		2.2	0	6.8
Employers	Mexico	—	35.5	20	Viet Nam	—	—	24.6
Labor		—	2.1	3.5		—	—	8.7
Employers	Morocco	—	—	19.4	Yugoslavia	26.9	28.7	2.1
Labor		—	—	13.9		18.7	31	1
Employers	Netherlands	26.1	39.1	50				
Labor		15.2	40.5	19.2				

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National delegations to International Labor Conferences consist of four individuals: two representatives of the government, and one each for the major trade union and the major employer association. An index labeled "percentage of dissent" was constructed by using all roll-call votes taken between 1919 and 1958 at the first forty-two sessions of the International Labor Conference. Our "sample" was then made up of the entire "population" of 416 votes, "record votes" that permitted the identification of the voter. For each country the total number of votes was counted in which government delegates participated, excluding the few occasions on which the two government delegates opposed one another. Then the number of instances was counted in which labor and/or employer delegates from the same country voted differently from the government representatives. Abstentions by interest-group delegates were counted as dissenting votes whenever the government representatives did not abstain; conversely, affirmative or negative votes by the interest-group delegates were counted as dissenting whenever the government abstained. Total disagreement with the government yields a figure of 100 per cent; total agreement results in a score of 0 per cent. The same technique may be used for judging the influence of a given state in intergovernmental organizations of the standard variety.[12]

Broadly speaking, Table 4 furnishes data which give substance to the claim of the ILO that workers and employers act in the capacity of representatives of their groups at home and not as yes-men for their governments. This trend is most obvious in the older industrialized countries with traditions of voluntary group organization of a functionally specific character. But it is curious that the figures for such countries as Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Yugoslavia, Latvia, Ireland, and Greece indicate that group dissent was the rule *before* industrialization was fully established. A feeling of group autonomy clearly antedates the realization of the modal type of democratic industrial society. On the other hand, the figures for most of the Latin American countries show no such autonomy until the most recent period. Compared with voting patterns in non-industrial countries that gained their independence since 1945, this Latin American pattern is curiously oligarchical. Ghana, Pakistan, and Ceylon are hardly more industrialized and modern than El Salvador and Costa Rica, yet they show vigorous group dissent. The degree of industrialization thus does not seem to be the

[12] See Robert E. Riggs, *Politics in the United Nations*, Urbana, Ill., 1958; Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

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chief factor associated with the growth of pluralist self-consciousness at the international level.

Nor is the degree of repressiveness of the national government a certain criterion for predicting the independence of interest group representatives. While the voting pattern in the Soviet orbit is eloquently simple, Spain, Portugal, the Dominican Republic, Poland under the regime of the colonels, Japan during the 1930's, and even Fascist Italy show surprising amounts of dissent. Granting that these dissenting votes may have been symbolic demonstrations of opposition rather than genuine measures for influencing national social legislation, they indicate that the character of the political system at home (except in the Communist case) *cannot* be used as a factor for specifying the degree of national unity in international meetings. The only major positive virtue of this technique of counting, therefore, is the verification of the ILO's claim to having undermined the unity of national delegations. However, whether the implied growth of pluralism at the international level brings with it consequences transforming the national state and making for international integration is a question that cannot be dealt with on the basis of this technique.

IV. International Solidarity and the Logic of Pluralism

We can, however, measure the cohesion of the organized international groups in the International Labor Conference as well as the solidarity displayed by unorganized clusters of delegates within them. Together with the measure of national disintegration discussed above, the reality of the collective will of international functional groups can be statistically sketched. Obviously this technique will provide no clues as to the causes for cohesion or the lack of it, nor provide any insight into the consequences of such a condition. Both of these questions are much more vital in the study of international organization than the mere establishment of the fact of cohesion, but the establishment of the fact—if fact it is—remains a necessary precondition.

Among the questions relating to the processes of international organizations in the context of world politics, facts concerning group cohesion may shed light on some or all of the following:

(1) Does a pluralistic institutional framework bring with it increasing value-sharing among the employers, workers, and government officials represented?

(2) Is intra-group cohesion more readily achieved with respect to substantive or procedural issues? My study of the Council of Europe

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suggests that procedural issues are more important in this context, a conclusion which may not be borne out by the ILO data.

(3) Do voting patterns in functional international organizations permitting the participation of non-governmental professional groups bear out Mitrany's assertion that political issues can be separated from functional preoccupations, thus producing harmony along group lines?[13]

(4) Are regionally, ideologically, culturally, or politically distinct subgroups among the representatives of workers, employers, and governments more or less united than the group as a whole? If they are less united, does the lack of cohesion correspond to major world political divisions, thus seemingly invalidating Mitrany?

The index I use in the study of group cohesion is called "deviation from unanimity," an adaptation of the Rice Scale to the study of international assemblies. It is computed in the following manner: the total number of votes cast, or the number of votes on specific issues, is counted for a predetermined period; voters are identified by nationality and affiliation with one of the three organized ILO Groups (Governments, Employers, Workers). We then count the number of times each delegate voted with the majority (or minority) in his Group. The frequency of identification with the minority will then be specified as the percentage of the minority vote of the total vote. For this purpose it is immaterial whether the delegate whose votes are being counted voted "yes," "no," or abstained. The only concern is his identification with the minority or the majority. If the Group splits into three divisions on a vote, as happens frequently, the "majority" is the division that includes the largest number of members voting, and the "minority" is the sum of the two remaining divisions. This occasionally results in the "minority's" outnumbering the "majority." A deviation from unanimity of 50 per cent indicates a complete splitting of the Group; a score of 0 per cent signifies complete unity.

We are entitled to speak of a "group" when it is no longer empirically necessary to establish its existence: in the case of the three ILO Groups, the fact of institutional existence, complete with officers, secretariats, and rules of procedure, has prevailed since 1919. It is otherwise with the regional clusters for which the index was also computed. These have no institutional existence and it is not even definitely known that all the individuals counted in this context caucus regularly. The com-

[13] For the most complete statement of the functional argument, see David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943. For a succinct summary and critique of Mitrany's assumptions, see Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares*, New York, 1959, ch. 16.

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putation was made merely in order to discover whether possible geographical or ideological ties among these individuals result in *ad hoc* patterns of cohesion. Tables 5, 6, and 7 give the results for all roll-call votes which occurred in the International Labor Conference, considered together, whereas Tables 8 through 19 specify voting cohesion for each of the three Groups as it applies to specific issues before the Conference.

The Government Group (Table 5) differs from the others in that it functions essentially for procedural purposes only. Governments are not united outside the ILO by any kind of permanent organization, whereas workers and employers are. The governments make no attempt to arrive at common policy positions vis-à-vis the other Groups on matters of substance. Their primary concern is to make common policy in matters relating to the election of the government members of ILO organs and committees and with respect to budget, personnel, and credentials. The table suggests that in an organization thrown open to the pluralist dynamic, in a context in which major political quarrels do not always dominate business, a "group" of governments is an anomaly in the sense that it does not collectively join or oppose the other Groups. Aggregate figures on group cohesion show no trend of any kind, with solidarity waxing and waning from session to session, depending on the agenda. The only approximation to a trend stands revealed in the sharp decline in group cohesion that followed the re-entry of the Soviet Union into the ILO in 1954.[14] From that point on, issues of economic development, colonial freedom, and the standardization of workers' rights increasingly were debated within the aura of the Cold War, with obvious disintegrative consequences.

The regional computations suggest a somewhat different trend. Before World War II only two putative regional groupings are apparent, Latin America and the Commonwealth. Both show internal cohesion in excess of that of the Government Group after the mid-1920's for reasons probably relating to the deterioration of world commodity prices and concern with stabilization during the depression years. Internal cohesion among Western European, Eastern European, and Asian-African government representatives was frequently less than for the Government Group as a whole, suggesting a minimum of internal compromise, consultation, and mutual responsiveness in two of the very regions which after 1945 made the most rapid strides toward internal integration. During the postwar years, the influence of the Cold War is striking in under-

[14] For an exhaustive and balanced evaluation of the consequences of the Soviet return to the ILO, see Harold K. Jacobson, "The USSR and ILO," *International Organization*, XIV (Summer 1960), pp. 402-28.

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TABLE 5. VOTING COHESION OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN GOVERNMENT GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	Session	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Asia-Africa	Latin America	Commonwealth		Government Group
1919	1	17.5	10.5	9.1	9.9	4.2		18.3
1920	2	17.5	3.1	16.1	6.9	10.9		17.5
1921	3	15.2	12.7	13.2	9.6	15.9		16.8
1922	4	10.5	3.9	20	0	14.3		9.2
1923	5	12.8	8.4	14.3	5.9	0		10.8
1924	6	12.4	3.7	4.7	2.5	20		9.2
1925	7	23.9	3.8	11.1	5.9	12.6		9.5
1926	8	11.2	9.6	0	0	20		14.2
1926	9	14.2	2.9	15.4	5.7	12.1		12.2
1927	10	18.4	5.9	12.9	7.6	9.4		17.6
1928	11	0	6.6	0	0	5.9		1.9
1929	12	8.6	6.5	1.9	8.4	4.9		10.0
1929	13	3.1	0	0	0	0		1.4
1930	14	9.8	11.1	6	4.3	7.1		10.0
1931	15	7.5	11.7	0	10.4	0		10.7
1932	16	9.9	7.4	18.5	6	0		11.8
1933	17	5.9	3.6	0	12	2.9		6.5
1934	18	18.2	18.3	22.8	4.5	0		17.4
1935	19	25.1	17.9	32.1	5.2	8.6		22.5
1936	20	23.4	16	26.1	1.4	8.5		17.8
1936	21	14.7	6.3	25.6	0	4.8		14.5
1937	23	17.6	7.6	11.6	0	4.3		12.1
1938	24	0	1.3	0	0	0		0.3
1939	25	0	0	16.4	0	0		2.8
1944	26	5.9	0	8.3	0	0		2.7
		West	*Western Neutrals*	*Soviet Bloc*	*Latin America*	*Afro-Asian Neutrals*	*Afro-Asian Westerns*	
1945	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1946	28	12.6	2.6	0	14.7	9.1	0	16.0
1946	29	21.1	11.1	0	15.8	20	0	26.6
1947	30	12.8	10.5	6.7	10.3	0	0	13.5
1948	31	9.2	6.9	0	9.4	5.9	4.3	9.4
1949	32	1.7	0	1.5	4.8	0	0	5.3
1950	33	0	7.4	—	0	0	10.5	2.0
1951	34	7.7	7.8	0	0	6.9	7.3	8.1
1952	35	7.5	2.4	0	3	16.9	7.1	8.3
1953	36	14.1	12.9	0	6.8	18.8	4.3	17.1
1954	37	16	13.8	0	11	9.1	21.1	21.9
1955	38	9	11	0	8.8	7.1	8.8	18.5
1956	39	19	30.9	0	11.6	18.9	28.9	28.7
1957	40	23.5	22	1.6	13.7	11.6	30.1	24.6
1958	41	18	10.8	0	18.9	12.9	23.7	15.1
1958	42	16.2	27	0	15.3	25.3	24.2	30.9

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TABLE 6. VOTING COHESION OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN EMPLOYER GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	Session	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Asia-Africa	Latin America	Common-wealth		Employer Group
1919	1	21.9	15.4	5	10.8	6.7		21.6
1920	2	16.3	6.7	0	0	0		10.4
1921	3	11.2	12.4	10	—	6.8		16.3
1922	4	12.5	6.7	0	—	0		9.3
1923	5	3.2	3.6	0	—	11.1		3.7
1924	6	4.5	0	0	0	9.1		5.8
1925	7	3.9	4.5	0	3.5	2		5.5
1926	8	9.8	0	12.5	0	9.1		10.4
1926	9	3.7	3.4	8.7	9.7	0		7.1
1927	10	10.3	5.4	15.4	3.6	0		14.1
1928	11	9.8	2.9	0	15.4	9.1		8.6
1929	12	5.4	2.9	4.2	5.3	3.7		5.2
1929	13	9.1	6.7	0	—	0		6.6
1930	14	6	4.8	2.9	0	6.9		6.8
1931	15	4.3	3.8	11.1	0	0		5.7
1932	16	2.8	0	0	0	0		1.4
1933	17	12.6	12.2	20	12	2.8		18.1
1934	18	10.7	7.7	0	0	0		11.5
1935	19	7.7	0.7	0	2.6	7.3		6.5
1936	20	5.3	0	2.9	3.8	0		3.5
1936	21	16.7	30.5	14.3	—	15.4		23.6
1937	23	3.3	15.2	3.8	26.3	3		10.8
1938	24	5.7	0	0	0	0		4.6
1939	25	0	0	0	15	0		10.5
1944	26	25	0	0	16.7	25		36.4
		West	*Western Neutrals*	*Soviet Bloc*	*Latin America*	*Afro-Asian Neutrals*	*Afro-Asian Westerns*	
1945	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1946	28	10.9	2	6.3	17.8	—	0	14.8
1946	29	16.2	0	0	18.8	0	0	16.7
1947	30	3.8	0	25	25	0	0	8.7
1948	31	1.6	0	0	22.2	16.7	20	11.1
1949	32	8.1	4.7	2.3	0	0	7.4	19.3
1950	33	0	0	—	27.3	0	0	11.0
1951	34	2.1	15.9	0	25.5	9.1	15.2	19.4
1952	35	4	19.6	0	26.5	9.4	3.1	19.5
1953	36	3.5	21.7	0	0	14.3	4.2	16.0
1954	37	1.7	14	0	1.9	15.2	8.5	18.7
1955	38	3.1	11.6	0	8.2	16.7	6	16.5
1956	39	4.8	12.5	0	8.1	15.9	21.5	27.7
1957	40	6.8	12.2	3	9.3	24.6	15.9	25.0
1958	41	8.3	17.4	0	25	37.5	15.4	16.0
1958	42	9.8	8.7	0	14.4	29.6	15.9	26.7

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TABLE 7. VOTING COHESION OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN WORKER GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	Session	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Asia-Africa	Latin America	Common-wealth	Worker Group
1919	1	5.3	4.3	6.3	2.2	6.9	8.4
1920	2	3.2	0	6.7	0	0	3.8
1921	3	0.3	0.7	0	—	1.9	0.5
1922	4	0	0	16.7	—	0	3.4
1923	5	5	7.4	0	—	0	4.8
1924	6	0	2	0	9.1	0	1.2
1925	7	0.8	0	0	0	0	0.4
1926	8	1.9	0	0	0	0	0.9
1926	9	1.6	1.4	0	0	0	1.1
1927	10	2	0	9.1	4.8	0	2.5
1928	11	0	2.3	0	0	0	0.7
1929	12	0	0	0	2.3	0	0.3
1929	13	1.5	0	0	—	0	0.7
1930	14	1.8	2.4	0	0	1.7	1.6
1931	15	1.4	0	0	3.3	0	1.1
1932	16	2.1	0	0	0	0	1.1
1933	17	1.4	0	0	0	0	0.6
1934	18	0	0	0	0	0	0
1935	19	1.6	1.6	0	0	0	1.1
1936	20	0	0	0	0	0	0
1936	21	0	0	0	—	0	2.9
1937	23	0.7	2.9	0	0	0	1.1
1938	24	0	0	0	0	0	0
1939	25	0	0	0	3.1	0	1.0
1944	26	0	0	0	0	0	0

		West	Western Neutrals	Soviet Bloc	Latin America	Afro-Asian Neutrals	Afro-Asian Westerns	
1945	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1946	28	4.1	0	0	6.5	0	0	5.5
1946	29	2.1	14.3	0	8	0	0	12.1
1947	30	5.4	7.1	—	8	0	16.7	6.7
1948	31	1.6	6.2	0	2.7	1.7	0	2.9
1949	32	0.5	0	2.3	1.2	0	0	4.4
1950	33	0	0	—	0	0	0	0
1951	34	0	1.6	0	1.3	0	0	1.4
1952	35	1.4	5.9	0	4.5	8.1	2	4.4
1953	36	9.3	9.1	0	4.2	16.7	7.7	11.2
1954	37	11.9	15.9	0	5.6	6.1	25	26.4
1955	38	5.8	14	0	6.5	0	11.6	20.6
1956	39	19.6	27	0	21.5	6.5	26.9	32.0
1957	40	10.4	20.6	1	10.5	6.6	15.5	19.5
1958	41	0	0	0	6.3	8.3	7.7	2.1
1958	42	4.7	8.9	0	8.2	12.5	21.8	20.6

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mining the regional clusters and their possible bases for internal unity. The Western governments are only very slightly more united than the Group as a whole, whether they are considered as neutrals in the Cold War or as NATO members. The habits of unity developed in regional organizations were *not* carried over into the different functional context that ILO represents. While the Soviet bloc is truly monolithic after the Czech coup, cohesion among Latin American governments declined after the war despite the gradual solidification of the inter-American system. The Afro-Asian governments, for purposes of computation, were divided into two hypothetical groups: countries somehow allied with Western nations and those which profess a self-conscious neutralism. The pro-Western group is shown to be a pure abstraction, possessing no reality so far as voting behavior is concerned. While the neutrals are somewhat more cohesive than the Government Group as a whole, they are also clearly the least united regional cluster in the International Labor Conference, apparently severely buffeted by the winds blowing from Washington and Moscow.

Table 6 shows that the Employer Group is slightly more cohesive than the governments and that its global unity deteriorated sharply over the years. At the same time, however, the regional patterns indicate an altogether different trend. The Afro-Asian employers disagree more with each other as the Soviet challenge intensifies; Latin American employers oscillate sharply and apparently without pattern. The employers in the NATO countries clearly have increased their internal cohesion as compared with the pre-1945 pattern, but their colleagues from neutral European countries seem as ambivalent as the Asian employers as the Cold War atmosphere of discussions in the ILO becomes a regular feature.

Workers in the ILO display an altogether different behavior pattern. Before the onset of the ideological conflict in the postwar world, they approached something resembling international working-class solidarity with almost perfect internal cohesion, made possible in part by the near-monopoly of the International Federation of Trade Unions in claiming the affiliation of worker delegates. The postwar division of the world trade-union movement decreased the solidarity of the Worker Group. With the exception of the Soviet bloc delegates, all the regional clusters show evidence of internal strain, but the degree of cohesion within each putative group is still greater than the Group's overall consensus, which seems to have deteriorated irretrievably since the war. The Cold War has brought about the disappearance of global working-

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class solidarity, but it has also furnished a visible impetus toward the regionalization of trade union interests and loyalties.

Tables 8 through 19 attempt to break down the trends suggested by the gross voting statistics with respect to specific issues that recur in the life of the ILO.[15] With respect to the Government Group (Tables 8, 11, 14, 17), they demonstrate that what appears in the gross statistics as an absence of trend really amounts to a sharp deterioration of consensus since 1945 when applied to controversy on the credentials of delegates and the agenda of the Conference. As regards conventions and recommendations, however, the postwar lack of consensus is no greater than similar disunity during the interwar period. With the perhaps not wholly unexpected exception of the Soviet bloc, the regional clusters show no marked trends. Internal dissent was always most marked on the matter of labor conventions and continues to be so, whereas the less controversial matter of recommendations predictably produced less disunity within the Group as a whole and within the regional clusters. Again, the Cold War clearly produced a decline in intra-group cohesion in the matter of seating delegations whose credentials were challenged. In short, a breakdown of votes by subject matter contains no suggestion that regional groupings among governments have solidified over the years.

The Employer Group grew less cohesive over the years on each of the four issues isolated for study, thus scarcely supporting any kind of argument that the logic of pluralism has worked in the direction of active international value-sharing among industrialists (Tables 9, 12, 15, 18). There is no trace of any managerial common front, or of any ideology. Clearly, the fact that employers freely oppose their own government delegates hardly implies that they then seek to advance their professional interest at the international level by uniting tactically and ideologically. With the exception of the Soviet bloc "employers," the regional groupings display exactly the same tendency as the entire Group toward disunity with respect to the major substantive issues, conventions, and recommendations. However, this is not true for the employers from NATO countries: these show a consistent tendency toward

[15] The same 416 roll-call votes that were used as our data thus far were broken down as follows in terms of specific issues:

International Labor Conventions	177 votes (Tables 8, 9, 10)
International Labor Recommendations	78 votes (Tables 11, 12, 13)
Agenda	49 votes (Tables 14, 15, 16)
Credentials of Delegates to International Labor Conference	48 votes (Tables 17, 18, 19)
Others	64 votes (not computed separately)

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TABLE 8. ILO CONVENTIONS: VOTING COHESION OF GOVERNMENT GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 Session 1-13	*1930-1944 Session 14-26*		*1945-1958 Session 27-42*
Governments	12.4	17.3	Governments	14.5
Western Europe	13.1	18.6	West	13.5
Eastern Europe	4.8	15.6	Western Neutrals	8.6
Asia-Africa	12	21.6	Soviet Bloc	0.8
Latin America	5.2	5.3	Latin America	10.1
Commonwealth	9.9	2.7	Afro-Asian Neutrals	9.2
			Afro-Asian Westerns	9.8

TABLE 9. ILO CONVENTIONS: VOTING COHESION OF EMPLOYER GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 Session 1-13	*1930-1944 Session 14-26*		*1945-1958 Session 27-42*
Employers	8.7	10.5	Employers	22.3
Western Europe	7.9	8.2	West	9.5
Eastern Europe	4.2	7.7	Western Neutrals	10.2
Asia-Africa	5.5	4.5	Soviet Bloc	2.3
Latin America	6.3	8.1	Latin America	22
Commonwealth	1	2.7	Afro-Asian Neutrals	19.5
			Afro-Asian Westerns	12.9

TABLE 10. ILO CONVENTIONS: VOTING COHESION OF WORKER GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 Session 1-13	*1930-1944 Session 14-26*		*1945-1958 Session 27-42*
Workers	1.3	0.5	Workers	4.1
Western Europe	1.4	0.3	West	2.1
Eastern Europe	0.3	0	Western Neutrals	1.4
Asia-Africa	0.9	0	Soviet Bloc	0.8
Latin America	0	0.5	Latin America	3
Commonwealth	1.5	0	Afro-Asian Neutrals	2.8
			Afro-Asian Westerns	1.7

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TABLE 11. ILO RECOMMENDATIONS: VOTING COHESION OF GOVERNMENT GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 *Session 1-13*	*1930-1944* *Session 14-26*		*1945-1958* *Session 27-42*
Governments	9.5	2.3	Governments	9.7
Western Europe	8.2	2.2	West	8.4
Eastern Europe	8.1	1.3	Western Neutrals	6.9
Asia-Africa	9.3	11.1	Soviet Bloc	0.9
Latin America	5.3	0	Latin America	7.4
Commonwealth	7.5	6.3	Afro-Asian Neutrals	5.9
			Afro-Asian Westerns	13.7

TABLE 12. ILO RECOMMENDATIONS: VOTING COHESION OF EMPLOYER GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 *Session 1-13*	*1930-1944* *Session 14-26*		*1945-1958* *Session 27-42*
Employers	15.5	16.6	Employers	23.2
Western Europe	12.9	9.6	West	8.1
Eastern Europe	9.2	12.2	Western Neutrals	12.6
Asia-Africa	7.4	0	Soviet Bloc	0
Latin America	11.9	0	Latin America	17.2
Commonwealth	5.2	9.7	Afro-Asian Neutrals	16.4
			Afro-Asian Westerns	15.5

TABLE 13. ILO RECOMMENDATIONS: VOTING COHESION OF WORKER GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 *Session 1-13*	*1930-1944* *Session 14-26*		*1945-1958* *Session 27-42*
Workers	0.6	0	Workers	9.1
Western Europe	0.9	0	West	5.4
Eastern Europe	0.5	0	Western Neutrals	6.9
Asia-Africa	0	0	Soviet Bloc	0
Latin America	0	0	Latin America	7.6
Commonwealth	0	0	Afro-Asian Neutrals	4.1
			Afro-Asian Westerns	10.7

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TABLE 14. AGENDA OF ILO CONFERENCE: VOTING COHESION OF GOVERNMENT GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 Session 1-13	*1930-1944 Session 14-26*		*1945-1958 Session 27-42*
Governments	15	4.5	Governments	22.7
Western Europe	15.5	3.7	West	11
Eastern Europe	7.5	2.7	Western Neutrals	17
Asia-Africa	2.7	15.4	Soviet Bloc	0
Latin America	7.9	1.6	Latin America	9.1
Commonwealth	24	3.4	Afro-Asian Neutrals	16.7
			Afro-Asian Westerns	21.3

TABLE 15. AGENDA OF ILO CONFERENCE: VOTING COHESION OF EMPLOYER GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 Session 1-13	*1930-1944 Session 14-26*		*1945-1958 Session 27-42*
Employers	12.5	8.5	Employers	15.8
Western Europe	14.6	7.8	West	2.2
Eastern Europe	7.1	3.9	Western Neutrals	10.1
Asia-Africa	0	5.3	Soviet Bloc	0
Latin America	0	10.7	Latin America	9.1
Commonwealth	10	6.7	Afro-Asian Neutrals	11.1
			Afro-Asian Westerns	8.3

TABLE 16. AGENDA OF ILO CONFERENCE: VOTING COHESION OF WORKER GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 Session 1-13	*1930-1944 Session 14-26*		*1945-1958 Session 27-42*
Workers	0.5	0	Workers	15.2
Western Europe	0	0	West	5.3
Eastern Europe	0.9	0	Western Neutrals	8
Asia-Africa	0	0	Soviet Bloc	0
Latin America	0	0	Latin America	9.7
Commonwealth	0	0	Afro-Asian Neutrals	2.3
			Afro-Asian Westerns	13.4

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TABLE 17. SEATING OF DELEGATIONS IN ILO CONFERENCE: VOTING COHESION OF GOVERNMENT GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 Session 1-13	*1930-1944 Session 14-26*		*1945-1958 Session 27-42*
Governments	3.3	1	Governments	28
Western Europe	4.2	1.6	West	18.4
Eastern Europe	0.5	1.4	Western Neutrals	24.5
Asia-Africa	0	0	Soviet Bloc	0
Latin America	3.1	0	Latin America	12.6
Commonwealth	12.8	0	Afro-Asian Neutrals	18.7
			Afro-Asian Westerns	27

TABLE 18. SEATING OF DELEGATIONS IN ILO CONFERENCE: VOTING COHESION OF EMPLOYER GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 Session 1-13	*1930-1944 Session 14-26*		*1945-1958 Session 27-42*
Employers	2	0.4	Employers	20.8
Western Europe	0.6	0	West	0.8
Eastern Europe	1.3	1.5	Western Neutrals	12.7
Asia-Africa	4.2	0	Soviet Bloc	0
Latin America	0	0	Latin America	5.7
Commonwealth	11.1	0	Afro-Asian Neutrals	16.7
			Afro-Asian Westerns	14.7

TABLE 19. SEATING OF DELEGATIONS IN ILO CONFERENCE: VOTING COHESION OF WORKER GROUP, AND OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE GROUP, 1919-1958
(Deviation from unanimity in per cent)

	1919-1929 Session 1-13	*1930-1944 Session 14-26*		*1945-1958 Session 27-42*
Workers	2.5	7.8	Workers	31.7
Western Europe	2.5	8.8	West	14.2
Eastern Europe	2.4	13.1	Western Neutrals	22.3
Asia-Africa	0	0	Soviet Bloc	0
Latin America	3.5	3.7	Latin America	15
Commonwealth	0	0	Afro-Asian Neutrals	6
			Afro-Asian Westerns	31.3

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greater mutual support on the issue of excluding Communist bloc employers from the ILO and on keeping the Conference agenda small, without at the same time seeming to achieve unity on substantive questions. Small comfort is afforded by the fact that regional solidarity in general is somewhat greater than overall unity. The differences are small except in the case of the Western employers after 1945. The Cold War, through the medium of the ILO forum, has contributed to shattering any semblance of global consensus among non-Communist employers; it has merely brought about a hardening of differences in pitting the Western employers against their colleagues from elsewhere as well as against the workers.

The disintegration of Group consensus is most marked in the case of the workers (Tables 10, 13, 16, 19). It applies to all types of issues, though unity remains strongest in the case of labor conventions. Neutrals and Western-allied, Latin American, and NATO members show more internal dissent on the issue of recommendations than was true before 1945; in part, at least, this reflects differences over the degree of militancy thought desirable, with many union delegates voting against recommendations because they preferred conventions. In the instance of the Conference agenda (Table 16), perfect unanimity before the war has given rise to internal differences at the regional and the global levels, reflecting in part uncertainty over the desirability of including items relating to the Cold War and the colonial struggle. And the question of credentials (Table 19) has occasioned the greatest differences of opinion at all levels. The sharp clashes within the regional groupings reflect the uncertainty among national unions over the desirability of accepting without question the delegates of totalitarian nations. Universality as the dominant argument rivals the concern over ideological purity in the selection of delegations. The voting trends merely indicate that the labor movement has not achieved internal unity on this issue, despite the existence of a forum that provides institutional scope to the integrative dynamic of pluralism.

Numerous other conclusions and suggestions could be culled from these statistical compilations. To exploit them all fully is not the purpose of this article. The voting tables provide interesting hints as to trends, and they provide clear and economic means for demonstrating the degree of integration achieved by the groups being studied. As such, they prove again that statements of process derived from a purely legal and structural rendering of international organizations are to be mistrusted, for the close integration of employers and workers, respectively,

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expected by the early commentators on the ILO simply has not come about. They also prove that glowing statements by international officials concerning the same trend are frequently based on hope rather than on fact. Functionalism and pluralism at the international level remain interesting phenomena, potentially capable of transforming the international environment; but the nature of the transformation will not consist of a simple re-enactment of the modal collective-bargaining situation at the global level.

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Review Articles

THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By RICHARD A. FALK

Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1961, 372 pp. $6.95.

Julius Stone, *Quest for Survival*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961, 104 pp. $2.75.

MACHIAVELLI begins his *Discourses* by observing that "the curious nature of men, so prompt to blame and so slow to praise, makes the discovery and introduction of any new principles and systems as dangerous almost as the exploration of unknown seas and continents." *The Political Foundations of International Law* runs this hazard, as it is both a splendid pioneering venture and vulnerable to all sorts of criticism. Although it most suggestively studies the theoretical interaction of law and politics, it provides scant doctrinal support. Although it brilliantly applies systems analysis and prudently uses decision-making theory, structural functional approaches, institutional studies, and a subtle form of historicism, it flirts outrageously with the relevance of game theory to the role of law in international affairs. Although it advances its views of international jurisdiction with unprecedented sophistication, it resorts to amateurish simplification when it discusses the United Nations Charter or the major European regional organizations. In sum, *Political Foundations* is at once profoundly provocative and frustratingly unrealized. However, its achievements are so much greater than its defects that it warrants high praise and mild rebuke.

Political Foundations has deep affinities with the excellent work of Myres McDougal, Charles De Visscher, and John Herz; as well, it builds significantly upon Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics* (New York, 1957) and Katzenbach's long article, "Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law."[1] Thus it examines international legal phenomena in their socio-political context, and relies upon techniques of social science far more than upon traditional modes of logical analysis

[1] *Yale Law Journal*, LXV (1956), pp. 1087-1157.

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and doctrinal interpretation. As such, *Political Foundations* is the methodological antithesis of the Kelsenite approach to international law.

Kaplan and Katzenbach make two especial contributions that I should like to identify at once. First, *Political Foundations* demonstrates the value of systems analysis for the study of international law. Although the authors do not purport to make a rigorous application of systems analysis, they do enough to convince one of its usefulness as a methodological innovation, especially with respect to evaluating the effectiveness of legal norms. Second, without sacrificing the sophistication of the legal realists, Kaplan and Katzenbach manage to restore one's confidence in the capacity of legal norms to generate stable limits. Decision-making theory is used, but in moderate form, and as only one of several ways to study normative phenomena. This avoids the tendency of unrestricted "rule skepticism" to dissolve the objective quality of legal obligation. It is very crucial to retain a firm sense of normative guidance in the international legal system, where actors often possess contradictory policy objectives. For we seek to encourage the perception of common legal norms by national actors with different instrumental and ideological orientations in the system. Advocates of a decision-making approach to international law—principally McDougal and Lasswell—often neglect this important implication of their analysis.

There is an additional special reason to single out Kaplan and Katzenbach for high praise: they have written profoundly about the bearing of the Cold War upon international law without embracing the Manichean heresy. Part of this success may be a consequence of the depersonalizing tendency of systems analysis. Inquiry into characteristic behavior patterns makes one less susceptible, perhaps, to the manipulating effects of one's own national and cultural myths. If this is true, it would be an important beneficial side-effect of systems analysis, since international legal scholarship frequently disguises national advocacy; this happens especially under political conditions of challenge and crisis such as presently exist. It is, however, not a new phenomenon. In fact, the pedigree extends back at least as far as the Grotius-Selden debates on the freedom of the high seas. The best instance among numerous recent examples may be the McDougal-Schlei defense of the "legality" of nuclear testing by the United States on the high seas. The Communist counterparts are far less subtle; the legal attacks made by Korovin and Zhukov in *International Affairs* (Moscow) upon the right of the United States to orbit observational satellites over Soviet territory provide typical illustrations. Such a provincial tendency in the serious

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literature has the special effect of obscuring the dimly perceived and bewilderingly relevant novelty of the present situation.

For one thing, politics in a nuclear age challenge deeply the traditional delimitation of national interests. A national concern with survival now gives new incentive for the attainment of a higher quality of international order. We can no longer afford to use selfishly the ordering techniques provided by international law. The advantages of international stability seem to outweigh, with certain exceptions, any national gains that might be won by a selfish shaping of legal claims to suit immediate national convenience. It seems essential that the nuclear powers, at least, *perceive* the link between world order and national interest, and *act* accordingly in specific instances.

The United States, as the dominant non-revolutionary nation with a deep cultural commitment to legal order, has the responsibility for exercising leadership in this regard. It must seek to convey to the Soviet Union a perception of the connection between national interest and international legal order. Such a perception follows from a universal will to avoid nuclear catastrophe. We must not overlook this common ground. For this reason it is disturbing to observe the tendency of the United States to depart from a law-oriented approach to world affairs under the pressure of the Cold War. One thinks notably of the U-2 incident and the American sponsorship of the Cuban invasion of April 1961. We cannot expect revolutionary nations to *perceive* the benefits of legal order when *status quo* nations *act* in violation of applicable legal standards. This position has several parts: first, the national interest of the nuclear powers urgently requires stable limits upon permissible conduct; second, national elites must perceive and act upon this awareness; third, the older law-oriented nations must take the lead to increase the prospect that revolutionary nations will perceive that their national interest also depends upon adherence to legal norms; and, fourth, the significance of a law-oriented approach to foreign affairs must reach United States policy-makers entrusted with the power to make Cold War decisions.

Kaplan and Katzenbach provide a lucid account of the international legal system that encourages one to see clearly why it is mutually advantageous for the nuclear powers to work toward international stability by reciprocal adherence to applicable legal norms. With great skill, *Political Foundations* depicts the distinctive quality of international law as a predominantly *horizontal* legal order in a highly

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decentralized social system.[2] Norms govern the behavior of formally equal units. Insufficient central enforcement exists. However, a level of order is reached by horizontal ordering techniques. Reciprocity and self-interest play a dominant role in this process. A national unit tends to refrain from claiming more than it is willing to permit other units in the system. Our U-2 flights over Soviet territory would prevent us from objecting to corresponding overflights of American territory. It is important that nations perceive and act upon a calculation of self-interest that includes this factor of reciprocity. A norm of international behavior is entitled to the status of law even though there is no central enforcement. To understand international law we must learn to see its distinctive attributes, and not to appraise its reality by the degree to which it conforms to our images of domestic legal order.

The effectiveness of international law arises, as well, from the habits of compliance that government officials develop. The observance of international law is routinized in the standard bureaucratic operations of most states. Suspension of the rule (or deliberate violation) requires an extraordinary decision at high echelons of government and, for this reason alone, tends to be infrequent. Such a view of international law does not overlook the weakness of a decentralized system that must keep order between hostile units, but it does point to important areas of structural support given to the norms of international law.

Kaplan and Katzenbach add to this description a strong sense of the relationship of function, interest, and effectiveness. For instance, the law of neutrality was developed to limit the scope of belligerency, thereby serving the interests of all states so long as the outcome of a war did not endanger the non-participating states. When war came to endanger neutral nations, they grew unwilling to abide by the rules of neutrality. Norms lose effectiveness when they no longer promote the reciprocal interests of most nations under most conditions. This is especially true with respect to norms bearing upon national security interests. Thus, the rules of blockade and visit and search could not retain effectiveness upon the advent of economic warfare and the development of submarine and aerial combat.

[2] A legal order is vertical if it possesses a hierarchical arrangement of norms backed by an institutional hierarchy that assures effective implementation. Modern non-federal states possess vertical legal orders. A legal order is horizontal if implementation of norms usually depends upon self-help and self-restraint on the part of formally equal participants in the legal order. That is, there is no compulsory procedure for resolution by appeal to a higher level in the legal system. This is generally the case in international law. Of course, the distinction between horizontal and vertical is a gross first approximation. It is useful, however, to highlight a contrast between international law and developed systems of domestic law.

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Finally, the absence of legislative institutions and the difficulties of reaching explicit agreement places a heavy responsibility upon major nations to moderate their unilateral claims to act by self-limiting appraisals of reasonableness. The "legitimacy" of a national claim arises partly from a unilateral display to the rest of the world that it is reasonable in view of an objective balance of benefits and burdens. At minimum, a nation should seek to restrict injury to other nations when it acts. This refers especially to claims with military implications. Such a stress upon self-limitation is a necessary restriction upon sovereign discretion. It supplements the generally acknowledged burden of obeying normative restraints that have the status of "law" with the more subtle general burden of refraining from the assertion of "unreasonable" claims. McDougal's *Studies in World Public Order* (New Haven, Conn., 1960) brilliantly indicates the ordering role of reasonableness in the international legal system. Such a perception involves a minimum commitment by members of the system to some degree of stability, at least with regard to resort to force. The prospect of mutual destruction arising from excessive instability should provide the nuclear nations with adequate incentive to moderate their unilateral claims. The alternative to moderation seems so futile and fearful that we must not lose patience as a result of Soviet impatience.

The authors show how the pattern of power distribution in the world influences the effectiveness of particular legal norms and shapes the role of supranational legal institutions. Building upon Kaplan's provocative earlier work in systems analysis, *Political Foundations* adopts the balance of power and the loose bipolar models as its basic interpretative tools. The book argues that international law grew up to meet the political needs of the balance of power system that lasted until World War I. After a period of transition to bipolarity—tested by the struggle of Germany and Japan for bipolar world domination—the end of World War II produced a genuine condition of loose bipolarity. The looseness of the bipolarity derives from the existence of blocs of nations (rather than single national empires), from uncommitted nations, and from the presence of a universal mediating organization like the United Nations. Many norms inherited from the balance of power system—for instance, the doctrine of non-intervention or the law of neutrality —are not effective in a loose bipolar world in which national actors seek to expand their bloc by the absorption of new members and in which no nation can be indifferent to the destabilizing effect of changes in the relative strengths of the blocs. Underlying *Political Foundations* is the belief that international restraints upon national behavior will be

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effective only so long as they correspond roughly to the survival interests of the major national actors in the world. This, in turn, rests upon the assumption that national survival and strength depend upon certain characteristic behavior that results from the nature of the international system. The attractiveness of this approach includes provision of a way to distinguish between effective and ineffective norms in the prevailing legal order, and hence suggests the kind of doctrinal reform that is necessary to promote increasing adherence to law.

An illustration helps to suggest the value of using system models. Let us look at the Kaplan-Katzenbach treatment of the Congo crisis, especially as it bears upon the role of the United Nations in a loose bipolar world. A characteristic of the loose bipolar model is the development of a universal organization to mediate between the blocs and to control peace-endangering situations that arise independently of the Cold War. The United Nations, then, is effective for violent non-bloc disputes, ineffective for inter-bloc disputes. Korea was an exception resulting from the capture of the organization by the Western bloc as a consequence of the temporary Soviet boycott. The original decision by the United Nations to enter the Congo was made when it looked like a non-Cold War issue; that is, the Soviet Union and the United States both favored the use of the United Nations to protect the Congo from Belgian re-encroachment. However, the displacement of Lumumba meant that the Congo would not receive leftist internal leadership. The Soviet Union was not eager for a restoration of internal order in the Congo except in Lumumba's favor. When the Secretary-General chose a contending faction that seemed to be inclined toward the Western bloc, the Congo controversy became a Cold War inter-bloc dispute, involving the future political orientation of the whole continent of Africa. As such, the Soviet perception of the Secretary-General as an agent of the Western bloc was quite predictable, as were the resulting Soviet efforts to undercut his effectiveness. The high stakes in the Congo made the Soviet Union particularly sensitive to the antagonism between its policies and those of the Secretary-General. Kaplan and Katzenbach point to the normal Soviet preference, at least outside its own bloc, for instability as the political condition most favorable to the development of communism. Since the United Nations seeks stability as its primary objective, it is bound to collide frequently with Soviet interests. Thus Kaplan and Katzenbach provide a very simple, but essentially accurate, view of the limits of effective United Nations efforts in behalf of world stability.

This analysis helps us to appraise the Troika proposals. For the basic

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Kaplan-Katzenbach hypothesis suggests that the revolutionary impetus of the Sino-Soviet bloc puts it in continuing opposition to the United Nations, whereas the commitment of the Western bloc to stability gives it a continuing incentive to strengthen the organization. This indicates the deep vulnerability of the United Nations. Suppose that control should pass to the revolutionary nations? Kaplan and Katzenbach correctly state that such an event is likely to "increase intervention in the internal affairs of other nations and to decrease normative constraints on that kind of activity" (p. 313).

The loose bipolar model provides an interpretation (not made by Kaplan and Katzenbach) of the intense historical forces pressing toward radical social change in many parts of the world. Is it not also important to consider the stabilizing value of encouraging United Nations intervention on the side of the internal faction with a radical program of social change? Can we accommodate these pressures for change except by civil strife and intervention? This points to the absence of supranational legislative institutions. Might it not be better to centralize, and hence moderate, the interventionary process in the United Nations? Thus, a potential contribution to international stability might result from giving the revolutionary nations more influence in the administration of the United Nations. The Kaplan-Katzenbach analysis of systemic behavior fails to comprehend the impact of these pressures upon the possibilities for international stability in the world today. Their focus upon the international distribution of power gives crucial insight, but it is a monolithic interpretative tool that is unable to provide real guidance for policy-makers.

This is part of a more general criticism. The simplicity of the loose bipolar model requires some sacrifice in understanding. Kaplan and Katzenbach, for instance, suggest that the shift from the flexible alignments of the balance of power world to the rigid alignments of the loose bipolar world undercuts the political (or systemic) support for the doctrine of non-intervention. There is virtually no attention given to the influence of nuclear weaponry upon the interventionary pattern of Cold War politics. Specifically, it seems relevant to see that intervention becomes a *feasible* way to advance political objectives in the course of international conflict without taking substantial risks of nuclear war. It limits the scope of conflict without giving up the politics of expansion. As such, it accords perfectly with Soviet foreign policy. The West, less at ease in most interventionary situations, seeks to deter Soviet intervention by characterizing it as a provocative basis for nuclear retaliation.

There is a further consideration in this regard. The focus upon the

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loose bipolar model leads to a natural emphasis upon external relations among the political units that make up the system. There is scant attention given to the relevance of the internal distribution of power within the participating national unit. One finds, it is true, a perceptive discussion of the tendency for domestic courts to become "apologists for national policies determined by the political aims of government" (p. 268) instead of independent agencies of a developing world legal order. However, once depicted, this phenomenon is ignored. This suggests the heuristic quality of the entire Kaplan-Katzenbach endeavor. There is ample occasion here for further probing. For this process of politicizing the national judiciary detracts greatly from the stability of normative standards under present conditions. It has found its way into the treatment of the Act of State doctrine in the tentative draft of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and is expressed in a recent judicial decision (*Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino* 193 F. Supp. 375 [1961]) invalidating Cuban governmental claims to expropriate sugar located within Cuban territory. This trend acts to disrupt the territorial distribution of policy-making authority. It interferes with the basic jurisdictional allocation of authority among national units in the decentralized world system. This seems undesirably destabilizing for those problems, such as the status of property, that arise from a legitimate diversity of policy on the part of various social systems. Here, the tradition of deference to official foreign governmental policy continues to serve the cause of world order.

The growth of law depends partly upon the development of mutual respect for diversity and joint action in areas of agreement. Thus the universality of formal sentiments supporting basic human rights does provide national courts with a universality of sentiment that encourages the application and development of universal norms. The institutional deficiencies of international law make it imperative that we try to depoliticize domestic courts and use them as part of the international structure. However, this requires us to regard political decentralization as a limiting condition for the effective creation of international norms in national institutions. This forms part of the effort to make national decision-makers aware of the current connection between the national interest and world order. I suggest that the distinction between legitimate diversity and universal consensus provides some guidance for a domestic judiciary ready to contribute to international stability.

Systems analysis appeals to us because it is an advance over *ad hoc* empirical observation. It tends to show the wider implications of particular behavior for the stability of the entire social order. Thus it widens

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the horizon of relevance, enabling a more rational grasp of the risks of normative ineffectiveness. It also closes the gap between structure and process by providing an overall image of the society in motion. Kaplan and Katzenbach use systems analysis with great benefit. Among other things, they make a persuasive case for the existence of international law. This is done by showing the bearing of normative phenomena upon international relations. The models of international behavior, however, remain primitive, as they do not reflect a variety of other factors that influence the pattern and effectiveness of international law: nuclear weapons; ideological, moral, and cultural convergence and divergence; distributions of power *within* the basic participating unit of world affairs; the historical pressures favoring radical social change. Kaplan and Katzenbach give us a superb heuristic introduction, but one hopes that it is a starting-place rather than a terminal-point. This is not meant to belittle an extraordinary book. *Political Foundations* strikes me as almost certain to exercise a helpful influence upon serious thinking about international law in the generation ahead. Not many books give occasion for such a prediction.

Quite another spirit animates Julius Stone's *Quest for Survival*. He, too, seeks to depict the influence of politics upon the effective outer limits of law in international relations, especially with regard to the use of force by nations to defend vital national interests. *Quest for Survival* expresses in brief form the views already developed more fully by the same distinguished author in *Aggression and World Order* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958). As before, he plunges his lance deep into the flesh of those who proclaim the imminent reign of the Rule of Law. Stone wants to emphasize that failure to give nations assurance of a just resolution of their international conflicts will predictably continue to induce recourse to national force. This is an unescapable weakness of a decentralized distribution of power among egoistic national units. Under such conditions it does not help world order to specify the outer limits of permissible recourse to force. These remain wasted words of pious men until nations possess effective alternative means to secure a just consideration of their claims. In fact, Stone suggests that selective recourse to force, as in the 1956 Suez campaign, tends presently to improve, rather than to disrupt, the just order of international relations.

Julius Stone knows that such an interpretation of international affairs is full of dangers now that major nations possess nuclear weapons. But this is the burdensome reality that he finds threatening us. We can work for survival only by doing what is *feasible* (Stone's key limiting criterion) to stabilize international relations and very little turns out

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to be "feasible." However, four feasible tasks are outlined: better mechanisms for third-party settlement; international co-operation to promote human welfare (combating disease, illiteracy, poverty); the use of the United Nations in a more systematic way to curtail the spread of violence; and the maintenance of consultative contact between the Kremlin and the White House in the event either is about to unleash a nuclear attack upon the other (in the hope of reducing the prospect of miscalculation and misinterpretation).

Such a show of reasonableness indeed intimidates a potential critic. Any more radical response to the current crisis could easily be dismissed as an infantile exercise in wish-fulfillment. The self-assured poise of Stone's style adds beguiling strength to his appeal and makes it that much harder to pronounce his enterprise to be an unconscious, yet dangerous, seduction of our capacity to comprehend the link between law and force in world affairs. Stone overlooks the crucial value for present world order of stable limits on the permissible use of force. We should recall that Members of the United Nations did agree to renounce the use of force in international affairs, except to defend against an armed attack—and have, in practice, generally abided by this renunciation. It is not accidental that Stone argues in behalf of a liberal construction of Article 51 (self-defense) that allows flexible recourse to defensive force. This gives provisional legitimacy to decentralized decisions to use force to overcome injustices of all sorts. The removal of the objective requirement of "armed attack" from the definition of permissible use is itself a factor that tends to destabilize international relations at its most vulnerable point. It encourages a further repoliticization of the decision to use force, overlooking the need to establish international order first and international justice later. It is strange that Julius Stone refuses to heed his own insight: "It may be true that peace at any price means war in the long run; but it is for us an even more urgent truth that justice at any price, in any particular nation's version of it, is likely to mean war and human immolation in the short run" (p. 99). And so it is!

Although we cannot afford utopian flights from reality, neither can we be content with modest proposals. Invidious comparisons invite affront, but it seems useful, nevertheless, to say that Kaplan and Katzenbach deal far more perceptively with legal control over the use of force in international relations than does Julius Stone. They see more, integrate it better into a total view of world order, and arrive at more persuasive (and more constructive) conclusions.

Both books interestingly consider the urgent challenge: how can we

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use legal order to reduce the prospect of nuclear war? Neither holds out very explicit hope. Much depends upon whether the Soviet Union and the United States can be made to see soon enough that their national interest will be better served by progressive mutual adherence to legal restraints, extending especially to infringing unilateral military conduct. National selfishness can become an instrument to achieve international legal order as well as performing its traditional role as an obstacle to its achievement.

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HOW NON-WESTERN ARE THE NEW NATIONS?

By DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD

Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960, 466 pp. $7.75.

I

ALTHOUGH the Asian and African peoples have often alleged that the Western nation-state produced untold injustices in the less-advanced portions of the world, these same peoples are now eagerly using the same organization to order their political and social affairs. Indeed, it is not difficult to find national rivalries in Africa and Asia that exceed the historic rivalries of Europe. The new nations have taken on Western political patterns with a fervor, and sometimes a ruthless purposefulness, that have seldom been equaled. Very few advancing peoples are content with anything less than a nation, and very few new nations have been more successful than their Western counterparts in erecting supranational agencies for political or economic purposes. Professor Emerson has provided us with a remarkable account of the paradoxical simplicity and the unlimited complexity to be found in the spread of the nation-state among the Asian and African peoples.

The book is divided into five parts, three of which deal with a major problem area in the study of national politics in Asia and Africa. In the first part the author states his grounds for evaluation. He makes it clear that he intends to be neither an apologist for the West nor an advocate of political change for its own sake. From the beginning Professor Emerson stresses the importance of stating problems of non-Western politics in terms that permit empirical investigation. For example, he quickly dismisses "the interminable and inconclusive" arguments that have centered on vague conceptions of progress (p. 13). From this he advances to the concept of imperialism, whose historical and explanatory bankruptcy is clearly outlined (pp. 16-17). With a keen sense for the actual concomitants of colonial change, he points out that the common people of Europe were treated with no more enlightenment than colonial peoples in much of the nineteenth century. The nationalist who fumes over Macaulay's views on the Indian civil service

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should read Dickens' portrayals of English life of roughly the same period.

After this introductory treatment of the shibboleths of colonial studies, Professor Emerson sketches in the general lines of the transition from colonial to independent status from 1914 to the present. He outlines the major differences in colonial policy among the European powers, and the rapid spread of nationalism during the past generation. This provides a setting for the second part of the book and the first major problem to be discussed: how are we to analyze the complex pattern of behavior that goes into making a nation? Neither European nor nationalist is spared in Emerson's search for an empirically rooted explanation of modern nationalism. The author does not wish to shirk the important questions posed by the spread of the nation-state, but he is insistent on our failure to approach such questions with enough *prima facie* evidence to make intelligent decisions and useful theory. As Emerson points out, we know a great deal about modern nations, but "what we do not know or have taken for granted without adequate evidence adds up to an impressive body of ignorance and uncertainty which is all the more dismaying because of the frequent failure to face up to the limitations of our knowledge" (p. 89). How successful Professor Emerson has been in handling this problem is open to dispute, and he does not pretend to have any universal solutions, but the difficulty facing the student of Asian and African politics has seldom been put more squarely.

The second part of the book is concerned with the main analytical categories used in past studies of the nation. The anatomy of the modern nation is examined in terms of the people, territory, language, culture, religion, and economics that comprise it. Emerson shows how these classificatory ideas are all inadequate for the study of nationalism. They do little to arrange the welter of information in useful form, and they do even less when it comes to extracting convincing explanations from our storehouse of data. For his preliminary investigation Emerson wisely relies on commonly accepted meanings for the classifications. The reader is spared none of the complexity that exists in each of these areas of inquiry, and henceforth will probably be less likely to assign the imponderabilities of political studies to the economist, the social anthropologist, and so forth. This is in some ways the most ambitious part of the book and it is also one of the most helpful in trying to assess the future of political studies in Africa and Asia.

Two examples may illustrate Emerson's approach. The author firmly resists arguing from cultural uniqueness, which tends to make cross-

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cultural, comparative studies impossible, or at least superficial. As he succinctly notes, the idea of a national culture is "an admirable one whose principal shortcoming is its remoteness from historical fact" (p. 149). The efforts of nationalist leaders from Atatürk to Nkrumah to generate a common culture are sufficient evidence of how pliable cultural differences become when confronted with the modern nation. One of the first tasks of the new nation is to restrain cultural diversity and to select those aspects of the nation's past culture that best serve the interests of the new country. Nor does economics hold any panaceas for the study of new nations. In reviewing the economists' explanations, Professor Emerson concludes "the economic realm does not . . . establish the nation as an economic phenomenon nor as having any necessary affinity for any particular economic system, be it capitalist, socialist, or something else" (p. 179).

If the other social science disciplines have been no more successful than political science in analyzing the new nation, where is the political scientist to turn? Professor Emerson's answer is not essentially different from his conclusions on the above-mentioned approaches to the study of non-Western politics. It is that the new nations are not greatly different from the nations of Europe, although they may initially rebel against the Western model. Nationalist values were propagated in Africa and Asia by Westerners. Nationalist motives were stimulated by Western colonial and educational institutions. To understand Emerson's conception of Asian and African nationalism, his psychological approach to modern nationalism must be noted. In his view, "Nationalism is no more than the assertion of a particular 'we' arrayed against the 'they' of the rest of mankind . . ." (p. 213). This idea appears repeatedly, and its meaning is the same for any nation. Some of the implications of this conclusion will be explored below, but for the moment it will suffice to say that Emerson considers the unifying element of the nation to be the establishment of a new kind of identity, which presumably can be used to elicit certain kinds of behavior from the individuals involved. Let it be noted, however, that this conclusion is not nearly as ethnocentric as it may sound to some readers.

The remaining three parts of the book are discussions, respectively, of nationalism and democracy, of self-determination, and of the author's conclusions. These are continuing areas of speculation, and Professor Emerson does not claim to have a theory that solves all problems. He does, however, have a familiarity with a sufficiently wide range of materials, including the experience of Western democracies, to make some extremely valuable common-sense observations. In the discussion

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of nationalism and democracy he notes that the most successful experiments in democratic government in both the West and the non-West have taken place where there were appreciable increases in social mobility (pp. 215-21). There are, however, some reasons to doubt whether the more advanced democracies have in fact maintained the high degree of social mobility that has often been ascribed to them.[1] Furthermore, there are some grounds for questioning whether the new nationalist leaders are as willing to have a large-scale social revolution as once was supposed. The problem is one that deserves much more investigation, both in regard to its importance in our own political development and to the relation of increasing mobility to democratic government in the less-advanced countries. It is important to note, however, that Emerson has put the problem in terms that are amenable to empirical investigation and that maximize our ability to use our own experience in attempting to understand new nations.

Although nationalist movements are frequently inspired by democratic ideals, they may be reluctant to see their own political edifices remodeled once independence has been achieved. In his discussion of the nationalist as a democrat Professor Emerson gives us the kind of frank, informed appraisal that is needed in order to assess our failures and to recognize our opportunities in the new nations. Many of the leaders of the early nationalist movements were aristocrats, and the colonial regimes did not ordinarily foster democratic habits. Nevertheless, as Emerson notes, one must be cautious in explaining undemocratic behavior by pointing to colonial tutelage, because there are several countries that made the transition to modern nationhood without excessive colonial influence and still succumbed to authoritarian government. Once again it appears that there are no easy explanations. However, it is a little surprising to find Professor Emerson giving the emphasis that he does to military governments and single-party systems (pp. 282-92) when he has noted previously the strength and pervasiveness of the nationalist "identity" in new nations. This point will be discussed further below.

The last major area examined by Professor Emerson is self-determination. The chapters on this subject do not do as much to clarify the author's concern with the politics of the new nation as might be hoped. The concept of self-determination is too legalistic and too formal to come to grips with the questions encountered in the less-advanced nations. For example, "the capacity to make an effective choice" is a

[1] Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959.

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deceptive rule of thumb (p. 327) when one recalls that this approach gave Libya independence in 1951, while her much more advanced North African neighbors were experiencing ruthless repression by the French. Libya had the good fortune of having been occupied by Mussolini, whose fragile empire was later cared for by the United Nations. Or again, is it quite fair to chide Morocco for its objections to permitting self-determination in Mauritania (p. 351), when a generation ago all Europe stood by while France occupied Morocco? Self-determination is clearly a concept that has meaning only when supported consistently by an existing institutional system.

Professor Emerson's conclusions are consistent with his earlier observations concerning the infinite variability of nationalist-inspired behavior. At one time it was thought that the Western-oriented nationalist might find communism more appealing than would the more traditionally rooted nationalist. As Emerson suggests, it now appears that a form of "resurgent traditionalism" may emerge that finds it much easier to submit to Communist wishes (p. 371). Thus, in Morocco the trade union leaders are criticizing the government's acceptance of Soviet arms if this means Soviet influence in Moroccan affairs, while the action is accepted by both the ruling monarchy and the Islamic Istiqlal party.[2] The members of the more modern elite are jealous of their control over resources and foreign policy, but the more traditional elite may find such compromises easy to accept in order to preserve old values. The experience of India, Indonesia, Iraq, and the erstwhile U.A.R., to name only a few, has demonstrated that neither the Soviet Union nor the local Communist parties necessarily benefit from modern nationalism.

In his last chapter Emerson returns to the explanation of modern nationalism that appeared in his introduction and in his analysis of the components of nationalism today. In his view, the modern nation always incorporates some kind of "identity" (p. 93), a "body of people who feel that they are a nation" (p. 102). His conclusion aims at specifying the virtues of such perceptions. He sees the national identification as providing "a sense of independent worth and self-respect and a new social solidarity to replace traditional bonds" (p. 380). It is a precondition to the establishment of a more elaborate international order and a means whereby newly independent peoples can be motivated to

[2] This example calls for some explanation, because the progressives took a more friendly position toward the Communists before they were forced out of the government. They were willing to use communism to give their country international influence, but it is doubtful if they would have made concessions involving Morocco's internal affairs.

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make the material sacrifices needed to reconstruct the new nation rapidly. By an exhaustive elimination process Professor Emerson arrives at the conclusion that the common factor in the rise of the new nations has been the spread of a common identity in a structure called the "nation." It is, therefore, basically a psychological process that has taken place in the West and the non-West. When one reflects on the infinite manifestations of nationalism, it appears that the usual categories fail to hold up. The step that remains is to see whether the process of identification is similar in all types of countries.

II

The nation represents a new identification in the lives of the persons involved. The psychological meaning of this identification can be phrased in several ways. The new citizens have acquired a new value, a new frame of reference, a new focus for their needs and expectations. The identification applies to a new sphere of personal interaction, to a collection of people that is considerably larger than the family or tribe, but much smaller than the international realm of action. How does this identification acquire meaning in the new nations? How does this identification affect political behavior? Research on these questions, even in the more highly developed nations, is not as advanced as might be thought, but there has been a certain amount of empirical investigation and some very suggestive speculation.

To differentiate the variety of ways in which national identification might be used, a threefold classification will be suggested.[3] The identification can be, first, a highly charged affective relationship between the citizen and the nation. There is ample evidence in Emerson's study that this characterizes the nationalists' use of national identity, and there is considerable evidence that national identification remains an emotional relationship even in the advanced nations. The nation is a remote concept that has little everyday application in the lives of citizens compared with other psychological frameworks of political action. The family, the village, the local club are all more open to observation and their contributions are perceived easily. All of these structures may have affective meaning, but the national relationship is particularly well suited for the inspiration of large-scale sacrifice and the justification of widespread uniform action.

[3] It should be stressed that research has hardly progressed far enough to put forward more than the most tentative suggestions for the classification needed to deal with this problem. The three aspects given are meant to be illustrative only, although they correspond to a frequently used method of classifying values.

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But it is important to note that the nation can also take on cognitive and evaluative meaning. The identification can become part of our intellectual equipment, and may help us to sort out information and solve certain problems. The modern nation must engage in many kinds of activity that do not call for extreme sacrifice or that require individual adjustment to changing circumstances. Relative to the less developed countries, the more advanced political systems appear to minimize the affective significance of the nation. The citizen of the modern nation identifies the nation as a means of solving problems and as a device to relate himself to remote affairs in an understandable way. How this is done is not thoroughly understood, but there are some promising beginnings that are of great value in attaching meaning to national identification.[4] The available inquiry does make clear, however, how relative are the terms used to differentiate the European nations and their immediate associates from the new nations. In psychological terms it is perfectly imaginable, though perhaps unlikely, that a new nation might be associated with an image having less affective meaning than the national identification created in a modern nation. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that many older nations have indeed manipulated their citizens' sense of national identity in such a way as to make more rational, moderate behavior almost impossible.

The growing, though still small, body of research and theorizing along these lines may help clarify some of the ideas introduced above. Much of the speculation about the new nations has tended to stress the impact of the affective form of national identification, and how it may permeate political thinking throughout the system. Pye has observed, for example, that the political sphere in the less developed nation is not sharply differentiated, that parties tend to "take on a world view and represent a way of life," and that "issues tend to become associated with fundamental questions about the destiny of the society."[5] This is a description of what has been repeatedly observed in new nations, and can be related directly to the difficulties of giving instrumental meaning to a recently acquired national identity. It has often been asserted that

[4] The most important research of this kind has centered on apathy, political efficacy, and empathy. The voting studies have done a great deal to clarify these ideas in reference to national politics. See particularly the recent electoral study by Angus Campbell and others, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), and Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958). Probably more work has been done on this aspect of national identification than any other, and the methodological tangles that have been unraveled by research in this country make the concepts especially attractive for comparative inquiry in new nations.

[5] "The Non-Western Political Process," *Journal of Politics*, XX (August 1958), pp. 468-86.

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the low level of education and limited resources explain the failure to use the new identification in more discriminating ways and may even justify preserving a national image that is vague and easily manipulated in crisis situations. This reviewer suspects that we may have accepted such rationalizations uncritically, and that by doing so we may jeopardize our long-run interests.[6]

There is some work that supports the view that individual perceptions and feelings are structured similarly across national and cultural boundaries.[7] Much of this research deals more with personality characteristics in different settings, but it provides solid grounds for reasoning that more complex psychological relationships are similar. One inquiry specifies with remarkable accuracy and detail the kind of ambivalence felt by members of a new nation when they can attach neither affective nor instrumental meaning to their country.[8] Although conducted in the United States, several investigations of "jingoism" have results of unmistakable comparative value.[9] When the nation's sense of identity is played upon to arouse deep feeling, it appears that the American reacts much like the non-Westerners concerned with Kashmir, West Irian, or Mauritania. But these examples have dealt largely with national identification used to minimize individual differences and to elicit uniform action in the face of crises, real or imagined.

How does Emerson's conclusion relate to the more moderate, adaptable activity that we find associated with the nation in modern societies? This aspect of the problem has received much less attention, and there is little empirically grounded research. Most of what can be said about the nation must be inferred from sociological studies. S. N. Eisenstadt has done some careful analyses of how nationality groups were absorbed

[6] It would be well worthwhile establishing with more accuracy the per capita wealth, educational capability, etc., of the European nations when they began to reform their representative institutions. Few nations of Europe did much to redistribute wealth until the turn of the century. However, the fact that the new nations are being established after the early industrializers have redistributed great wealth and have developed effective parliamentary institutions creates the impression that everything can be done at once.

[7] Two excellent examples are the issue of the *Journal of Social Issues* edited by Bradford B. Hudson, "Cross-Cultural Studies in the Arab Middle East and United States: Studies of Young Adults," xv, No. 3 (1959); and Gustav Jahoda, "Nationality Preferences and National Stereotypes in Ghana Before Independence," *Journal of Social Psychology*, L (November 1959), pp. 165-74.

[8] Patricia L. Kendall, "The Ambivalent Character of Nationalism Among Egyptian Professionals," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XX (Spring 1956), pp. 277-92.

[9] Charles D. Farris, "Selected Attitudes on Foreign Affairs as Correlates of Authoritarian and Political Anomie," *Journal of Politics*, XX (February 1960), pp. 50-67. Another interesting example of how extreme nationalist feelings can lead to contradictory behavior is Ross Stagner's "Correlational Analysis of Nationalistic Opinions," *Journal of Social Psychology*, XII (August 1940), pp. 197-212.

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in Israel. His discussion of the role of "general norms" provides some insight into the role of the variable national image, and its importance in enabling the new country to advance with a minimum of social and individual tension. Using a more complex system of differentiating among norms, he has pointed out the importance of encouraging relationships that permit a person to spread his psychological risk in an unfamiliar situation and to acquire an image of more remote activity to which he can relate himself without apprehension.[10]

The national identification, of course, is only one of many that determine an individual's political behavior. However, Eisenstadt's work suggests how the affective national identification may obstruct the kind of varied, multi-faceted identification associated with the acceptance of social change and greater individual security. In its emotional form the nation can be used to inhibit group activity and restrict individual interaction to approved channels. Eisenstadt is aware of what he calls "monolithic tendencies" among the members of the new political and bureaucratic elite of a new nation, but he also notes that in "a society in a state of transition towards the modern pattern . . . a monolithic status structure is impossible because of the inherent functional needs of the complex division of labor."[11] The new nation whose leaders choose to use the newly won national identity to establish the unquestionable pre-eminence of their party or the inviolability of their own actions may enjoy short-term political gains. Indeed, it must even be admitted that the degree of chaos that sometimes follows attainment of independence may justify stressing the affective side of the national relationship. However, we have seen instances of how this can result in government by crisis, and we should be aware that it may actually make later political and social adjustments more difficult.

An emphasis on the affective aspect of the nation may retard social development and fail to stimulate individual adaptive and learning capacities. Later, when critical changes are undertaken, tensions may explode in violence and extremism or the once jubilant nation may be

[10] Eisenstadt's studies of Israeli social structure are all extremely valuable to the student of new nations. The discussion of general norms takes place in "Studies in Reference Group Behaviour: I. Reference Norms and the Social Structure," *Human Relations*, VII, No. 2 (1954), pp. 191-216. It is elaborated in "Reference Group Behavior and Social Integration: An Explorative Study," *American Sociological Review*, XIX (April 1954), pp. 175-84.

[11] "Changes in Patterns of Stratification Attendant on Attainment of Political Independence," *Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology*, 1956, p. 40. Approaching the problems of social and economic change from another angle, Edward Shils arrives at a similar conclusion in "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," *World Politics*, IX (October 1958), p. 18.

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overcome with apathy.[12] It is the military regime's rigid adherence to the national concept and the single party's sweeping claim to national loyalties that lead to the doubts expressed above on these solutions. There is no reason to presume that such governments will purposefully inhibit group activity or that they will always express the nation's needs and interests in rhetorical questions. Nevertheless, it may prove shortsighted to welcome such regimes uncritically simply because they appreciate "the more complex problems of national reconstruction and development."[13] There would be a tragic irony in the open societies' fostering inflexible value systems in new nations in order "to get the job done." In fact, it may be the highly variable psychological relationship between citizen and nation that contributes to both the material success and the political freedom of the advanced nations.

III

These comments on Professor Emerson's conclusions are not intended to be simple assertions as to the superiority of the political systems of the free world. There is an accumulating body of evidence that the concept of the nation and its place in our value system are directly related to the accomplishments and adaptability of the free world. Our national identification is communicated in such a way that our citizens have an unusually high degree of confidence in their government. They seldom resort to violence or become ineffectual and unresponsive as a result of apathy. They express individual differences within a single political system to an extent unknown in history, and their ability to do so is a vital national resource. This is not to suggest that a new nation must adopt a European value system *in toto*, but it does suggest that a new nation would be well advised to exercise caution in communicating the meaning of a new frame of reference. There is need for more research on the psychological attributes of the citizen of a free nation, but a demonstrable proof of the value of the free nation's approach to political life seems possible.

Professor Emerson's work has three implications of particular importance to the student of the new nations. First, the meaning of the category of "Western," advanced, or highly developed nations varies greatly with the context or problem being studied. Until precise mean-

[12] The student interested in suggestions for psychological studies of political behavior in new nations will find Morris Rosenberg's study of political apathy in the United States extremely helpful. See "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVIII (Winter 1954), pp. 349-66.

[13] Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, XI (April 1959), p. 331.

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ing is given to key terms and there is some agreement as to the universe of discourse, inquiry is difficult and unlikely to have cumulative value. This reviewer feels that Emerson has provided a great service by bringing a large body of data to bear on this point. Second, his study suggests that the social differences among nations may not be as valuable for political studies as are the psychological differences. The common element in all nationalisms is the identification with the nation, which is a psychological phenomenon. Third, it would be foolhardy to subscribe to an authoritarian pattern of values because the psychological attributes of our own national image are unclear. Lack of clarity may be one of the ways by which our national identification accommodates a variety of individual differences and needs.

Above all, Emerson has made a carefully documented and persuasive plea for empirical inquiry among the new nations, and even in the older nations. The concept of nationalism has been dispassionately examined from many angles and his conclusions are basically favorable to behavioral studies. His main conclusion is summed up in the following statement: "Nationalism by itself gives the answer to virtually none of the particular problems which the development programs pose, and, indeed, to very few of the broad array of questions which confront peoples coming to independence" (p. 370).

To assume a critical posture toward the work of one's generation requires selfless scholarship, and to do it with insight and imagination opens the way for more useful and more suggestive research in the future.

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DEMORALIZATION AND RE-EDUCATION

By ROBERT WAELDER

Theodore H. E. Chen, *Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals*, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1961, 247 pp. $5.00.

Robert Jay Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China*, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1961, 510 pp. $6.75.

Edgar H. Schein, with Inge Schneier and Curtis H. Barker, *Coercive Persuasion: A Socio-Psychological Analysis of the "Brainwashing" of American Civilian Prisoners by the Chinese Communists*, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1961, 320 pp. $6.75.

I

IT was a great shock to the American public to learn that during the Korean War some American prisoners had co-operated with their captors. It was obvious that they had acted under pressure, and it came as a surprise both that helpless prisoners had been subjected to such pressures and that Americans had yielded to them. It had long been taken for granted that prisoners of war would be treated according to the gentleman's code (except, possibly, for isolated outrages). It was overlooked that modern totalitarianism had never recognized the gentleman's code but had denounced it as a fraud, meant to facilitate the exploitation of the masses.

But the shock was greatly intensified when it turned out that some prisoners had not merely co-operated with the enemy but had actually been converted to his creed. While it had always been clear that, from all but a very few, virtually any statement could be obtained under torture—as shown by the history of witch trials—it had been taken for granted that only the hand or the tongue but not the mind could be coerced. "Compulsion by society," as a prominent scientist recently put it, ". . . is powerless to change my private attitudes. A realization of this is part of the armory of self-respect of the individual."[1] That it could be otherwise, that man's thoughts can indeed be coerced within wide limits, was felt as a threat to that armory and as a violation of the inner sanctum of the personality and it conjured up memories of horror stories about hypnotism.

Yet there need have been no surprise. The essence of the matter had not been unknown; Alexis de Tocqueville formulated it in the terse

[1] P. W. Bridgman, *The Way Things Are*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p. 261.

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statement: ". . . nothing comes more naturally to man than to recognize superior wisdom in those who oppress him."[2] More recently, the impact of totalitarianism upon the mind of its subjects had been observed and adequately described. George Orwell, for example, gave a detailed account of it in his novel *Nineteen Eighty-four*, albeit with some artistic exaggeration. His main character, Winston Smith, who had been tortured, ended up by *loving* Big Brother. Orwell showed the main psychic mechanism through which this—to Western minds,[3] paradoxical—result was brought about: in a most extreme situation, facing horrible torture, Smith betrayed the woman whom he loved, by shouting—and shouting with relish, to boot—that she rather than he should be subjected to this ordeal. Thereupon the torturer stopped the procedure, as his purpose—the subject's utter demoralization—had been achieved. Smith had now been completely stripped of any self-respect: he could have only contempt for himself. He could however recuperate, to a degree, if he accepted the tenets of the regime: for then his moral fall became not a betrayal but a necessary, albeit painful, step on the road to salvation.

II

The authors of three recent works on this subject come from different quarters of the scholarly universe. Theodore H. E. Chen is head of a Department of Asiatic Studies; Robert Jay Lifton and Edgar H. Schein have their roots in academic psychiatry and psychology respectively. Chen deals with the thought reform of Chinese intellectuals, Schein with the indoctrination of American civilian prisoners, Lifton with all groups—Western military and civilian prisoners and Chinese literati. Chen treats his subject as a historian, and describes the history of thought reform of scientists and scholars on the basis of available sources, particularly the confessions published in the Chinese press. Lifton and Schein proceed as behavioral scientists; their material is intensive interviews with persons who had been subjected to this re-education.

In the thought reform of educated Chinese, as described by Chen, nobody suffered, or was threatened with, physical harm. Pressure was limited to social pressure: if one wanted to live in China and continue with one's work, one had to make one's peace with the regime.

Thought reform took place in so-called "revolutionary colleges" where the disciples assembled, more or less voluntarily, for the purpose of political "studies." There was constant pressure through criticism

[2] *Oeuvres Complètes*, Paris, 1864ff., I, 2, p. 19 (my translation).
[3] I.e., to the minds of those who have never had to face extreme situations.

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and demand for honest self-criticism, not only for specific misdeeds but for one's total cultural make-up—pressures to purge oneself of one's former self by making comprehensive and humiliating public confessions. Induced to co-operate by their manifest interest, the intellectuals made concessions and, once started on this road, they found it increasingly difficult to turn back. Chen believes that "many intellectuals signed the confessions without complete surrender of their inner selves" and he emphasizes that "the confessions neither broke the spirit nor warped the mind of the intellectuals" (p. 71). His picture is more one of behavioral compliance than of genuine conversion.

With Westerners, as studied by Lifton and Schein, the same demands were buttressed by more or less severe physical pressure. To begin with, the subjects were prisoners unaware of the length of their confinement; they lived under the threat that they might be held indefinitely if they did not co-operate. Then, the continuous pressure of the cellmates, themselves prisoners but in a more advanced stage of Communist rehabilitation, urging the prisoner to struggle against his bourgeois self, to cleanse himself completely of his crimes by comprehensive confessions without mental reservation, leaving him no moment of peace, no time to collect himself, assumed the quality of physical pressure by its physically exhausting persistence.

Finally, a man who showed himself unco-operative might have his legs and hands painfully shackled for weeks, the hands upward in a most uncomfortable position; his cellmates would take care of his elementary physical needs and clean him after defecation. One prisoner was severely injured.

Thought reform, says Lifton, derives "its emotional scope and power" from "the combination of external force or coercion with an appeal to inner enthusiasm through evangelical exhortation" (p. 13). In the process "an adult human being was placed in the position of an infant or a sub-human animal, helplessly being manipulated by larger and stronger 'adults' or 'trainers.' Placed in this regressive stance, each felt himself deprived of the power, mastery and selfhood of adult experience" (p. 67). The subjects are driven to guilt feelings, forced to betray others and themselves: ". . . some degree of self-betrayal is quickly seen as a way to survival. But the more of one's self one is led to betray, the greater is one's involvement with the captors, for by those means they make contact with whatever similar tendencies already exist within the prisoner himself—with the doubts, antagonisms and ambivalences which each of us carries beneath the surface of his loyalties. This bond of betrayal between prisoner and environment may develop to the point

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where it seems to him to be all he has to grasp; turning back becomes ever more difficult" (p. 69).

There is an excellent description of "ideological totalism"—that is, of the Communist way of thinking and operating (Chapter 22)—and many an epigrammatic statement like these: "The Communists . . . did everything to make men fit the image" (p. 236); "The will to orthodoxy requires that men be modified in order to reaffirm the myth" (p. 432); or, the doctrine is called a "blend of counterfeit science and back-door religion" (p. 429).

Schein emphasizes that the development of thought reform by the Chinese Communists represented a much milder way of dealing with the bourgeois intelligentsia than had been employed by the Russian Communists, because it was a policy of salvage and rehabilitation—from the Communist point of view—rather than physical liquidation. This is an important historical insight.

He also points out that re-indoctrination includes three stages: unfreezing (of old beliefs and attitudes), changing, and refreezing. This concept is derived from the treatment in psychoanalytic writing of superego changes in hypnosis and in mass situations, though Schein does not seem aware of this origin. He pays particular attention to the stimulation of social guilt feelings in the process of unfreezing.

Schein finds a person's accessibility to thought reform dependent on a variety of factors, among which are his liability to guilt feelings on account of a privileged social position, the degree of his attachment to a set of values and of his inner-directedness, his acquaintance with Communist operations, his age, and the moral support, or lack of it, provided by the local population. As far as the events during the imprisonment are concerned, he finds that the lenient, slow-moving interrogator was more effective than the harsh one who, while arousing fear, aroused hatred even more.

His data strongly suggest that the constant "struggling" of the cellmates for the prisoner's soul was the most effective weapon of thought reform. He has also some interesting things to say about the released prisoner's attitude toward American society, and his constant checking of Communist predictions against his own subsequent experience.

Schein explains the Communist insistence on general acceptance of Marxism-Leninism in all walks of life by assuming that a "passion for unanimity" is characteristic of totalitarianism, and he proceeds to explain it in terms of demands of the ideology, interests of the leaders, and characteristics of leaders and followers, all subdivided into many categories. But it seems doubtful whether Communist intolerance of devia-

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tion is due to a passion for unanimity *per se*. The various branches of the Christian Church tried to stamp out heresy, not because they saw any special virtue in unanimity as such but, at least as far as conscious motivation is concerned, because they were convinced that they were in possession of absolute truth, and because they believed that heresy was a mortal threat to the Church and to the spiritual health of the community.[4]

We, too, insist on unanimity whenever we are convinced of the correctness of our proposition, and of the perils of disregarding it. We insist that surgery be carried out under aseptic conditions and we would not tolerate doctors or nurses disregarding this rule or encouraging students to disregard it. If the Communists insist on unanimity in many subjects in which we do not, it seems to be due to the fact that they believe they are in possession of absolute truth in these matters—truth that can be disregarded only at grave public peril—while we do not.

It seems regrettable to me that, with Lifton and with Schein, pertinent insight is often embedded in the fashionable theories, or at least the language, of the "struggle for identity." Thus, for example, when a prisoner had to submit repeated confessions until the authorities were satisfied, Lifton speaks of various "confession identities" (p. 80); or, the fact that a successfully resisting clergyman interprets his ordeal to himself in Christian theological terms is called "identity re-enforcement" (Lifton, p. 147); or, people who carry their norms within themselves and are therefore not dependent on approval by others are said to have a "strong sense of identity" (Schein, p. 161). I would see in the first case a series of successive adaptations (more or less deep, more or less superficial); in the second, an attempt to understand the situation, which is a first step toward mastery; in the third, a high degree of internalization of norms. Examples such as these abound in both books. The term "identity" has just the right combination of vagueness and suggestion of profundity to recommend it for wide application.

Lifton and Schein look for situations in our society that contain, in however small doses, the ingredients of brainwashing. Schein deals with re-education in prisons, reformatories, hospitals, religious orders, and the like. Lifton goes farther and looks for analogies in psychotherapy or in the training of psychiatrists in psychoanalytic institutes, situations in which the coercive aspect, if any, is infinitesimal.

There is merit in treating all manifestations of coercive persuasion

[4] Consideration of unconscious factors will add to, or alter, the picture, but it is hardly likely that a passion for unanimity would be added from this point of view.

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together, from the severest to the mildest form of pressure, as they may have common denominators. But it also seems necessary to treat the more severe cases of pressure separately. After all, almost all persuasion has *some* element of coercion, as there is usually one opinion more popular than others and thus some pressure toward adopting it; every persuasion may thus be looked upon as coercive persuasion. Furthermore, response to pressure is not simply proportional to the degree of pressure applied; there is a breaking point for an individual where his response changes in kind, where, as a Marxist might put it, quantity turns into quality. Under very great pressure, men may do things that are alien to them otherwise—for example, betraying their closest friends. In Orwell's novel, the high party official points out that a special study is made in each individual case to determine the one thing that, for that individual, is entirely unbearable.

All in all, the three books are tightly packed with valuable information, and the theoretical perspectives, often illuminating, are always stimulating.

III

It seems to me that in any comprehensive theory of re-education, special consideration should be given to four points:

(1) The relation of coercive persuasion to *moral education*. Child-rearing not only consists of support and protection during the years of maturation and instruction in knowledge and skills, but also requires the implantation of rules of conduct and moral principles. We have in recent times considerably reduced the extent or the articulateness of the rules of conduct that we lay down for our children, and we encourage them to make up their own minds on many more subjects than former generations did. But there remains an irreducible core of implantation and indoctrination. We do not tell a four-year-old child who tries to throw his infant brother out of his crib that he should decide for himself what to do regarding the new arrival; we stop him and enforce our prohibition. And where we want to guide our children toward an autonomous decision of their own, we have to implant the very idea of the desirability of autonomy.

All these rules make up the superego, or conscience; its main building materials are identifications—that is, internalizations of parental commands and prohibitions. What makes this implantation possible is the long period of dependence, physical as well as psychological, of the child on his elders. Thus, the condition of coercive persuasion—that is,

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the combination of psychological influence with overwhelming physical power—exists, naturally and unavoidably, in childhood.

The superego implanted in childhood is subject to revision in later life in the light of growing criticism but, except for extraordinary conditions such as mass situations, such revisions rarely touch its most basic principles.

Moral education of children is therefore *necessarily* similar to coercive persuasion; it is the *prototype*, and coercive persuasion is the *copy*. Coercive persuasion is a re-education of an adult, an attempt to introduce a new set of moral standards in a person in the place of a superego already formed.

From this it can easily be seen that, in brainwashing, the existing structure must first be "unfrozen" before it can be shaped anew. But it also follows that the unfreezing is done by encouraging a partial regression of an individual to attitudes of a child—a process already initiated by the helplessness of an individual in the hands of overwhelming power unrestrained by law and custom, and helped along farther by countless humiliating experiences, from being treated as a sinner and urged to repent, down to the inability of the shackled prisoner to take care of his fundamental bodily needs, which, as with an infant, are attended to by others.

This enforced regression to the psychological condition of a child makes it possible for the already internalized parental authority—which, incidentally, is now shown as unable to protect the prisoner and is therefore partially devalued—to lose its power to the external authorities of the moment, who are subsequently incorporated and become the new inner authority.

If the fundamental relation between moral education in childhood and "brainwashing" is not realized, some pseudo-problems may present themselves. Lifton reports on a seminar attended by the faculty of a girls' college in which the similarities between educational practices and thought reform caused the faculty members some anguished soul-searching. One professor accused the college of being engaged in brainwashing; another protested and claimed innocence; while a third, "facing the continuities [of education] with thought reform . . . as an unavoidable paradox," suggested as a way out a measure of relativism, recommending that educators hold their beliefs "with a certain amount of tension" (p. 443).

But the whole problem is unreal. College education is education of human beings who have as yet not matured and it *must* have elements of indoctrination; even the most liberal and the most skeptical education

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must at least request the acceptance of the liberal faith. There are many who think that there should be more, rather than less, indoctrination of youth with the fundamental values of our civilization if this civilization is to survive. The issue is not that, in our civilization as well as in any other, children are being treated like children; the issue is that in totalitarianism *adults are being treated like children.*

(2) The second point has to do with what to this reviewer seems an overvaluation of the specific techniques employed by the Chinese for the process of thought reform. This reform, I submit, is brought about, to a large extent, by the *impact of the totalitarian climate*, with its combination of mass enthusiasm and all-pervasive terror, with or without special programs and techniques such as those introduced by the Chinese Communists.

The evidence for this contention seems to me to lie in the experience of the Nazi era in Germany. The Nazis had no special re-education program—no revolutionary college, no ritual of public confessions—but after a very few years the great majority of Germans were nonetheless effectively *gleichgeschaltet*—that is, had accepted, in the main, the Nazi ideology. There is no reason to believe that the Chinese have achieved more, or indeed as much.

The thought reform of German civil servants who had stayed on under Hitler was described in 1945 in simple words by the German economist, Wilhelm Roepke: "One persuaded oneself and others that by staying on one's job one could 'prevent worse things from happening,' that one could not permit oneself to be 'passed over,' that 'perseverance' demanded greater sacrifice than withdrawal, that one could not 'desert the fatherland in this grave hour,' and more of the same. But he who had given his little finger to the Nazis soon came to the point of keeping silent where conscience would have required him to speak out, of remaining inactive where an honest man should have acted, of lying and being a hypocrite and doing things that made one a partner in the conspiracy. Then there remained only three possibilities: one could still make up one's mind to break with the regime; or one had to hold oneself in contempt, day in, day out; or one had to try to convince oneself that one had after all been somewhat off the beam in one's original judgment of national socialism. For the first course one had no longer the courage; the second would have been against human nature. So there remained only the third way out and one began to talk of the 'good sides of the regime, which after all were real, too,' of the possibility of a progressive normalization of the regime,

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or of the so-called necessity of supporting the 'decent ones' among the Nazis against the worse elements."[5]

This is the process of yielding under pressure and rationalizing one's concessions in moral terms. The result is a gradual corrosion of one's former moral principles and their gradual replacement by new ones—similar to, though less dramatic than, the story of Orwell's hero.

Under relentless pressure from an overwhelming power which is not content with securing the silent obedience of its subjects but requests genuine faith, those for whom the ruling creed carries no appeal whatever are in the position of travelers from Western civilization who have fallen into the hands of a cruel savage tribe bent on the conversion of its captives. Those for whom some aspects of the creed have at least a partial appeal are in an even more difficult position, as the external enemy has an ally within their own minds. If they render lip-service to the regime, they must constantly take care lest they be found out, and if they collaborate with the regime to the point of acting against their consciences—e.g., by betraying their friends—they must live with guilt and shame. But there is a way out of this predicament by identification with the regime and acceptance of its tenets as correct and just.

(3) The main questions asked by the authors about the conditions of thought reform are perhaps not the only ones that need asking; we should also ask by what means we, in *our* dealing with defendants, succeed in *avoiding* brainwashing.

We are always inclined to accept what is pleasing to us as "normal" and thus not in need of explanation, and to ask for "causes" only in regard to what frustrates us. "Cause" is still largely what it originally was: *aitia*, guilt. Thus, man has asked for a long time about the causes of illness, assuming that health needs no explanation, and we have only recently come to realize that the success of an organism in functioning adequately and in maintaining a sense of well being under the constant onslaught of life is perhaps more wondrous than its occasional, and at last its final, failure. One has studied time and again the causes of war, yet the reasons for strife are not difficult to understand; it would perhaps have been more rewarding to study by what means men have sometimes succeeded in keeping peace over a considerable time. In the same way, we ask for the causes of "brainwashing" because it shocks and frightens us. Yet it is probably the *original* condition between victor

[5] Wilhelm Roepke, *Die deutsche Frage*, 2nd ed., Zurich, 1945, pp. 55f. (my translation). See also Robert Waelder, "Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism," in *Psychoanalysis and Culture*, ed. by George B. Wilbur and Warner Muensterberger, New York, 1951, esp. pp. 189, 192ff.; and Waelder, "Characteristics of Totalitarianism," *Psychoanalytic Study of Society*, 1 (1960), esp. pp. 13ff.

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and vanquished, and part of the surrender of the latter. *Cuius regio, eius religio* has probably been true over most of history. Only through a long moral and legal development have Western societies arrived at an effective protection of the weak against spiritual as well as bodily violence. Among these innovations are laws that limit the power of the state and make its actions predictable within large limits, thereby removing the terror of the unknown; laws, furthermore, that provide the accused with a counsel to whom he can open his heart without fear of betrayal and who will stand at his side, extracting every ounce of advantage from a law heavily weighted in favor of the accused.

(4) Finally, there is the question why we have no information of a prisoner having tried to indoctrinate his captor. The odds, of course, are heavily against the success of such an endeavor and its risks are obvious. Yet, some early Christians are said to have converted their jailors. Perhaps these accounts are legends; but there are well documented reports of this kind in a more recent case—the revolutionary movement in Tsarist Russia.

For example, Sergei Gennadovich Nechaev (1847-1882) was imprisoned in the Peter-Paul Fortress for his participation in the murder of the student Ivanov. He was considered a particularly dangerous prisoner and was held in isolation, his legs and his arms shackled part of the time. Nevertheless, in the course of a check-up after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II (1881), the authorities found that Nechaev, the isolated prisoner, had slowly won over the soldiers of the Guards —sixty-nine of them were arrested—and with their help had established contact with the revolutionary committee outside. Plans for Nechaev's escape from the fortress had been made and might have been carried out had Nechaev not given priority to the assassination of the Tsar.[6]

We see here the unshakable conviction of a fanatical revolutionary as to the rightness of his cause—coupled with complete disregard for life and limb, unimpaired by personal attachments, ever ready to be a "witness" (martyr) for his cause—encountering the feeble beliefs of the defenders of the Tsarist order, beliefs that once had been as powerful as the revolutionary creed was then (or is now) but that had long since lost the power to move the hearts of men.

In Chinese thought reform, however, fanatical belief was on the side of the captors, while the Western beliefs of the prisoners were, in most cases, corroded by ambivalence and doubt. There arises the crucial question whether the ideological softness shown by most Western

[6] Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, New York, 1960, pp. 387f.

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prisoners was only a characteristic of those individuals or an ominous cultural symptom. Perhaps the Western creed—empiricism and pragmatism—skeptical by its very nature, does not lend itself to fanatical devotion. But this is not conclusive; there have been men utterly devoted to the ideal of an autonomous conscience, or to its secular offspring, the ideal of liberty—men for whom these were not negotiable issues. But in our day their number seems to be small. Perhaps liberal empiricism has overreached itself by extending the test of empiricism from questions of fact to the very question of whether there is merit in the dispassionate pursuit of truth; by extending the right, or the need, to question and to doubt from concrete issues to the very desirability of questioning and doubting; by keeping an open mind even to the proposition that there is no need for openness. In one of those logical paradoxes that fascinated Greek thinkers, empiricism and pragmatism may have done away with themselves as the last consequence of their own principles.

Be that as it may: thought reform or coercive persuasion, deriving, as Lifton put it, "its emotional scope and power" from a "combination of external force . . . with an appeal to inner enthusiasm" (p. 13), is a function of both the kind and degree of physical pressures and the individual's reactions to them, and the relation of the existing superego structure to the usurping ideology. It can be effectively resisted only by those who are equipped with the full measure of moral strength and physical fortitude.

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FROM FORT SUMTER TO POLAND

The Question of War Guilt

By LOUIS MORTON

A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, New York, Atheneum, 1962, 296 pp. $4.50.

I

IT is now more than a hundred years since the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, precipitating four years of terrible conflict. Since then, the question of who was responsible for the opening salvo of the Civil War has continued to occupy the attention of publicists, polemicists, politicians, and scholars.

There is no doubt about who fired the first shot; it was the Confederate battery across the channel from Sumter at Fort Johnson. The exact time—4:30 A.M., April 12, 1861—and the circumstances surrounding that event are known almost to the last detail. Nor did Jefferson Davis ever seek to evade or deny his responsibility for the decision that led to the bombardment. But this admission is only the beginning of any inquiry into the question of responsibility. Davis contended then and later that the order to fire on Fort Sumter was necessary as a measure of defense; that Lincoln had provoked the conflict by his refusal to evacuate the fort in Charleston Harbor, the very heart of the Confederacy, and that his effort to send provisions to Major Anderson at Sumter constituted an open act of aggression.

Lincoln supporters deny the charge, but not the facts. The President, they say, was simply trying to maintain the *status quo*. He had promised to send only food to the Sumter garrison, which was nearing the end of its supply, and in doing this he was merely doing his duty as President. He meant to preserve the Union and protect Federal property, but he did not seek war. The choice was the South's, and it made its choice on the morning of April 12, 1861.

Here we have posed sharply the difficult problem of responsibility for the Civil War. There is no question that Lincoln by his decision to send provisions to Fort Sumter presented Davis with a hard choice. Did he do so deliberately to provoke the Confederate leader into firing at Sumter, or was he genuinely seeking to preserve the peace while maintaining the form but not the substance of Federal authority? Did Jefferson Davis actively desire war as the only means to consolidate Confederate

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sentiment in the South and bring Virginia and the wavering border states into the Confederacy? Did Lincoln's effort to feed the starving garrison furnish Davis, therefore, with the pretext he needed to start a war that would save the infant Confederacy?

The arguments on both sides have been repeated endlessly. After a century of historical study, the facts are clear; they have been recounted at considerable length over and over again. The differences are differences in emphasis and interpretation, and it is about these that the debate continues. The fact is that Lincoln and Davis were in much the same position in April 1861. Each wanted peace on his own terms, Southern Independence or Union. The issue had been put by Webster a decade earlier when he said in his much-quoted Seventh of March speech that peaceable secession was an utter impossibility, politically and morally. Given Lincoln's determination to preserve the Union, the South could only hope to achieve independence by force. Even if there had been no Sumter, Lincoln would have had to take some sort of action. Northern sentiment demanded it and the future of the nation depended upon it.

Davis was as determined on independence as Lincoln was on union. So long as the North refused to recognize the Confederacy as an independent nation and maintained forts in the South, his position was untenable. It was rendered more so by Unionist sentiment in the South and by the failure of the border states to come over to his side.

By early April, if not before, war had become inevitable. For Davis there was no turning back; for Lincoln no compromise with union. Both men faced extremists who threatened to take the initiative into their own hands; both calculated the risks of delay. Action would risk war; inaction the cause for which each man stood. But it was Lincoln, not Davis, who broke the deadlock. For by his decision to send provisions to Fort Sumter he presented the Confederate leader with the ultimate choice.

And so we come back to the question that has always plagued students of the Civil War. What did Lincoln intend when he ordered the ships to Charleston Harbor? The answer will probably never be known, for it lies buried in the mind of Lincoln, beyond the reach of curious historians. But there is a larger question here that has broader implications than the guilt of any one man, and that is: What is the significance of this concern with responsibility for war? Is it purely an historical question or does it reflect deeper forces and contemporary issues?

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II

This question of war guilt is an ever-present theme in American history and exercises a fatal fascination for historians. Who fired the first shot at Lexington that lit the tinderbox of the Revolution? Did we go to war with England in 1812 to protect American sailors at sea from impressment, or were our motives less noble? Did Polk send General Taylor into disputed territory deliberately to provoke war with Mexico and thus gain by force what he could not acquire by peaceful means? Did we join Britain and France in 1917 to make the world safe from German domination, to protect the investment of bankers and munitions makers, or because of British propaganda? Did the sinking of the "Lusitania" merely furnish the pretext for a decision already made?

World War II provides only the most recent example of this tendency to pin the guilt for war on a single man, actuated by ulterior purposes. The United States had scarcely emerged from that war when revisionist historians began to re-examine the events that had led to Pearl Harbor. The result was strikingly similar to the revisionist view of the attack on Fort Sumter. In its simplest form, the thesis may be stated as follows: President Roosevelt maneuvered Japan into attack by diplomatic and economic pressure, withheld vital information from Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and deliberately kept the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor against the advice of Admiral Richardson to invite attack and so bring the American people into the war united behind the Administration. Pearl Harbor, from this point of view, may be termed President Roosevelt's Sumter.

Even if it was not good history, this interpretation found wide acceptance because it served several purposes. For Roosevelt's political enemies it provided a convenient weapon to use against the late President and his party. Isolationists, who wished to withdraw from the complexities and dangers of leadership in the nuclear age, found in it support for their own views. Anglophobes and pro-German groups took comfort in it, for it affirmed their belief that the United States had been the victim of British deceit and propaganda as in 1917.

In addition to the political and ideological causes it may serve, revisionism reflects a moral concern with the overt act of aggression and a deep-felt need to justify the ultimate resort to force. National interest is not enough to justify war, for in the American view war is justifiable only in self-defense against attack. An open act of aggression, no matter how just the cause, brands the aggressor and fixes the guilt. Thus, the opening blow of the war assumes a significance scarcely warranted in

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the sequence of events that led to the war. For Americans, therefore, it is a matter of prime importance to believe that the overt act was defensive and not aggressive.

The moral anxiety displayed by Americans toward the use of force has, it would seem, placed the issue of war guilt in a moral rather than a political setting. In the belief that war is evil, no matter what the cause, and that no objective can justify resort to force except in self-defense, American historians have shown infinite patience and endless ingenuity in their efforts to establish responsibility for the first blow. The position of the United States today with regard to preventive and pre-emptive war illustrates this principle vividly. "Our arms will never be used to strike the first blow in any attack," said President Kennedy in his special message to Congress on the Defense budget in January 1961. ". . . It is our national tradition." And it is not without significance that the present military policy of the United States is to develop and maintain a nuclear *retaliatory* force—i.e., a force capable of striking the enemy after he has hit us first. Or that American strategy, in military parlance, is called a second-strike strategy, as distinguished from a first-strike strategy.

III

Americans are not alone in their concern over the morality of force and responsibility for war. Other nations share this concern and their histories reflect the need for justification, whether on moral, political, or emotional grounds. Certainly the Germans, who were officially branded the aggressors after World War I, viewed the events that led to the war in a different light from the French and British. And when their historians began to write the history of that period, they found the Allies less innocent than had been thought. Some British and American historians began also to revise the existing interpretation of the war, criticizing the policies of their own government and questioning the reasons for going to war. On the German side, there was a practical aspect to this rewriting of history. For if it could be demonstrated that Germany was not guilty of starting the war, then the punitive clauses of the Versailles Treaty could be attacked as unjust as well as unwise. The revisionist historians on the Allied side had their own reasons for challenging the accepted view of Germany's war guilt. Thus, the decade of the 1920's and 1930's witnessed a continuing historical debate over the causes of World War I, a debate conducted in an atmosphere of general disillusion with war and economic depression.

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Revisionist writing after World War II was confined to the United States and concerned itself almost exclusively with the events that led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The only question was the extent to which President Roosevelt was responsible for America's entry into the war. Responsibility for the war that began in Europe in 1939 received little attention from the revisionists, who, like most historians, accepted the standard interpretation that the conflict was brought on by the egomaniac Hitler with his plan for world conquest—a judgment that was, or seemed to be, amply confirmed by the mass of evidence accumulated at the Nuremberg Trials.

Fixing the guilt for World War II on Hitler was, in many ways, a most satisfying explanation of the origins of the war, and there was little disposition in the United States or abroad to question it, especially as the prospect of a third and more horrible world war appeared increasingly likely. Hitler's guilt fixed responsibility clearly. It was a simple explanation that could be understood and accepted by everyone. It placed the responsibility on one man, a madman who was now dead and therefore in no position to affirm his innocence. This interpretation also confirmed the immediate prewar policies of the Allied war leaders and concealed any errors of judgment they may have made. It absolved the German people of blame not only for the war but for all the atrocities of the Hitler regime. And it satisfied Germany's former allies because they could claim that Hitler forced them to do what they did. Even the diehard American revisionists could take solace from this thesis, for it explained how the United States had become involved in the European war. No sane German statesman would have declared war on the United States after the Pearl Harbor attack. Only a madman like Hitler could have done so.

This version of events has stood virtually unchallenged from 1939 until this past year when the distinguished and controversial British historian, A.J.P. Taylor, undertook to provide a different explanation of the origins of the war. An authority on modern German history not noted for his sympathetic treatment of the Germans, Professor Taylor asserts that Hitler's war guilt is a myth, that the Nuremberg records are a lawyer's brief and not to be trusted, and that the war was the result very largely of the blunders of Western statesmen. Hitler, according to this interpretation, far from being a madman, was merely a traditional German statesman seeking to restore Germany to its "natural" position in Europe. To do so, he had to destroy the system created at Versailles—a system, says Taylor, that "lacked moral validity from the start" (p. 28), and

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had no basis in the realities of the European balance of power. Thus, in seeking lost German territory, Hitler was only righting a moral wrong and doing what was politically necessary. He had no long-range plan for war, no blueprint for world conquest. After all, says Taylor, "statesmen are too absorbed by events to follow a preconceived plan. They take one step, and the next step follows from it" (p. 69). And Hitler was no different from other political leaders; he simply took advantage of the "objective" situation in Europe.

In Taylor's interpretation of the events that led to World War II, Hitler is pictured as a passive instrument reacting to external pressures. He did not desire annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, or war with Poland. These measures were forced on him by events—the objective situation—and the policies pursued by Germany's enemies. It was Schuschnigg, not Hitler, who provoked the Austrian crisis; the Sudeten Nazis, independent of Hitler, who provoked the Czech crisis; the intransigent Poles who brought on the Polish crisis. The Munich Settlement in Taylor's version was not appeasement but wise recognition of Germany's rightful claim, "a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life" (p. 189). That it did not save Czechoslovakia was not Hitler's fault or Neville Chamberlain's; it was the Czechs who forced Hitler to occupy Prague. Similarly, in the Polish crisis, Hitler wanted merely to right the wrong of Versailles in the matter of Danzig. He sought not war with the Poles, only friendship, and the proof of this, says Taylor, can be found in Germany's inadequate military strength, which in 1939 was far from sufficient to carry out the conquest of Europe. Even the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, we are told, was intended by Hitler to prevent war, not to prepare for it. But the French and British, acting irrationally, refused to be dissuaded by the pact and gave Poland their support. The war that followed, concludes Taylor, "far from being premeditated, was a mistake, the result on both sides of diplomatic blunders" (p. 219).

This, in brief, is Professor Taylor's thesis. It is powerfully argued, brilliantly written, and always persuasive. Whether it is good history is another matter. Already it has come under a strong attack from some of the most eminent historians in Britain as "utterly erroneous," a distortion of history, a perversion of the evidence, irresponsible and a disgrace to the profession of historian. Most historians will want to weigh the evidence carefully and examine Mr. Taylor's assumptions and methods (which are certainly open to question) before accepting his thesis. In the final analysis, however, the strength of revisionist writing depends less on historical accuracy than on deep-felt needs to explain the

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past in terms of present problems. Taylor's thesis strikes the same chord and has the same moral and political implications as the revisionist writing after World War I. Germany is no longer the major power of Europe seeking to assert its natural weight in affairs. The Soviet Union has taken its place, and the Germans are now British allies. German troops assigned to NATO are being trained in England and the Berlin crisis raises the possibility of armed intervention on behalf of the Germans. If World War II was a diplomatic blunder for which the Western powers must bear a fair share of the blame, as Taylor says, then perhaps Germany deserves the support of its former enemies. Certainly no one wishes to repeat the blunders of 1939, if, indeed, the war was the result of a blunder.

The question of responsibility for World War II has other implications for our own time and Mr. Taylor's volume may mark the beginning of a rewriting of the history of the period preceding the war. Already it has given support to the neo-Nazi movement in Germany and will undoubtedly find a sympathetic hearing among similar groups in other countries, including the United States. One can expect also that the judgment of Nuremberg will be sharply challenged, as was the Versailles verdict after World War I. And if we must revise our picture of Hitler, as Taylor says, then will not the next step be to adjust our image of Stalin, and perhaps also of Khrushchev? If Hitler had no blueprint for conquest (notwithstanding *Mein Kampf* and the Hossbach Memorandum), then, to follow Taylor's reasoning, how much weight should we attach to Khrushchev's claim that he will bury capitalism? If Hitler was only acting under the pressure of events to secure for Germany only what was right and just, may not Khrushchev be taken as merely a Russian version of the German model? How then shall we treat with him? Shall we take his claims of world conquest seriously and oppose him as we did Hitler, and thus, as in 1939, blunder into a world war? Or shall we give him what he asks in the belief that he (like Hitler) is merely a traditional statesman seeking his country's natural rights? In a sense, this is the central question of our time, and the answer to it may depend partly on our reading of history.

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DETERRENCE, DEFENSE, AND DISENGAGEMENT

By GLENN H. SNYDER

B. H. Liddell Hart, *Deterrent or Defense*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960, 257 pp. $4.95.
Eugene Hinterhoff, *Disengagement*, London, Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1959, 445 pp. 45s.

I

PERHAPS the central dilemma in national security policy is how to reconcile the obvious potency of nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence with their dubious utility as instruments of defense—i.e., for fighting a war at tolerable cost in case deterrence should fail. In pre-nuclear days, deterrence was more or less a function of an efficient capacity for defense, but with the new technology deterrence may be accomplished with capabilities and threats that do not correspond to the capabilities and strategies most suitable for rational military action. This dichotomy forms the leading theme of *Deterrent or Defense*, by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, one of Britain's leading military analysts. The book is a collection of articles written mostly during the past three or four years, and concerned chiefly with military problems of NATO. As in many books of this sort, the articles overlap to some extent and are not always consistent. Leaving aside the inconsistencies for the moment, Liddell Hart's basic position can be stated briefly. Strategic nuclear airpower is useful for *deterring* an all-out nuclear attack on the United States or a full-scale conventional assault on Western Europe. But it has no value whatever for purposes of *defense*, because the inevitable result of the actual use of such weapons is simply "mutual suicide." Even though it would be "lunacy" for the United States to initiate thermonuclear war in response to a Soviet attack in Europe, the Russians' fear of such a response probably is still strong enough to deter them from all but limited actions. Hence, the major problem facing NATO is to develop an effective non-suicidal defense against limited aggression. The book's greatest merit lies in its contribution to the solution of this problem.

In its cursory treatment of the problem of the "central war," this book contrasts sharply with the recent output of American scholars, with their complex analyses of such topics as retaliatory and counter-

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force strategies, first-strike and second-strike forces, pre-emptive war, bargaining, limited retaliation, and the like. Liddell Hart is a "minimum deterrence" man, pure and simple. Although the "prime requirement" is to maintain a deterrent against all-out attack, in his view this is a fairly easy task. Moreover, deterrence is everything; no attention needs to be given to "the now futile and obsolete aim of winning a war" (p. 64). Planning for such a war is "nonsensical" because the chaos would be so great within a few hours after an attack that the war could not continue in any organized sense. Since only a small number of H-bombs could inflict overwhelming destruction, and thus are sufficient to deter, great savings can be made in strategic bombing forces. Substantial economies also can be made by "cutting out preparations and stockpiling for a long war of the old unlimited kind" (*ibid.*).

Liddell Hart recognizes that if a limited attack were not quickly defeated, it could expand, without intention by either side, into all-out war. Hence, "tactics, movement, formations and organizations must always be adaptable to the possibility that nuclear weapons may suddenly be used" (*ibid.*). Now, it is hard to see, if a small war may expand into all-out war, and if tactical preparations must take account of this contingency, why preparations to fight the war at the strategic level are "out of date." Even if it be true that a "minimum deterrent" can effectively deter a massive Soviet first strike, we must still be able to fight the Russians on equal or better terms in a strategic nuclear war that occurs through escalation. That this is the most likely way in which an all-out war would occur is the most damaging argument against the minimum deterrent thesis. Remarkably little analysis has been devoted to the nature of warfare that might develop out of the spiraling process and to the force requirements for fighting such a war, but it does seem clear that reliance on a minimum strategic deterrent capability would leave us well short of the forces to fight it effectively. The escalation process might conceivably stop at the tactical nuclear level, but there is at least a strong possibility that it could develop either into a "slow-motion" strategic war involving limited nuclear strikes against the homelands of the United States and the USSR, or into an all-out war, through a gradual intensification of the limited strategic battle. In either case, there would be a need for strategic forces to destroy missile bases, air bases, and other strategic and tactical targets in the Soviet Union, to gain the advantage in the rate of attrition, and to pose a threat of further destruction powerful enough to bargain the Soviets into terminating the war and accepting settlement on our terms. Such forces must be *in addition to* the minimum deterrent forces, for the

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latter must at all times be reserved to deter an ultimate Soviet decision to launch a massive strike.

Although doubts creep into his argument at various points, Liddell Hart is fairly confident that "the Western Powers' capacity for nuclear retaliation should suffice to deter Russia from launching a large-scale invasion of free Europe" (p. 55). Here, he apparently contradicts himself. For, with only the small quantity of nuclear weapons that he says are required for deterrence of a massive nuclear assault, how can the United States credibly threaten a first strike in response to a ground invasion of Western Europe? The notions of "minimum deterrence" and "credible first-strike capability" are logically incompatible. Liddell Hart expresses strong doubt that the United States actually would precipitate all-out war to defend Europe; any attempt to annul Russia's power to retaliate would be like trying to "pick out needles in a haystack." In his view, the logical difficulty is offset by Soviet "uncertainty" about the United States' resolve and by the "hope" that the men in the Kremlin will take account of "emotional reactions" on the Western side. No doubt these are important deterrent factors, but, lacking the support of a strong strategic first-strike capability, they do not justify the degree of confidence that Liddell Hart professes.

The book makes its most valuable contribution in its discussion of the forces and tactics appropriate to deterring and defending against a sudden Russian "pounce" on some small sector of NATO territory. Here Liddell Hart brings to bear his profound and unequaled command of the concrete details of military organization and tactics. Such a limited attack, he says, is the most serious challenge that the NATO ground forces must be prepared to meet, since larger-scale aggressions probably would be deterred by the capacity for nuclear retaliation. At most, the Russians could use only 40 divisions for such a surprise move —the 20 divisions now deployed in East Germany, plus 20 more that they could bring up stealthily without alerting the West. Utilizing the inherent advantage of the defense, NATO could hold its own against such a force with about 26 divisions, provided they were mobile and flexible and deployed in the optimum manner. Thus only a small further effort, in terms of numbers, is required to bring the NATO shield capability up to its necessary strength. A much more serious problem, in Liddell Hart's opinion, is the qualitative nature of the shield forces. These forces are preponderantly heavily armed infantry divisions, requiring a long "tail" of non-combat personnel. They are inherently less mobile than light infantry divisions and more wasteful of manpower. Their mobility is further hampered by the use of short-

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term conscripts. Much more appropriate for meeting a sudden limited attack would be a force composed of light infantry divisions to quench a local outbreak of "fire" before it spreads, and armored divisions to repel a sudden thrust by mechanized forces. Half of the total force would be deployed forward—10 divisions on the German front and three on the mountainous Czech border. The other 13 divisions would be deployed as a mobile reserve capable of rushing quickly to the point of attack and blocking enemy penetrations. All these forces should be composed of long-term professionals. Their strength could be reduced to 20 divisions by the creation of a citizen militia, manning a deep network of defense posts in the forward zone.

A shield of this nature and size could promptly check a surprise attack, and if it were checked, Liddell Hart believes, it would be unlikely to be reinforced and continued, for further persistence in attack would subject the Soviets to serious risk of a nuclear response. Moreover, even if the Soviets did decide to continue, the maximum strength that they could reach even after a month would be 60 divisions, which could be held with a NATO force of 40 divisions. Under present arrangements, NATO could reach such a capability in a month of mobilization.

Liddell Hart's shield force of 26 divisions probably could fulfill the purpose prescribed for it—blocking a sudden thrust by the Soviet forces in East Germany. But surely this is not the only contingency that NATO must face. The Russians may not be deterred from a full-scale invasion of Western Europe by fear of a massive nuclear response. A small incursion might expand into a large-scale attack without triggering nuclear war; then it would be desirable to have large conventional forces for defense at tolerable cost. Russian effective ground forces probably are considerably lower than the 175 divisions often mentioned, but we must reckon with the possibility that, given time to fill out skeleton divisions, the Soviets could bring considerably more than 60 divisions to bear on the central front; 100 would seem closer to the mark. Moreover, they are reputed to be able to mobilize up to 300 divisions from reserves in fairly short order. Using Liddell Hart's defensive-offensive ratio of 2:3, these figures would imply a ready NATO shield in the neighborhood of 60 divisions, plus a capacity to match on a 2:3 basis the Soviet rate of reserve mobilization.

Finally, Liddell Hart's estimate is based on the assumption that NATO forces will always be on the defensive. But if the attacker has the advantage of surprise, he is usually able to make initial gains. Then it becomes necessary for the defender to counterattack. In the counterattack the "advantage of the defense" rests with the original attacker.

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Moreover, situations may arise requiring NATO to take the *initial* military action—e.g., a Soviet or East German blockade of the ground access routes to Berlin.

Liddell Hart adds his voice to the swelling chorus of analysts who deplore the heavy reliance on tactical nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. He doubts that such weapons inherently favor the defensive side; although the attacker must disperse to avoid presenting a nuclear target, the defender must disperse too, thereby reducing the extent to which the attacker must concentrate to achieve a penetration. NATO depends on seaports for reinforcement, and ports are excellent nuclear targets. Control of small-yield weapons must be decentralized, but such weapons in the hands of low-level units create serious risks of accidental or unauthorized use. Whatever logistical and economic advantages accrue from reliance on tactical nuclears are lost in any attempt to maintain a dual capability, and a dual capability must be preserved. There is serious risk that a tactical nuclear war would expand to all-out war.

While opposed to the *use* of tactical nuclear weapons as a means of defense against conventional attack, Liddell Hart recognizes that they are necessary as a deterrent to their use by the Soviets. He argues, however, that they must be assigned only to special detachments, kept "high up the sleeve" and directly subject to high-level political-military control, in order to reduce the risk of their accidental use. Line units must not become so dependent on such weapons that they are unable to operate effectively in non-nuclear combat.

Liddell Hart denies that tactical nuclear weapons have any value for deterring Soviet conventional attacks; the Russians' knowledge of NATO's belief that tactical nuclear warfare could not be limited would encourage them to feel they could go a long way in non-nuclear provocation before NATO would dare take nuclear action of any kind. However, this argument cuts both ways, for the Russians' fear of spiraling should restrain them from gambling too much on NATO's timidity. One may contend, just as cogently, that the primary function of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe today is to make credible the threat of all-out war in response to a major Soviet conventional move, and thus to deter such a move. If the Russians believe that NATO *may be* committed to a tactical nuclear response to all but small-scale challenges, and if they really believe their own assertions that a tactical nuclear war could not be kept limited, they may be deterred just as effectively as if the United States possessed an excellent strategic first-strike force. Perhaps more so, for they must recognize that it would be a much easier decision for the United States to initiate tactical nuclear warfare than

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deliberately to make a strategic first strike. Tactical nuclear weapons "build a bridge," so to speak, between the deterrent qualities of limited conventional forces and those of the "big deterrent." This does not mean, however, that such weapons are a better means of deterrence than a fully adequate conventional force. On balance, their value as a deterrent is overwhelmed by their disutility as a means of defense—by the enormous risk that *if* war should occur, their use would set in motion a chain of events leading to all-out war.

The richness of *Deterrent or Defense* in matters of tactical detail more than offsets its superficiality and inconsistency in the realm of high nuclear strategy. Liddell Hart has many interesting and valuable things to say about such subjects as the use of gas, amphibious forces, the ratio of force to space, the future of tanks, and the value of night action. He analyzes incisively the weaknesses of NATO's Scandinavian and Middle Eastern flanks. In a highly informative chapter, he advocates a return to gas as a substitute for tactical atomic weapons; gas favors the defense, it does not risk mutual suicide, and it is more humane than conventional high-explosive weapons. In World War I, gas took men out of action as effectively as bullets, yet a man disabled by gas had 10 or 12 times as much chance of recovery as a man hit by a bullet or shell fragment. The prohibition of gas after the war was chiefly an emotional revulsion against a novel weapon, not a reasoned conclusion based on the facts of war experience.

II

Captain Eugene Hinterhoff's book is a useful survey of the various proposals for disengagement in Europe, with an analytical commentary on both the proposals and the standard objections to them, and is capped by the author's own disengagement plan. Its strength lies in the meticulous detail with which he has presented the proposals from both sides of the Iron Curtain, from both official and unofficial sources. For this reason, it is truly an indispensable reference work for all those who would tackle the problem of how to end the dangerous deadlock in Central Europe.

Its weakness stems from the author's own partisanship. Hinterhoff is a strong advocate of disengagement and the skeptics may well question his objectivity. He deals rather summarily with some of the arguments against disengagement and avoids others altogether. For instance, he does not explain how German neutrality would square with Germany's membership in the Common Market and the other institutions of

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"united Europe," or whether these institutions could survive and prosper without German participation. He seems overoptimistic about Russia's willingness to evacuate Eastern Europe if, as he asserts, these countries would then immediately throw off their Communist regimes and become defense outposts of the West. He fails to make explicit his underlying assumption that the Soviets are more concerned about security than about ideological expansion, a necessary condition for Russian acceptance of disengagement, but one that certainly cannot be taken for granted.

Hinterhoff's own proposal calls for the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and the evacuation of NATO forces from West Germany. These countries would have their own limited, non-nuclear armed forces. They would accept a status of "military non-alignment" as between East and West but would be allowed to form defensive alliances among themselves. NATO forces would take up new positions elsewhere in Western Europe. Both the redeployment of foreign troops and the limitations on indigenous forces would be subject to international control and inspection.

The neutrality and territorial integrity of the countries concerned would be guaranteed by the great powers in a European Security Pact. Any re-entry of foreign troops, whether or not at the invitation of a local government, would be considered a violation of the Pact and would bring sanctions into play. Germany would be unified, apparently (although Hinterhoff is not clear about this) through some combination of free elections and the Soviet-sponsored confederation scheme, under United Nations supervision. The question of the German-Polish boundary would be settled and guaranteed by the signatories of the Pact.

The plan is well-drafted, drawing upon what Hinterhoff considers to be the best aspect of plans proposed by others. Unfortunately, it lacks political feasibility; any chance that the Soviets would accept such a scheme seems remote at best. We are reminded by Hinterhoff's survey that between 1952 and 1955 the Russians offered disengagement plans similar to this; the author asserts that they would have accepted any face-saving formula for getting out of Eastern Europe during their embarrassment in the fall of 1956. Whether or not we can interpret these earlier offers as genuine negotiating bids, it is clear that since 1956 the Russians' price has gone up. Lately they have been demanding the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and the dismantling of all "foreign bases." They are bent on firmly consolidating Communist rule in Eastern Europe, as amply evidenced by their Berlin demands and their strong support of the East German regime.

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In broad terms, there are two other variants of disengagement that might be politically feasible—i.e., acceptable to the Russians. One is a reciprocal withdrawal from Germany alone. The other is an evacuation of Soviet and American forces from all of Europe. The Soviets might become so disillusioned with the congenital weakness of the East German satellite that they would be willing to sacrifice it in return for a Western withdrawal plus German neutrality. It has been generally assumed that a mutual withdrawal from Germany alone would be a bad bargain for the West, since it would be evacuating much more territory than would the Soviets and there is no assurance that the NATO defense apparatus could be reconstituted west of Germany. Yet there are compensating factors. A united and armed Germany would contribute substantially to the defense of the West, even though its formal ties with NATO were severed. The unification of Germany and the consequent solution of the Berlin dilemma would be a major political gain. The Soviets undoubtedly would insist that unification be achieved via negotiations between the two German states, but the results of such negotiations need not be as detrimental to the West as is often feared. The fear that Communist participation in the government of a federated Germany would lead eventually to a Communist takeover of the whole shows remarkably little confidence in the strength of the democratic institutions of West Germany. Admittedly, there are risks in establishing a united, powerful Germany free from alliance restraints, but there are also risks in attempting to preserve the status quo. The danger of a deal between Germany and the Soviet Union would be much reduced if Germany were strong and if, as part of the settlement, Germany could be induced to relinquish its aspirations for the trans-Oder-Neisse territories. The problem of relocating American, British, and Canadian forces west of Germany is a difficult one, given the attitude of General de Gaulle, but there is a possibility at least that they could be stationed in the Low Countries, Britain, and Spain. Certainly any such relocation would entail drastic revisions in NATO organization and plans. Nevertheless, this type of settlement should not be rejected out of hand.

The second alternative involves much greater concessions by both sides. Would the withdrawal of the Soviet army inside Russian borders be worth the sacrifice of the American military presence in Europe? A case can be made for the affirmative. The day may soon arrive when intercontinental missiles can replace American strategic air bases and missile sites in Europe and on its periphery. In the past, a major function of the American ground forces in Europe was to act as a "trip-wire" to

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detonate "massive retaliation." But the trip-wire is rapidly being de-fused by the Soviet acquisition of a strong retaliatory capability, so this function is now obsolescent. A second function has been to provide the tactical nuclear capability to deter and defend against a large-scale Russian ground attack. It has become increasingly clear, however, that to initiate the use of such weapons carries no advantage for the West, although, if American forces are withdrawn, some way must be found to provide the Europeans with a nuclear capability to *deter* a tactical nuclear attack by the Soviets, short of an East-West agreement to dispense with such weapons. A third function has been simply to assure the West Europeans that the United States would fight in their behalf. This function is still valid and is not to be lightly disregarded. Surely there is a danger that a complete withdrawal of American forces from Europe, or even a partial withdrawal, would instill a belief in the Europeans that the United States had reverted to a policy of isolationism, and prompt them to make their peace with the Soviet Union on whatever terms they could get. However, these fears might be offset in some degree by the fact that the Soviet Union would be in a much less threatening position, and they could be assuaged by an explicit pledge by the United States to re-enter the moment the Soviets re-entered Eastern Europe.

The fourth function of the U.S. ground troops has been simply to contribute to Western Europe's defense capabilities. If the five U.S. divisions were withdrawn, the Europeans probably could raise equivalent forces, with U.S. military aid. But the important question is whether the present and planned NATO conventional capability in Europe is any longer sufficient, and if it is not, whether the European countries by themselves could raise the *larger* conventional forces that are now required in view of the declining effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Disengagement presumably would reduce this requirement, by moving the Red Army several hundred miles to the eastward, by establishing a united and powerful Germany as a first line of defense, and by creating a belt of neutral Eastern European states as an armed *glacis*. The Western European economies are now strong enough to support a substantially increased military effort. Yet it should not be assumed, without careful study, that the Europeans could create the necessary strength without intolerable political and economic strain, especially since disengagement probably would mean losing the benefits of military integration.

On balance, total disengagement is worth serious consideration as a long-run solution. But it would have to be preceded by less drastic

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measures, and whether it would ultimately be acceptable to the West may depend on whether it is accompanied by some degree of conventional disarmament by the Soviet Union, and the nuclear armament of the West European countries.

A third possibility is some type of arms control in Central Europe, with Soviet and NATO ground forces remaining "engaged" and with Germany remaining divided. The most attractive variant on this theme is a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, repeatedly proposed by Poland and the Soviet Union. If it is correct that tactical nuclear weapons provide no defensive advantage to the West, the risks of agreeing to this proposal do not seem prohibitive, and the gain in reducing the risk of all-out war could be substantial. One of the gravest dangers in the existing situation is that of the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons by a lower-level military commander in some minor fracas. Denial of nuclear weapons to the front-line units would largely remove this danger. There is the chance, of course, that nuclear weapons based outside the area might be used inside it in case of conflict—Hinterhoff, incidentally, is too optimistic when he says this would be barred by prior agreement. But at least such a decision could hardly be accidental. A nuclear-free zone would remove the Soviets' fears of a nuclear-armed Germany and perhaps make them more willing to compromise on the issue of German unification. Experience gained in control and inspection of such a zone could be a stepping-stone to wider measures of arms control.

A drawback to this scheme is that it would mean discriminating against West Germany or a unified Germany. If possession of, or access to, nuclear weapons becomes the symbol of great-power status, Germany would not willingly accept being placed in a position of permanent inferiority. This objection would be overcome if the zone were extended to include the whole of Europe. This would be tantamount to total tactical nuclear disarmament, with the United States and the Soviet Union agreeing to limit themselves to strategic weapons and not to disburse tactical weapons to their allies. Such an agreement would remove one of the objections to total disengagement—the loss of the deterrent to Soviet tactical nuclear action resulting from the withdrawal from Europe of the United States nuclear-armed forces.

Total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons may be the most valuable form of arms control that is within reach today. The most likely way in which World War III could start is through the gradual escalation of a limited war. Dispensing with tactical nuclears would remove the "bridge" between limited conventional war and all-out

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nuclear war, vastly reducing the chances of an uncontrollable spiral. By reducing the possibility of a "slow-motion" strategic war, it would add cogency to the thesis of "minimum" or "finite" deterrence and reduce pressures for an arms race in strategic weapons. If the United States can break from the dubious dogma that tactical nuclear weapons are indispensable to redress the imbalance in conventional power between East and West, such an agreement may well be attainable, since the Soviets hold no special brief for small atomic weapons.

There is no more urgent item on the world's agenda than solving the dangerous problems of Central Europe. Even if the current Berlin crisis is patched up by measures short of German unification, it cannot be resolved permanently except in the context of unification and disengagement. A new disengagement debate is overdue. Captain Hinterhoff's book provides invaluable materials and guidelines for such a debate.

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